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The ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, prompted in part by the sheer scale of those 
fleeing the conflict in Syria, elicited mixed responses from the public, media, 
and governments of Germany and the USA. Narratives of fear arose within 
various clusters of both societies, with xenophobic and racist sentiments 
directed towards the bodies of refugees. I argue that these narratives are 
created and sustained by a collective cultural emotional residuum of fear that 
exists in certain silos of the societies of Germany and the United States. Fear is 
accretive - it extends and perpetuates itself. The narratives of fear that 
surround refugees in both nations between 2015-2019 stem from cultural 
fears that have been built up over generations. By examining key political and 
social moments within the histories of each nation, I suggest that these fears 
take on certain patterns and topoi, which dictate responses to cultural and 
social ‘others’ throughout time - and that reactions towards refugees represent 
the latest ‘other’ created and targeted by these fears. The historical narratives 
examined all arose at times of vast social and cultural change. I argue that 
these narratives of fear of refugees are an expression of the uncertainty 
created by the dissolution of ‘traditional’ boundaries and identities 
experienced within neoliberal globalisation, and are a symptom of the 
movement towards nationalism and right-wing populism across the globe. It 
is suggested that fear has gained such traction within certain pockets of both 
societies, because shared emotion provides sites of belonging, within a system 




I would like to thank my supervisor Dr Gregory Rawlings, for his support, 
interest, insight, and patience. Thanks also to the University of Otago 
Anthropology department, and the University of Otago, for the Masters 
Scholarship that enabled the start of this thesis. 
 
To Bobby, thanks always for your love. 
 
Thanks to Kiersten-Anna, our life-long friendship is such a gift. 
 
Lastly, thanks to my parents, Tushar and Anthony. 
When fear threatens to overwhelm my worldview, 
I need only look to you both, to be reminded of how to proceed 
instead,  
with kindness. 
















Fear: Mapping the Emotional Landscape ................................... 13 
Fear and the Other: Fear with a Face ........................................................ 19 
Narrative .................................................................................. 24 
Refugees: Some Definitions ...................................................... 28 
Citizenship ................................................................................................. 30 
Anthropology and Refugee Studies ........................................................... 33 
The Refugee Crisis: 2015 and Beyond ....................................................... 35 
Chapter	3:	Historical	Narratives	of	Fear	.................................................................	39	
Narratives of Fear in Germany ................................................. 39 
Folk Tales and Morality: The Brothers Grimm ......................................... 39 
Nazi Germany: The Rise of Propaganda, and ‘International Jewry’ ........ 48 
Further Internal Divisions: The Second Berlin Crisis and the Erection of 
the Berlin Wall ........................................................................................... 58 
Narratives of Fear in the USA ................................................... 69 
Captivity Narratives and ‘Savage Indians’: Colonialism and the Seeds of 
Systematic Racialisation in North America .............................................. 69 
Paternalism and Proslavery in the Antebellum South .............................. 78 
Post 9/11 Rhetoric: The Speeches of President Bush, and the 
Crystallisation of the Muslim ‘Enemy’ ...................................................... 87 
Chapter	4:	Narratives	of	Fear	of	Refugees	..............................................................	96	
Mass Media and the (Re)creation of Social Fears ...................... 96 
Social Media: New Frontiers? .................................................. 103 
Narratives in Germany ............................................................ 110 
Narratives in the USA .............................................................. 122 
The Collective Cultural Emotional Residuum of Fear .............. 134 
Chapter	5:	Conclusion:	Globalisation,	Collective	Emotion	and	the	Search	for	
Identity	and	Meaning	..................................................................................................	143	
Neoliberal Globalisation and the Softening of the Nation State 143 
Ontological Insecurity and Existential Anxiety ........................ 145 
Fear and Power ....................................................................... 148 






Chapter 1 | Introduction 
	 1	
Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 2015 Germany opened its borders to one million refugees, mainly fleeing 
the civil war in Syria. In 2016 the United States elected Donald Trump as 
President, a man who had promised to ‘build a wall’ on the US southern 
border. These two reactions, (arguably on opposite ends of the spectrum) in a 
world in the midst of a ‘refugee crisis’ solicited mixed responses from the 
public of both nations, with narratives filled with racist and xenophobic 
sentiments circulating and sticking to the bodies of refugees in both the USA 
and Germany.  I suggest that these narratives create, and are created by a 
collective cultural emotional residuum of fear that exists in various narrative 
clusters of German and United States society. This thesis is about the cultural 
exegesis of these narratives of fear. These fears feed off of their own 
antecedent pasts, preconditioning reactions to cultural ‘others’. 
 
The increase in narratives of fear surrounding refugees in German and North 
American public discourse was triggered partially in response to the large 
number of people fleeing the conflict in Syria, which has been labelled as a 
refugee ‘crisis’. Conflict in Syria (which began in earnest in the spring of 2011 
as an upsurge of resistance to Bashar al-Assad’s regime) would displace an 
estimated 7.6 million people internally, and 3.7 million fled the country by 
2014 (Ostrand 2015:255).  
 
In 2013, Syria became the main country of origin of asylum seekers, with an 
estimated 56,400 requesting refugee status in Europe, North America, and the 
Asia Pacific region. In 2014, the number of Syrian asylum seekers in the 44 
‘industrialized’ ‘Western’ countries reached 149,600, which is the highest 
number recorded by a single group since 1992 (Ostrand 2015: 256). By the 
end of 2014, Germany and Sweden had provided refuge to the largest number 
of Syrians outside the neighbouring countries (Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey).1 
																																																								
1 As of the end of December in 2014, Turkey had hosted the largest Syrian 
population, with 1,552,839 registered refugees. Lebanon had accommodated 
1,146,405 registered Syrian refugees; given that Lebanon’s pre-refugee 
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While an outward facing ‘responsibility to protect’ stance was adopted by the 
United States, the actual protections extended towards Syrians themselves 
remain somewhat uneven.2 The US provided shelter to a comparatively small 
number of Syrians - over the period of 2012-2014 asylum was only granted to 
approximately 1,900. In 2014 the United States loosely committed to 
increasing resettlement numbers of Syrian refugees in the upcoming years 
(Ostrand 2015). This commitment was acted upon, and in 2016 the number of 
Syrian refugees admitted was approximately 12,500. However, during 
Trump’s presidency refugee resettlement dropped to historic lows. 
Concomitantly Trump’s administration has made travel and immigration to 
the US prohibitively restrictive for 11 (predominantly Muslim) countries. In 
2018 the United States admitted just 62 Syrian refugees (Zezima 2019). 
Germany conversely continued to increase their quota. “In 2014, 202,834 
people applied for asylum in Germany; in 2013, this number was 110,000; in 
2012, there were 64,000 applicants” (Adam 2015 451). In 2015 Germany 
officially adopted an ‘open door’ policy, and took in almost 1 million people.  
 
While German civic sentiment towards refugees at this time was 
predominantly one of welcome, empathy, and at the least tolerance, this was 
still contrasted by the weekly anti-Muslim immigration demonstrations in 
Dresden by PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes: Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West), 
																																																																																																																																																														
population was 4.8 million, nearly one in every five people now living in 
Lebanon is a Syrian refugee. Jordan housed the third largest population with 
622,865 registered refugees. Iraq and Egypt also sheltered a smaller yet 
substantial number of Syrians, hosting 228,484 and 137,812 registered 
refugees respectively (UNHCR 2015).   
2 It is difficult to compare exact numbers of asylum applications to the US in 
comparison with Germany. Germany (along with Sweden and the UK) counts 
the number of individuals applying for asylum irrespective of how the 
application was lodged. The U.S. on the other hand breaks down applications 
by two types: affirmative and defensive. Affirmative cases are those that come 
forward to request protection, and are handled by the US Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS). While defensive claims are submitted as a 
defense against removal by those who are in the midst of the removal process, 
and are monitored by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). As 
a result it is difficult to assess the actual number of those seeking asylum 
annually (Ostrand 2015: 260).       
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which spoke to a simmering xenophobic sentiment in large sections of the 
German public (Adam 2015). The ‘general public feeling’ and expression of 
welcome underwent a swift and seismic shift after the events in Cologne on 
New Years Eve 2015, when many cases of sexual assault were reportedly 
perpetrated by refugee and immigrant men, against primarily German 
women.  
 
These simultaneous and contrasting attitudes of welcome and xenophobia are 
born out of Germany’s emotional residuum of fear. Starting by unpacking the 
folk and fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm, I argue that Germany’s cultural 
fear developed out of ideological anxieties surrounding the loss of a distinct 
Germanic identity. This theme appears again during the Third Reich, through 
narratives of dehumanisation and demonisation of the Jews. The National 
Socialist party incorporated the Brothers Grimm’s works into their ideals of 
sacred German culture, and the fears encapsulated by these folk tales were 
thus re-expressed, and built upon. The Brothers Grimm were writing against a 
backdrop of German nationalism and its opponents, whereas the National 
Socialists were spurred on by the very fragility of this nationalism. It is 
suggested that the Holocaust was not solely born from racially-based hatred, 
but from the desire to eradicate from Germany the threat of ‘international 
Jewry’ which was seen as diametrically and ideologically opposed to German-
ness, and threatening to German nationalism. Post-war, another element was 
added to the German residuum of fear – the fear of being characterised by, 
and tied forever to, the atrocities committed under Nazi reign. Germany’s 
identity crisis was brought into sharp relief once more during the Cold War. 
Berlin became the site of the agon between tense capitalist and socialist 
ideologies. Both the Western Allies in West Berlin, and the Soviet-backed state 
in East Berlin attempted to paint ‘the other side’ as incompatible with, and 
antithetical to, German-ness; while simultaneously inviting the German 
people to distance themselves from the fresh horrors of the Holocaust by 
allegiance to a new ideology (communism). While “the German nation itself is 
an epic register of momentous collective historical events, such as the 
Holocaust, two world wars, the political division of the Cold War, and 
unification” (Borneman and Ghassem-Fachandi 2017: 109), I maintain that 
Chapter 1 | Introduction 
	 4	
these events stemmed from, and helped to create the cultural emotional 
residuum of fear in the wake of refugee arrivals. This fear developed under the 
weight of its antecedent past, carving out emotional grooves surrounding any 
perceived threat to German identity. These emotional grooves - the residuum 
of fear - helped dictate xenophobic responses to refugees.  
 
I examine narratives of fear from 2015-2019 surrounding refugees through 
qualitative content analysis of a selected number of newspaper articles, 
tweets, and online comments. A continuity in themes appear that 
characterised fears in the folk and fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm, that 
typified Nazi narratives surrounding Jews, and that were used by both East 
and West Berlin to demonise ‘the other side’.   
 
Germany has made widespread educational attempts towards addressing its 
fascist history (Adam 2015), and has sought distance from this genocidal past 
on the political and global stage. These factors may have arguably prompted 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to open the border, and helped 
shape the attitude of empathy and tolerance originally extended by most 
Germans towards refugees. However, even before the events of 2015, 
Islamophobia was present and growing within some factions of German 
society, with many voicing worries that Islam was incompatible with the 
German ‘way of life’ (Schiffer and Wagner 2011).  
Current debates about Islam and Europe are closely linked to the 
(re)configuration of national identities and the emergence of a 
supranational identity in the new Europe. Historical narratives and 
memory are an essential part of these politics of identity. Hall (1990) 
defines the concept of identities as ‘the names we give to the different 
ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives 
of the past’ (Peter 2012:339). 
  
“The New Year’s Eve 2015 sexual assaults on German women in Cologne, 
activated latent fears and mobilized a xenophobic mood—primarily fear of the 
Muslim male’s sexualized aggression” (Borneman and Ghassem-Fachandi 
2017: 110). The speed with which ‘general public sentiment’ (reflected through 
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media constructions and representations) changed from one of welcome to 
one of xenophobia is demonstrative of how deeply ingrained the residuum of 
fear is within some areas of German culture. It also points to the immense and 
lengthy nature of the task of continuous education, and emotional 
reorientation necessary in order to reduce occurrences of ‘othering’, 
mistreatment, conflict, and massacres that may be born from these fears. This 
is a task that becomes even more important in a rapidly ‘globalising’ world.   
 
While Germany under Angela Merkel attempted to open its borders in the face 
of the refugee ‘crisis’, in 2016 the United States elected Donald Trump who 
ran a campaign partially fuelled by the promise to ‘build a wall’ on the 
southern border to keep ‘illegals’ out. North American reactions towards 
refugees have been less conflicted, and more convoluted, with narratives 
surrounding refugees being subsumed by a wider discourse on immigration in 
the US. Despite only admitting 62 Syrian refugees in the fiscal year of 2018, 
fearful narratives surrounding ‘illegals’, (a category that homogenises asylum 
seekers, ‘terrorists’, ‘gang members’, Muslims and other [brown] immigrants, 
all with vastly different countries of origin), have dominated the American 
conservative socio-political landscape. In the narratives of fear explored 
through the words of President Trump, right-wing media coverage, tweets, 
and online dialogue, a pattern emerges of racially motivated fears. The 
collective emotional residuum of fear has the effect of limiting society’s 
perspective as the present is bound to past experiences, and thus anticipation 
about the future is also based on the expectations inherited from these 
narratives. Fear limits reactions to pre-conditioned patterns. 
 
This research was born from a desire to understand what these narratives 
were, and where they came from. Emotion - like language3 - is a social as well 
as an individual phenomenon. Culture provides the basis of understanding 
that translates emotion, and dictates emotional experience. Such socially 
																																																								
3 When studying emotion, language must also be examined, as the two work in 
concert together. It is through words that many humans make sense of, and 
communicate our emotions. Likewise words ‘stick’ emotions to certain bodies 
(Ahmed 2013), and are how we nominate and fix people into categories of 
likeness and deviancy.   
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shared emotions are not the creation of a moment, but rather build up over 
generations. Fear in this context is studied as a process.4 It is shaped by and 
shapes its cultural and institutional settings. This thesis is about the 
morphology of fear in Germany and the USA, and how these cultural fears 
have resonated within silos of society, resulting in racist and xenophobic 
reactions towards refugees from 2015 to 2019. Although xenophobic and 
racist narratives in Germany and the US reflect the emotional residuum of 
fear, and are often characterised by similar topoi, these fears are neither 
entirely timeless, nor constant in form. They wax and wane, changing both in 
nature and virulence, responding to political and social fluxes. While 
narratives and reactions surrounding refugees have been divided in both 
Germany and the US, the focus of this thesis is on those born out of the 
cultural emotional residuum of fear, as they represent a clear and present 
threat to human rights and security. 
 
When it comes to understanding the ‘refugee crisis’ anthropology can play an 
important role: linking human experience to macro political, economic, and 
historical structures; analysing the phenomena and “highlighting sites of 
contestation, imagining alternatives, and working towards them” (Holmes and  
Castañeda 2016:12).  While Anthropology provides the base for this research, 
the approach taken here is multidisciplinary. As Mary Douglas stated in 1992, 
intellectual fragmentation must subside as the pressure to speak to each other 
across national and disciplinary boundaries grows under the gravity of 
questions that frame the human experience in an increasingly interconnected 
world (2013 [1992]:x).  
   
Some have argued that emotion as a cultural and political motivator has 
lacked proper academic attention5 (Bainbridge and Yates 2014), and that the 
																																																								
4 Following on from Sarah Ahmed’s lead in her work The Cultural Politics of 
Emotion (2013). I am not asking ‘What are emotions?’ But rather ‘What do 
emotions do?’	
5 Some have suggested that this may partially be due to the fact that in the 
colonialist Western tradition, emotion is seen as secondary to rational 
thought. The linear evolutionary model has dominated how emotion has been 
thought about, and it has been associated with more ‘under-developed’ 
‘primitive’ (read black or brown) states of being (McClintock 2013). Feminist 
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emotional aspects of group conflict when discussed are too often “dismissed 
or lumped under ‘non-rational’ motives” (McLaughlin 1996:254). When 
examining identity construction, xenophobia6 or political leaning, most 
studies have tended to focus on questions of socialisation or economics. Yet it 
is emotion that lies at the very heart of the most important questions about 
what it means to be human: like, how does identification with particular social 
and cultural groups take shape? Where do these identities stem from? How 
are they created and sustained?   
 
Emotions are certainly at the heart of questions surrounding why the 
relatively small numbers (in this case - of refugees) “that give the word 
minority its most simple meaning and usually imply political and military 
weakness do not prevent minorities from being objects of fear and rage” 
(Appadurai 2006:49). Research has provided two general answers as to why 
there is a heightened fear of immigration. The first relates to ontological 
insecurity - increased competition for the scarcity of resources. The second 
relates to existential anxiety, through questions of identity and the desire for a 
sense of belonging achieved through in-group identification, and the 
differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Balch 2016:182). Both of these themes 
are observable in the narratives of fear that surround refugees and migrants in 
Germany and the United States.  
 
These narratives have their origins in the relationship between fear and 
power. Aristotle argues in Rhetoric that the prospect of some future evil is a 
powerful persuasive tool that proves a potent stimulus for action (in Kapust 
2008:357). Both Aristotle and Plato proposed that fear of a foreign enemy 
could facilitate the realisation of political goals, most notably creating and 
maintaining political accord, and fostering ‘moral energy’ (Kapust 2008:359). 
Fear can unify and energize. Similarly: “Narratives are a governmental 
practice, i.e. they articulate politics narrowly defined with individual conduct, 
																																																																																																																																																														
philosophers have also argued that the subordination of emotion is a tool of 
the patriarchy, as emotion is feminised and through its feminisation, 
discounted as secondary (Ahmed 2013).  
6For a study of the differences between racism and xenophobia see Bordeau 
(2009). Xenophobia: The Violence of Fear and Hate. 
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since narratives allow determination of the context and hence of the 
conditions under which adequate behaviour is decided. In this way, they 
orient individual autonomy towards specific uses” (Peter 2012:349). The 
feared ‘other’ does not spring up organically, but rather is deliberately chosen 
to facilitate “specific narrative and social work” (Ingebretsen 1998:26).  
 
I argue that while the nature of narratives of fear surrounding refugees in both 
nations is seemingly relatively new (arising in response to the refugee ‘crisis’), 
in fact these countries have built up, through the generations, a cultural 
residuum of fear; and that refugees are the latest ‘Other’ created and targeted 
by this fear. A cultural emotional residuum of fear suggests that people are 
linked by not only structural and social forms, but also through emotional 
ones. Neither Germany nor the United States are monocultural fields, and 
neither is characterised by a singular cultural emotion, or emotional 
experience. However, fear resonates and repeats within certain pockets of 
each society.   
 
These residual cultural fears form a pattern (aided through the use of 
narrative). This pattern often has the effect of limiting the society’s 
perspective, as past and present become inextricably linked, limiting 
responses to pre-conditioned configurations. “Formulas are by definition 
neither unique nor new; to the contrary, they are familiar, routine, and old. 
We know the monsters because we know the stories, and we know how they 
are supposed to turn out” (Ingebretsen 1998: 28). The cultural emotional 
residuum of fear in Germany and the US blurs the lines between production, 
cognition and coercion in both societies. I suggest that German fears are 
characterised by anxiety towards ideologies that threaten to alter the German 
conception of self and nation. In the United States however, cultural fear is 
marked by the racist construction of a ‘Dark Other’ that homogenises, 
delegitimises, and demonises the bodies of black and brown peoples.    
 
In 2010 A. Assman and S. Conrad distinguished between cultural memory and 
political memory. Cultural memory is both individual and communicative and 
appears in - and is repeated through - the mechanisms and practices of 
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society. Political memory on the other hand is a top-down institution and 
exercise of control in the service of a desired outcome. Cultural emotional 
memory – an emotional residuum - however is an interaction between 
organic, bottom up experience and controlled top-down institutional power. 
This corresponds with Hannah Arendt’s (1970) horizontal plane of power, 
which recognises that while ‘citizens’ are constrained by hegemony, they also 
help to create and perpetuate these very systems. Thus these cultural fears 
may not be as simply explained away as hegemonic mechanisms, or a means 
to an end. 
 
In the United States the cultural residuum of fear has predominantly been 
built around racism. I take European colonisation of the Americas as a 
jumping off point through which to examine the historical narratives that have 
informed this North American fear. The United States’ residuum of fear has 
been built up around the threat of a ‘Dark Other’. The capture narratives of 
settler-America constructed and informed what it meant (and means) to be an 
‘American’ through direct opposition to the brown ‘natives’. Capture 
narratives depicted the ‘Dark Other’ as ‘savage’, violent, and sexually deviant. 
This dehumanisation of indigenous peoples helped facilitate the genocide that 
European-Americans committed against them. Fears of the ‘Dark Other’ 
emerged again during the antebellum era. African Americans were depicted as 
‘less human’ than their white American counter-parts in order to justify the 
use of slavery. The systematic and systemic dehumanisation of African-
Americans helped reconcile slavery with (white) ‘American Christian values’, 
in a land where ‘all’ were (supposedly) ‘created equal’. Slaves in the South 
were seen as ‘heathen’, violent, sexually monstrous, and innately incapable of 
being free. In this way, African Americans were excluded from the ‘all’ of the 
(southern) United States.  
 
While many instances of racially- based othering occurred in the interim 
between postbellum USA and the election of Donald Trump in 2016, the final 
‘historical’ narrative that is examined in the North American context explores 
the dialogue that arose in the aftermath of September 11. For many Americans 
this event occurred in living memory, and thus colours fear of the ‘Dark’ (in 
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this case - Muslim) ‘Other’ in an even more salient way. It also sets the stage 
for patterns of narratives of fear that characterise US reactions towards 
refugees from 2015-2019, namely inflammatory presidential rhetoric, and 
round-the-clock media coverage. In the speeches that followed the attacks on 
the Twin Towers, President George W. Bush (2001-2009) broke the world 
down into Manichean opposites, painting the USA as the side of all that was 
‘good’, and the terrorists (and by association – the Islamic world) all that was 
‘terrible’. The post-9/11 presidential and public dialogue fell into the same 
patterns dictated by cultural fear that had characterised (for many) ‘white 
American’ interactions with the ‘Dark Other’ during colonial and antebellum 
times. Muslims, like indigenous peoples and African Americans before them 
were painted as ‘barbaric’, violent monsters that abused women. Unpacking 
the fears present in the post-9/11 ‘war-on-terror’ age is especially interesting 
as this is a time that many Americans lived through, and the Islamophobia 
that dominated the cultural consciousness at the time directly and viscerally 
influences the narratives that have appeared surrounding refugees in the 
Trumpian era.7  
 
Trumpian era narratives of fear in the US fit into the cultural patterns of the 
dehumanisation of the ‘Dark Other’. This particular incarnation of the ‘Dark 
Other’ has taken the form of ‘illegals’, who are a homogenous group of 
																																																								
7	In contrast to Germany, the US has never attempted any kind of National 
educational program aimed at redressing the horrors committed against 
indigenous peoples or African Americans (although this may be due in part to 
the fact that the US lacks a unified national educational curriculum, and thus 
curriculum varies from state to state). Indeed in many parts of the South the 
confederate flag is still widely used, and confederate statues and monuments 
remain (although these have been increasingly challenged and contested 
predominantly through the work of grass-roots organizations and activists). 
Thus while Germany has made some attempts to re-orient its cultural emotion 
due to the recognition of the harm that fear and hatred can wreak, the United 
States has made no such top down, ongoing, widespread concessions or 
attempts, with the administrations and media rather ramping up the 
emphasis on fear, and furthering the divisions that this causes. In 2020 
Donald Trump signed an executive order - The 1776 Commission - ‘protecting 
America’s founding ideals by promoting patriotic education’, about which 
Trump asserted that: “we will state the truth in full, without apology: we 
declare that the United States of America is the most just and exceptional 
Nation ever to exist on Earth” (Trump 2020).  
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‘terrorists from the Middle East’, ‘gang members from Latin America’, and 
other ‘brown’ migrants, all supposedly trying to force entry into the US 
through the Southern border. Narratives are propounded by citizens and 
President alike (each answering an emotional need in the other), and have had 
real-world implications on both policy and the lived experience of immigrants.  
 
While narratives of fear surrounding refugees arose in part due to the refugee 
‘crisis’, I argue that this is not the only reason. While Germany has been 
affected in very real ways due to the large numbers of refugees that it has 
accepted, the United States’ (arguably more) fearful response is not 
proportionate, as immigration to the US experienced no such exponential leap 
in response to the ‘crisis’. Indeed, nationalist sentiment, and right-wing 
populism is on the rise all over the world. This presents somewhat of a 
paradox, as the nation state arguably has less sway over the lives of its citizens 
than ever before.    
 
 The historical narratives examined in this research all arose, and dominated, 
at times of immense social and political change. The Brothers Grimm 
collected their stories as part of an attempt to unify Germanic tradition and 
identity, which was quickly changing in the face of industrialisation. 
Antebellum anxieties were born in part from the rapidly changing racial 
demographies of the States, and questions of Christianity and human agency. 
In this case, it is suggested that the rise of fearful narratives surrounding 
refugees is an expression of the disruption of boundaries and identities 
experienced through neoliberal globalisation.  
 
Neoliberal globalisation has led to the dissolution of ‘traditional’ 
understandings of identity, community and nation. Cultural representations 
and human populations are increasingly mobile and less tied to place 
(Kinnvall 2004). Life within the neoliberal system is dominated for many by 
the experience of ontological insecurity and existential anxiety (Wrenn 2014). 
Both of these states of insecurity and anxiety are compounded by the systems’ 
emphasis on hyper-individualism – the responsibility of which can be 
terrifying (Bourke 2005, Bauman 2006).   
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In times of upheaval, cultural revanchism becomes more and more appealing, 
with people often seeking out authoritarian styles of leadership to remove the 
burden of individual agency and responsibility. 
As individuals become disembedded from their old social structures, 
insecurity compels them to create social moorings and continuity 
through a reimagination of those social structures to which they plead 
greater allegiance and fidelity than they otherwise would have done 
absent the systemic changes. As the individual becomes de-
contextualized via change, both political and economic, she can become 
more attached to an imagined past, and in so doing, become more 
deeply rooted in that imagined tradition and less tolerant of deviations 
from it (Kinnvall 2004). The dismantling of tradition and the uprooting 
of social ties provokes nativist reactions manifest in religious 
fundamentalism as well as in a resurgence of right-wing, neo-fascist 
organizations, which in turn produce well-defined “others.” These 
reactions promise social continuity and security by giving meaning, 
purpose, and self-esteem to the individual (Wrenn 2014:342). 
 
Globalisation has resulted in huge wealth disparities, with most of the world’s 
population facing seemingly insurmountable economic hardships. The uneven 
spread of globalisation, and the uncertainty posed by the dissolution of 
boundaries, and changing social demographies has created fertile ground for 
the familiar patterns of the collective cultural emotional residuum of fear to 
take hold in specific social silos once again in both Germany and the United 
States, as shared emotion constitutes sites of belonging. 
 
While this paints a bleak picture, the movement towards continuing 
education, and cultural emotional reorientation suggests there is some hope 
for the future. However, further research is required to understand the depth 
and scope of how emotion impacts the most pressing social and political 
questions.  
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Chapter 2: Three Underlying Threads 
Fear: Mapping the Emotional Landscape 
Fear has been an integral instrument in shaping the human trajectory 
(Bourke, 2003, 2005). Indeed, Peter Stearns (2008) and Kevin Pelletier 
(2015) both argue that it is the most powerful emotion for effecting social, 
cultural and political change. However, despite the centrality of fear and other 
emotions in shaping both personal and social life - it has remained a 
somewhat liminal area of study within social sciences, politics, and economics. 
This is no doubt due to the problematic task of defining what emotions 
actually ‘are’, and what they ‘mean’. As Catherine Lutz and Geoffrey White 
(1986) identified - even within the anthropological tradition alone - the study 
of emotion has created several schisms.8  
 
Among the pioneers of the study of emotion in anthropology, materialism 
emerged as the dominant discourse through which emotion was explored. 
Through this lens, emotions were viewed as being biologically, and 
psychologically constituted – ‘hard-wired’ facts in our animal nature, that 
could be readily observed through physiological signals, but that held little 
inherent importance. 
Actually, impulses and emotions explain nothing: they are always 
results, either of the power of the body or the impotence of the mind. In 
both cases they are consequences, never causes. The latter can be 
sought only in the organism, which is the exclusive concern of biology, 
or in the intellect, which is the sole way offered to psychology, and to 
anthropology as well (Lévi-Strauss 2016 [1962]: 79).  
 
																																																								
8	Such as divergences in matters of universalism and relativism, materialism 
and idealism, positivism and interpretivism, the individual and culture, and 
romanticism and rationalism. These tensions within the anthropological study 
of emotion are explored thoroughly by Lutz and White (1986).  
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However, this was a somewhat reductionist view, in which emotion often 
appeared as a static isolated, internal effect. It is impossible to detach a single 
expression or instance of emotion, and cauterise the edges - severing it, and 
removing it from the temporal flow in which it exists. Secondly -and more 
glaringly - this treatment was seemingly somewhat at odds with the general 
ideology of the anthropological tradition, as it did little to explain the rich role 
of emotion in influencing (and as influenced by) social and cultural factors.  
 
Thus, later research placed emotion back in the sociocultural realm, and 
explored its cultural construction (Bateson 1958, Mead 1972, Geertz 1973) as 
well as the extent to which location within the social nexus may influence the 
way in which emotion is created and experienced (Levy 1973, Rosaldo 1980, 
Bailey 1983, Rosaldo 1984, and Abu-Lughod 1986).  
 
While these works created new pathways within the study of emotion, Beatty 
(2014) has argued that viewing this phenomenon as purely socially or 
culturally constructed tended to eliminate the individualised lived experience, 
flattening them to generalised and culturally specific idioms. One of the main 
problems with understanding and defining emotion is the subjective nature of 
emotional experience. Even when we have the same feeling, we do not 
inevitably have the same relationship to that feeling (Ahmed 2013:10). 
Emotions as they are studied might be ‘third-person constructions’, or 
collective products; but as they are lived they are ‘first-person’ experiences, 
that rely not only on temporal, but also socially specific understandings - and 
may not be reduced to single, stand-alone components (Beatty 2014: 551). 
 
While recognising the qualia of emotional experience is important, it is also 
crucial to concomitantly acknowledge the effect that power structures have on 
the experience and creation of emotions. Emotions occur in a world (with its 
existent power structures and dominant ideologies) made by others. Emotions 
are not simply ‘of’ the individual or social group – but rather they mediate the 
spaces between  (Bourke 2003:124). “The ‘truths’ of this world are dependent 
on emotions, on how they move subjects and stick them together” (Ahmed 
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2013:170).9 While emotions are feelings and processes that are informed by 
personal and cultural biographies, and can be seen as an expression of human 
agency, emotions are also very much created, shaped, and constrained by 
existent power structures and dominant ideologies, rather than being imply 
psychologically ‘inate’. Emotions are often heavily dependent upon location 
within the social nexus in which they occur. Simply put, emotions are an 
expression of power relations.10 This is certainly true in the context of the 
German and American reactions towards refugees, where minorities are 
demonised by ‘citizens’ who hold more power than them, but less power than 
the ‘elites’ who dictate the structure of society.  
 
Feelings are not simply internal or external. Rather emotions create the very 
boundaries between ‘in’ and ‘out’, ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘refugee’ and ‘citizen’. I draw 
from Ahmed’s model of the sociality of emotions, which holds that “it is 
through emotions, or how we respond to objects and others, that surfaces or 
boundaries are made: the ‘I’ or the ‘we’ are shaped by…contact with others” 
(Ahmed 2013:10). Emotions are at the heart of the very construction of ‘the 
social’.  
 
Bar-Tal (2001) has similarly argued that emotions are central to social 
relationships. He writes that societies may come to be characterised by a 
‘collective emotional orientation’, which describes the nature of a dominant 
emotion as it is experienced by any given group. The exploration of a collective 
emotional orientation is informed by the assumption that it is possible (in a 
general way) to expand our understanding of the character of individuals’ 
broad emotional experience, through an examination of the collective 
orientation, for “although shared emotional behaviour of society members is 
not a mere addition of individuals, it indicates unique holistic qualities of the 
society” (Bar-Tal 2001:606). This is because the macro and micro social 
planes are - in the creation and experience of emotion - tied inextricably 
																																																								
9 Ahmed (2013) proposes that certain emotions such as fear, ‘stick’ to certain 
bodies (such as brown, black, indigenous bodies).   
10 This is not always a negative, for as Bourke points out – while emotions can 
create or reproduce patterns of oppression and subordination, they can also 
unravel it (2003:125).  
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together in a ceaseless cycle. That is to say, that people who live in these 
societies often share central beliefs that consist of collective memories, 
ideologies, shared goals and myths: 
These central societal beliefs provide the prism through which society 
members view their world and relate to it. This prism not only 
organizes society’s cognitive outlook or directs intentional forms of 
actions, but also sets its collective emotional orientation (Bar-Tar 
2001:606). 
 
Collective or cultural memory is an integral part of the emotional puzzle: 
“what we feel might be dependent on past interpretations that are not 
necessarily made by us, but that come before us” (Ahmed 2013:170). When 
speaking of cultural memory, I refer specifically to the work of Aleida and Jan 
Assmann (2010 and 2011). In Cultural Memory and Early Civilisation (2011) 
Jan Assmann proposes that every culture formulates a connective structure 
that operates on two levels —social and temporal. This connective structure 
provides society members with a sense of order, trust and orientation through 
identity and social continuity. What binds cultures and nations together as a 
plural is the adherence to the same mores and norms, but also through the 
memory of a shared past. 
 
With all of this to consider when approaching the study of emotion it becomes 
clear that neither a biologically-determined, psychoanalytic, culturally 
specific, or phenomenological approach can truly get to the heart of the 
human emotional experience. Rather, they must in some way be combined 
before the whole can be truly revealed. How then must further 
anthropological studies of emotion proceed? Beatty (2010, 2013, 2014) 
suggests narrative as the most appropriate tool in its examination (a 
sentiment that is echoed by Bourke, 2003). As discussed emotions have a 
temporal and biographical (both social and personal) element that eludes 
static synchronic analysis.  
 
However, a narrative approach is able to capture and reflect elements of time, 
specificity and shared experience. “Emotions implicate narrative, and vice 
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versa… they are made for each other” (Beatty 2014: 558). Emotions are not 
static or isolated occurrences. They are processes imbued with temporal 
elements that both create and are created by personal understandings and 
social and cultural factors. Emotions are intentional (we are not just ‘afraid’ 
we are afraid of or because of something). This holds within it elements that 
both refer to past, and allude to future occurrences and behaviour. “In two 
senses, then, emotions possess a narrative aspect: they make sense within a 
narrative sequence, and they ‘tell a story’” (Beatty 2010: 430). Narrative form 
fits an examination of emotional landscapes “because it locates emotion in 
practice; in the invisible flow of action, character, and history – [and] can 
reveal the dimension of emotion hidden by other methods”  (Beatty 2010: 
440).11  
 
Having briefly sketched the points of departure that this research takes in 
dealing with emotion, I return to a more specific discussion of fear. 
As outlined above, it is recognised that fear is at the same time biologically 
constituted (it is ‘of the body’, in that it is a feeling that is experienced through 
physiological changes), and that it is dependent on personal, cultural, and 
social factors, and power relations all of which are temporally informed. 
However, ultimately “whatever their ontological status as cultural inventions, 
biological states, or constructed social roles – emotions are unified 
experiences” (Beatty 2014: 559). While fear is a collective subjectivity (and in 
each instance based on a myriad factors) there are, nonetheless, some 
unifying traits of the experience that emerge to form the (blurry) parameters 
that have lead to a recognition of this specific emotion.12  
																																																								
11	While Beatty’s call for a narrative treatment of emotion is meant to 
specifically address those undertaking participant-observation based 
ethnographic research, it is felt that the patterns which are evident in a first 
hand observation of lived emotion also appear in written form. Indeed while 
narratives do take oral form, they are also often transcribed. Thus written 
expressions of emotion (as secondary sources) lend themselves seamlessly to 
this particular mode of analysis.     
12	I make little attempt to delineate between fear and anxiety. While there are 
certainly important differences – fear is often defined as an emotion that 
arises in response to an “immediate, objective threat”, whereas anxiety is 
thought to be a more generalised state that refers to “an anticipated, 
subjective threat” (Bourke 2003:126), and is perhaps more prominent in post-
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So, then, what is fear? This seemingly simple question – proves deceptively 
hard to answer. Arguably, fear began as a survival mechanism, “the evolution 
of which allowed the early humans, indeed all species to adapt, evolve, and 
survive” (Wrenn 2014: 337).  This can be described as an ‘instinctual’ element 
of fear, and it is often this mode that has been used to explore the 
physiological response of fear in and of the body.  
The emotion of fear is fundamentally about the body – its fleshiness 
and precariousness. Fear is felt, and although the emotion of fear 
cannot be reduced to the sensation of fear, nevertheless, it is not 
present without sensation (Bourke 2003:123). 
 
Fear presents physically in a number of ways and can involve internally a 
release of adrenalin, “increase in heart rate, rise in blood pressure, decrease of 
salivation and secretion of digestive juices, and many complex changes 
throughout the sympathetic nervous system” (Thomson 1979: 1-2). Fear can 
also produce visible outer expressions on the body, such as a general pallor, 
sweating of the palms, and trembling muscles. These symptoms of fear are 
usually experienced in the face of potential threat or negative consequences, 
and accompany two main behavioural trends: fight or flight (Frijda, Kuiper 
and Schure 1989).  On a collective level fear is also conceptualised and 
expressed as a ‘fight’ or ‘flight’ emotion. Fear “increases intentions to move 
away from a threatening outgroup…(or)…opt for a ‘fight’ response when 
escape from a threat is not possible (Iyer et al., 2015:633-634). 
 
This is the expression of fear at its most instinctual level. But, as we have 
discussed, fear is not simply a sensation that is an ornament of the emotion on 
the body - but rather is a process that is simultaneously lived, socially 
constructed, and constructs society.  
																																																																																																																																																														
structuralist social sciences, they both belong to a similar kind of emotion. 
Defining and discussing at length the specific differences are less important 
here than exploring the experience and expression of fear and anxiety, (which 
are of a similar genus) in relation to historical cultural instances, and the 
refugee crisis.  
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Fear evolved from solely the instinctually driven ‘flight or fight’ 
response to include a more nuanced and generalized state of anxiety 
that reproduces the social structure and teaches the individual the 
importance of adherence to social norms (Wrenn 2014: 338).  
 
As political and governance structures began to emerge – fear was used as a 
population control element. For as Bar-Tal (2001) points out; in times of 
structural social change, or perceived danger, social fear and anxiety are 
heightened. As a corollary, individuals and groups seek to find a vessel in 
which to locate the source, and they become far more willing to accept 
leadership that implements strict rules and harsh social punishment for 
violation of those rules (as seen in 2016 with the election of Donald Trump, 
and the rising success of the Alternative für Deutschland). These are the 
elements that characterise human fear, and differentiate it from the instinct-
based fear that we share with other animals. Fear is not simply a reaction 
against danger, rather it is a shared social expression that shapes and reflects 
the structure of society, and is an architectural force in the creation of history. 
However, as Bourke points out, it is wrong to “assume that any particular 
emotion belongs to a specific social group. It is not the case that all members 
of the working classes feared the same thing, or that all women or all members 
of an ethnic community shared emotional experiences. Fear 'bunches' 
individuals in different ways” (2003:124).13  
 
Fear and the Other: Fear with a Face 
Throughout time, waves of popular fear have arisen from the epoch in which 
they were situated. The most visible of these fears are reflective of the 
interplay of the specific social and systemic conditions that defined that 
society and time, and create specific reactions - such as the Victorian panic of 
being buried alive, or the mid-to late-twentieth century fear of an apocalyptic 
nuclear conflict that was sparked by the Cold War (Bourke 2005). However, 
while societies and eras produce and experience these specific fears, there are 
																																																								
13 This view is reiterated by Ahmed (2013). 
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also more generalised threads of fear that reappear time and time again, 
woven through the fabric of history. One such thread is the archetypal fear of 
the ‘Other’.  
 
Unsurprisingly, there is argument as to whether this fear is biologically or 
culturally determined (or whether it is neither) (Keen 1991).14 But whatever its 
origins, the construction of (and opposition to) a feared Other seems to be a 
constant feature that leaves an indelible mark on the majority of societies and 
times (Said, 1978).15 Royal contends that the fear of a human ‘Other’ is one of 
the most terrifying experiences of fear: “if the threat has a face (for example a 
person or persons trying to inflict harm), the threat is deemed to be far scarier 
than if it is a phenomenon (for instance, impacts from climate change)” (2011: 
409). An examination of public opinion in the West would seem to support 
this claim, for example a large percentage of the USA still do not believe in 
climate change, but are very vocal in their reactions against immigration: 
likewise ‘terrorists’ are feared, but firearm policies which results in many 
deaths, are fiercely protected  (Hochschild 2018). However, I would argue 
(following on from Said, 1978 and Bar-Tal, 2001) that these trends 
demonstrate that fear surrounding other people (or peoples) is not so much 
more terrifying, as it is practised. That is to say, that a feared ‘other’ is an 
archetypal fear, and thus is embedded within the social repository of collective 
memory – making it an easily accessible fear, and one to which we know how 
to react. This is the case in Germany and the States’ reactions towards 
refugees.  
 
Fear reactions are evoked not only as a result of direct cues, but also by  
“conditioned stimuli that are non-threatening in their nature… [in addition] 
fear can be acquired on the basis of received information about certain 
objects, events, people, or situations that are supposed to threaten the person 
																																																								
14 I am approaching this exploration from the position that while biological 
factors may play some part in influencing the process of othering, it is a 
process that is predominantly culturally and socially constructed. 
15 There are, as always, exceptions – indeed Sue Mansfield (1982) argues that 
human warfare is at the most, 13,000 years old, and Keen (1991) reminds us 
of peaceful peoples, such as the K’ung Bushmen of the Kalahari, the Copper 
Eskimo, the Hopi and the Amish. 
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or his or her society” (Bar-Tal 2001: 603).  These fear memories are 
particularly resilient, and their salience seems neither to diminish with the 
passage of time, nor be dependent on their mode of inception (be it stemming 
from personal experience, or drawn from the frameworks of collective cultural 
and social memories) (Lazarus, 1991; LeDoux, 1996).  
  
This fear of the ‘Other’ is Janus-faced. The first of its faces appears through 
the explanation that fear of another group stems from issues surrounding 
competition for resources (which Blach (2016) terms the ‘clash of interests’ 
hypothesis).  The second face posits that these fears are about identity. People 
tend to create an ‘Other’ in order to secure identity of self. Through attributing 
binary opposites (be it through motive, or through a more visible physical 
expression of difference such as ‘race’ or religion, as in the case of refugees in 
Germany and the USA), and assuming mal-intent from the negative ‘them’, 
people create, or reinforce belonging within the positive ‘us’ group.  
 
Understandings of both the ‘self’ and the wider social ‘group’ to which we 
belong are integral to our social, individual and cognitive construction and 
understanding of the world. These constructions while often based on what we 
are, are just as often based on what we are not. The self is constructed in 
relation to, and opposition with individual and social otherness (Tulumello 
2017: 43). “Social identity—a set of meanings that an actor attributes to itself 
while taking the perspective of others—defines the actor and provides 
information on its interests and behaviour” (Arfi 1998:152).  
 
While I have touched on the variations of fear experienced dependent on one’s 
place within the social and economic matrix, it is crucial to similarly 
acknowledge the different ways that fear marks and imprints upon gender.16 
When I speak of ‘women’ I do not wish to exclude non-binary peoples, or 
																																																								
16 When discussing gender it is recognised that gender and biological sex come 
in many different combinations, and that gender is a ‘performative’ 
construction (Butler 2011). A discussion of gender and fear is particularly 
pertinent in relation to the study of constructions of national identity such as 
this, for as Kinnvall states, race and gender are at the heart of identity 
construction in terms of a nationalist discourse (2004). 
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those that have experienced similarly gendered fears; rather I take my lead 
from Iris Marion Young in Intersecting Voices (1997), treating women as a 
‘social collective’, which recognises shared experience, but also does not 
essentialise women into a single category that homogenises the differences of 
race, age, culture, class, sexuality and abled-ness. Differences of race within 
the female experience have often been overlooked (or at least underplayed) by 
the mainstream feminist movements. bell hooks (1981, 1989) writes on the 
struggle of women of colour (especially black women in the US) who are seen 
as ‘less than’, and ‘Other’ both in terms of gender and race, and thus are the 
most marginalised and discounted members of North American society.17 
 
Some have argued that women experience fear more intensely than do men 
due to the ‘physical vulnerability hypothesis’ (women are often physically 
weaker than men, thus are more ‘vulnerable’) (Pain 2001 in Rader and Haynes 
2011). This ‘physical vulnerability’ also contributes to the fear of sexual 
violence that marks the life experience of many women: “Rape occupies a 
central place in the fears of many women . . . (and) may be the master offense 
in fear of victimization among women” (Warr 1984 in Rader and Haynes 
2011:294). Fears of rape and sexual aggression perpetrated by refugees on the 
bodies of women are themes that run through the narratives in both Germany 
and the United States.   
 
Rader and Haynes (2011) argue that the ways in which fear is experienced 
differently by men and women have less to do with the ‘facts’ of biology, and 
more to do with the socialisation process. They propose that men generally 
learn that fear demonstrates weakness, whereas women learn that fear is the 
natural response to a world where the threat of rape or abuse is common. 
These fears have consequences, as women often take precautions to mitigate 
risk in the public sphere, such as avoiding certain areas, trying not to walk 
alone especially at night, often being mindful of how they dress. Risk-
																																																								
17 hooks argues that in the US race, not gender, is the most important signifier 
of identity. In most other places in the world she says, gender is the first 
determining factor that accords value and worth within the social structure, 
but racism runs so deep in America that it precedes all other identity markers 
(1981). 
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avoidance behaviours are often similarly practiced to differing degrees in the 
private sphere too, and this constant self-monitoring of mobility and 
behaviour serves as a mechanism for the social control of women.18   
Ahmed (2013) argues that approaching the question of gendered fear from a 
feminist perspective reads female fear as structural and mediated (rather than 
incidental), and is integral to the construction and functioning of patriarchal 
imperialist and capitalist based societies.  
 
What fears characterise ‘modern’ ‘Western’ society? And (how) do they relate 
to the archetypal fear of the ‘Other’? Wrenn (2014) drawing from Giddens 
(1991) identifies two major and overarching themes which she states are at the 
core of modern fear: ontological insecurity, and existential anxiety. 
Ontological insecurity relates to the individual’s need for “social continuity 
and the ability to materially and socially reproduce her standard of living” 
(2014:340).  Existential anxiety relates to the uncertainty of life’s meaning, 
and the finite nature of life itself. Primarily it is about the incompleteness of 
truth, and knowledge, and especially the knowledge of what happens after 
death.19   
In everyday life, the individual finds significance through tasks and 
relations with others as well as through the potential to advance either 
socially or in the contribution toward some social goal. When the 
																																																								
18 Iris Marion Young explores the embodied experience of womanhood in 
Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays (1990) where she unpacks the 
feminine habitus of spatiality, arguing that movement in the feminine body 
involves restricting one’s space and mobility compared to masculine bodies. 
19 The practice of othering over theological difference is imbued with fear on 
an extra level. Religion offers a salve for existential anxiety, by providing 
moral guidelines through which to navigate the uncertainties of life – but also 
provides answers to life’s existential questions. As a corollary, when pre-
existing religious belief structures are threatened, the individuals’ existential 
anxiety increases accordingly. Thus fears based on a religious other have been 
one of the most salient and repeated fears in human history. Religious 
difference remains one of the greatest drivers of conflict and warfare in the 
contemporary age. While Islamophobia (in particular) has contributed to 
fearful depictions of refugees in Germany and the USA – the US especially 
holds (and has from colonial times) Christianity as one of the defining traits of 
the ‘true American’, and attitudes towards refugees are coloured by the events 
of 9/11 which ignited a sense of Islamophobia in the ‘collective’ 
(predominantly white, male and rural) consciousness. 
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individual discovers the authentic nature of being is one that ends in 
death, all potential and more generally, significance is lost 
(Wrenn2014:340).  
These two attributes of present-day Western fear appear to lend themselves 
seamlessly to a collective fear of the ‘other’, or in this case – ‘the refugee’.  
 
Narrative 
The way that these (or any) fears are communicated is often through a 
narrative of some kind. Humans are story-telling creatures. Narratives help us 
make sense of the world, and our place within it. They are one of the rare 
‘human universals’ in that humans across time and space have had a 
relationship to storytelling (Boyd 2010). Throughout cultures, narratives 
appear as a fundamental means of making sense of experience. They create a 
sense of temporality, and continuity between past, present and future (as well 
as imagined) worlds. Narrative also mediates between the self and the social, 
through communicating emotions and identities, constructing relationships, 
and creating membership in and among communities. For both the individual 
and the group, a narrative framing interprets truth, simplifies complexities, 
links individual experience to social history, and identifies friends and foe.  
 
Narrativity has been embraced across disciplines within the social sciences 
and humanities20, as a narrative approach lends itself to pluralism, relativism 
and subjectivity (Brown 2006: 732). Like studies of emotion however, 
academic work surrounding narrative is multifaceted. Early functionalist 
attitudes tended to treat narratives as distinct artefacts that might hold the 
key to understanding other aspects of cultural organisation. Social 
constructionist approaches have more lately proposed that narratives must be 
understood as the results of specific contexts, and as such must be studied in 
situ (Gabriel 1995 in Brown 2006:733). Brown himself suggests that a 
																																																								
20 Maggio (2014) discusses the close relationship between anthropology and 
storytelling, arguing that the two are indelibly linked, and calls for 
anthropologists to lean into the narrative nature of the discipline. 
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narrative approach is central to understanding shared identity constructs and 
their accompanying organisations and articulations of power.  
 
A narrative approach encourages an unpacking of hegemonic process, as 
theorists examine the genesis of shared identities, and their accompanying 
ideologies and institutions (how and why did a narrative come to be told? 
Who is telling it? And to whom is it being told?). Narratives are told by 
authors from a particular point of view, for a specific audience, and thus are 
infused with motive: “It is by focusing on identity narratives, I maintain, that 
organisations can most easily be analysed as power effects” (Brown 
2006:732).21 
 
Scholars of the topic highlight two base dimensions of narrative: temporality 
and point of view. In relation to temporality (or as Bruner (1991) refers to it 
narrative diachronicity); narratives describe a transition from one state of 
affairs to another, the chronological dimension offers a tool for creating order 
out of otherwise separated experiences.22 Narrative has not merely an 
epistemological but also an ontological value. It is not only a cognitive 
instrument – a primary way of seeking, organising and expressing our 
knowledge of a part of reality. It is constitutive of our very being, it is our way 
of existing, of constituting ourselves (Carr 2001:198, in Beatty 2010:431). 
Narrative ultimately:  
																																																								
21	Narrative is not only utilised within a vertical praxis of power however. 
Arthur Frank (1997) illustrated how ill people who tell the story of their 
disease refuse the role of victim, regain agentivity, and make their suffering 
intelligible to other people who consequently become conscious of their own 
vulnerability. People are able to transform their suffering through telling their 
stories, and thus refuse the victim role. In accord with this view, existentialist 
anthropologist Michael Jackson argued that storytelling is a “vital human 
strategy for sustaining a sense of agency in the face of disempowering 
circumstances. To reconstitute events in a story is no longer to live those 
events in passivity, but to actively rework them, both in dialogue with others 
and within one’s own imagination” (Jackson, 2002: 15). 
22 As Brown says “time is an extremely flexible narrative resource that can be 
squeezed and expanded, made to seem episodic or linear, and imposed upon 
to create beginnings and endings which, in turn, define eras of supposed 
progress and regress, order and chaos” (2006:741). 
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is at the heart of how we think of ourselves as having a past and a 
future, and how we make plans for the future in light of the past. In this 
respect, it is no exaggeration to say that having this ability to think 
about our past and future is part of what it is to be human, for our lives 
would surely be bereft without it. (Goldie 2012:125) 
 
A narrative is far more than a simple sequential ordering of events. As 
discussed, every tale is told from a particular point of view, and often has a 
point to make. Point of view may be overtly conveyed through linguistic 
functions, but it is also implicitly realised through the structuring of narrative 
plots. It is events and emotions together that form a coherent and compelling 
narrative, and reveal the point of the story. “Interweaving human conditions, 
conduct, beliefs, intentions, and emotions, it is the plot that turns a sequence 
of events into a story or a history” (Ochs and Capps 1996:26). The purposive 
utilisation of narrative and emotion together proves to be extremely 
compelling, and has provided the basis for propaganda (as explored in the 
Nazi context), and drives news media bottom lines (as observed in the 
discussion on post 9/11 rhetoric, and news media reporting on refugees). 
 
The inclination to organise experience in terms of plot is a uniquely human 
attribute. Also unique to humans is the ability to create and recount imagined 
universes. Humans are both homo narans and homo fabulans – the tellers 
and interpreters of narrative (Currie 1998 in Brown 2006:734). Thus 
narratives that are held in a collective consciousness are often a combination 
of actual and quasi-fictional experiences, containing lacunae and hermeneutic 
uncertainty. These stories “might not be empirically accurate (indeed they 
often are not), but they are deeply felt, [and] often lie behind political 
attitudes and action, and reflect, shape, and solidify political, social, and 
cultural identity”  (Kreiss, Barker, and Zenner, 2017:472). All of these 
elements can be witnessed through the unpacking of German and North 
American fear narratives, which often seem to be a mix of fact and fiction, 
stemming from both top down, and bottom up sources, bolstering or bolstered 
by political action.  
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Michael Carrithers (1992 in Beatty 2014) has shown how our capacity to 
operate within and across cultural boundaries is dependent on our skill at 
reading situations, understanding the plot, and recognising and constructing 
the narratives that give shape to events. These narratives in which we place 
our new found knowledge fit into different genres. Preconceived notions or 
stories play a role in how people interpret threats. We draw upon learned 
analogies to make sense of dangerous or threatening situations – to predict 
outcomes and moderate behaviour. 
 
Narratives importantly create neural pathways. What neuroscientific research 
tells us is that we are predisposed to think in narrative form, thus “the reality 
we construct is a narrative one” (Brown 2006:734). Whenever we are 
presented with new material or information, we do not perceive every aspect 
of what is new. Rather, during the course of events new situations or facts can 
be understood by being placed within the context of known narratives, where 
gaps in knowledge of perception are quickly filled by relating back to pre-
existent stories. Cognitive science tells us that once a story pattern is elicited 
within a human’s mind, it is incredibly difficult to shift from the pre-conceived 
configuration of these cell assemblies (Lakoff 2008, Royal 2011). This general 
cognitive mechanism is called ‘encoding’ (Hogan 2003:35). Repeated 
exposure to certain narratives increases cognitive sensitivity to the patterns 
contained within them, and new information is understood through these 
existing models, creating pre-primed expectation and reactions. I suggest that 
this is also true of the collective emotional identity. Certain narratives appear 
throughout the social history of a people, and this repeated exposure 
hardwires the reactions of the group when presented with certain stimuli, or 
more to the point in the contexts of the USA and Germany, certain people. 
 Consequently narratives of fear feed off their own ancestral past.   
 
It would appear that narrative and emotions are often inextricably linked, and 
that the one can hardly be understood without the other. 
For example: sadness may be defined as what you feel at the loss of someone 
you care about, and it is what is expressed through the act of weeping.  
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“The most intense, immediate emotions—joy at the birth of a child, grief at a 
sudden death—derive their fullest meaning from complex personal histories” 
(Beatty 2010:430). Emotions are embedded in stories, and defined and 
explained through narrative (Goldie 2012).  Narrative is the perfect vehicle 
through which to explore emotion, because narrative (like emotion) draws 
together social and temporal elements. Narrative gives form and presence to 
emotions and memories, and lets them be communicated and shared on a 
micro and macro level, providing a connective structure.  
 
When examining collective emotions, and shared cultural narratives, it is 
important to remember that “narratives are not simply transparent, 
atemporal vehicles which carry pre-given meanings, but are the product of 
authorial and reader impositions at a particular historical juncture” 
(Worthington, 1996:76 in Brown 2006:741). Bhabha’s excellent work Nation 
and Narration (2013) suggests that nations consciously and actively construct 
narratives of self to create the impression of historical continuity and social 
unity to which immigrants and ‘others’ (such as refugees) are purposively and 
teleologically excluded. 
 
Refugees: Some Definitions 
In pop-culture, mass media, and political rhetoric, the terms ‘immigrant’ and 
‘refugee’ are often conflated, especially in the United States. However, 
‘immigrant’ and ‘refugee’ are completely different categories. ‘Immigrant’ 
describes anyone who comes to live in a country that is not their country of 
origin; it is a broad term that encompasses many different scenarios. 
Conversely, there are strict categories that delineate who is a refugee, and who 
is not. The UNHCR (the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, also 
known as the UN Refugee Agency) defines a refugee as someone who:  
Has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, 
or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership 
in a particular social group. Most likely, they cannot return home or are 
afraid to do so.   -UNHCR   
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The inclusion of a specific identified ‘refugee category’ is relatively recent. It 
was sparked by the greater restrictions sounding immigration post WWI to 
protect those fleeing from persecution (Colson 2003). However, this step 
simply marked the recognition for the need of such a category. It was not until 
the end of WWII that the rights and duty of protection of such peoples was 
established within the nomenclature of law.  
 
The 1951 Geneva Convention was the first, and remains the main international 
instrument of refugee law. It was created predominantly to deal with the large 
numbers of displaced people that the war created in Europe, but was 
expanded in 1967 as the number of refugees increased globally (UNHCR). 
These historical, political and bureaucratic actions surrounding refugees have 
been (and continue to be) predominantly reactive, and reactionary. Their 
focus is often myopic. They are not geared towards long-term improvements 
in either living condition or social policy - but as they are the only frameworks 
in place, they unsurprisingly have long-term effects in shaping social 
topographies (Feldman 2007).  
 
The question of aid, protection, and political involvement surrounding 
refugees is a complex one.  Colson (2003) argues that the refugee experience 
is highly politicised, in that one becomes and remains a refugee due to 
political action. This is undoubtedly true - and yet ironically - the question of 
politics is one of the endemic challenges of humanitarian relief and law for 
refugees. The non-political stance of humanitarian organisations is often what 
makes their practice possible, “permitting access to populations in need of aid, 
convincing countries to sign on to refugee conventions - but it also gives 
humanitarianism a sometimes cruelly narrow focus, able to keep people alive 
but entirely incapable of changing the conditions that have put them at such 
great risk” (Feldman, 2007:138-139). Additionally, once refugees are resettled 
(since policies surrounding this process are reactionary), there are generally 
troubles with successful assimilation into the pre-existent social structures23, 
																																																								
23	This can manifest physically within the geographies of cityscapes. 
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which can reinforce difference, and a sense of fear of the unknown, for both 
refugees and host communities.  
 
Citizenship 
The treatment of refugees often brings up questions of citizenship, for the two 
are inextricably linked. Asylum seekers occupy a unique and liminal position 
within both the conception and practice of citizenship. Indeed, questions of 
citizenship are so integral to understanding the broader plight of these groups 
of people that the loss of citizenship (and to an extent related identity) from 
their home environment, and their right to citizenship in their resettled 
location, has been the focus of many of the anthropological studies of the 
refugee experience (Feldman 2007, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016).   
 
Citizenship in its most basic form refers to the legal status of a person as a 
member of a nation or a sovereign state, and their associated rights.24 One of 
the most influential expositions of citizenship-as-rights is T. H. Marshall’s 
Citizenship and Social Class (1950). This work arose from the intellectually 
fertile ground of the post-war period, developing apace with the new 
legislative developments surrounding the delineation of a category of stateless 
peoples (such as the Geneva Convention, as touched on above). Marshall’s 
citizenship rights were based on three categories: civil rights (a place within - 
and protection of - a particular group, predominantly determined by 
geographical boundaries, such as countries or nation states), political rights 
																																																																																																																																																														
Simone Tulumello (2017) for example, provides a detailed examination of the 
intersection of urban space and otherness, and looks specifically at the 
location of refugees and immigrants within the social space. 	
24 This definition provides less than a skeletal understanding of the multiple 
facets that are contained under the banner of citizenship. Many scholars have 
come to dispute the notion that questions of citizenship can be so simply 
explained. Indeed, as far back as 1844, Marx was arguing in On the Jewish 
Question that the idea of citizenship as purely a language of a possession of 
rights and political participation was too narrow, and failed to address the 
“wide range of popular praxis and collective aspirations necessary for human 
emancipation in the wider sense” (Jaoul 2016:4). Access to true citizenship is 
the ultimate goal of the class struggle. 
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(such as the right to vote), and social rights (such as public welfare and public 
education).  
For Marshall, the fullest expression of citizenship requires a liberal- 
democratic welfare state. By guaranteeing civil, political, and social 
rights to all, the welfare state ensures that every member of society 
feels like a full member of society, able to participate in and enjoy the 
common life of society (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994:354). 
 
Discussions of citizenship chime with still broader questions on the nature of 
human rights. The relationship between citizenship and rights has been 
perhaps most famously addressed by Hannah Arendt in her work The Origins 
of Totalitarianism (1951). Arendt argued (drawing from the plight of the 
WWII refugees) that citizenship is the vessel through which people gain access 
to the most basic of human rights. There is no such thing in practice as 
‘universal human rights’; rights are bestowed by a nation state. Thus for 
Arendt, to be stateless symbolises the very loss of ‘the right to have rights’. 
This approach has been critiqued by others such as Rancière (2004), who 
argues that Arendt’s theorization of statelessness is aporetic, and creates a 
frame of description that proves effective “for depoliticising matters of power 
and repression and setting them in a sphere of exceptionality that is no longer 
political, in an anthropological sphere of sacrality situated beyond the reach of 
political dissensus” (299).  
 
Indeed questions of exclusion, power and repression come hand-in-hand with 
discussions of citizenship. “Theoretical and empirical interest in citizenship in 
the last two decades focused on processes and practices that exclude or 
include more or less actively members in a given political community” (Jaoul 
2016:4). Many scholars argue that the concept of citizenship developed 
alongside the idea of democracy, in classical Athens.25 Hosking (2005) 
suggests that citizenship is ultimately about freedom. He propounds that it 
was the growth of visible slavery that made the Greeks particularly conscious 
																																																								
25 This is not to say that other cultures outside of the Western world do not 
and have not had similar constructs, but rather that the wealth of accessible 
information exists on Western paradigms.  
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about the importance of freedom26, and made them anxious to provide a clear 
legal and social boundary as to divide those with freedoms (citizens) and those 
without.27 Citizenship would seem to exist on a scale of inclusion to exclusion: 
and ultimately be about the “struggles and processes that constitute the field 
in between” (Rieter 2013:xv). In other words, citizenship has never simply 
been about political and social involvement as argued by T.H Marshall (1950), 
but rather has always involved the process of othering; defining oneself in 
relation to (or opposition against) another’s set of rights, or non-rights. One 
may be legally a citizen, but paradoxically be fundamentally excluded from the 
very rights (be they political, economic, social, or cultural) that comprise such 
citizenship. This is often the case for resettled refugees who obtain citizenship.  
 
The specifics of citizenship - like all else that is peculiarly human – are not 
static. They vary across both time and space. However, the process of systemic 
exclusion of those who fail to possess the required social or economic standing 
to be embraced by the community/society/nation is a reoccurring pattern. 
Thus it is through this understanding of its inherent tensions that citizenship 
and the diametrically opposed condition of statelessness is here explored.28 
Two major reoccurring factors that have dictated the historical trend of 




26 Zygmunt Bauman’s understanding of freedom echoes these sentiments. 
Bauman sees freedom as a social relation - “for one to be free there must be at 
least two” (1988:9). 
27 In ancient Greece this category of  ‘non citizen’ originally included not just 
slaves, but also women, and those who did not own land. 
28 Historically the original Greek conception of ‘citizen’ reflected the 
understanding of democracy, in that all citizens were actively involved in the 
governance of their community, and there was little to no separation in this 
sense between the rulers and the ruled. In the Roman Republic citizenship 
was less heavily political, and was rather used as a banner under which to 
unite Romans, and those they ‘conquered’. In this instance also citizenship 
was still heavily dependent on one’s social and economic standing. This is a 
theme that continued in Europe throughout the Middle Ages, and 
Renaissance, and was transmitted through both time and space through the 
process of colonisation, and remains an important delineating factor today 
(Reiter 2013). 
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Examples of these exist (and continue to exist) within the history of the two 
focal nations of this research, Germany and the United States. In the German 
context Reiter argues that Christian advance in European democracy was 
“routinely achieved by climbing on the backs of the perpetual ‘others’ in 
Europe, the Jews” (2013:xx). The stratification of civil society based on anti-
Semitism reached its most visible and vitriolic in Germany with the rise of 
National Socialism (Nazism). Hitler’s Mein Kampf  (1943) classified denizens 
of the nation into three main hierarchical categories: citizens, subjects of the 
state, and aliens. Each had different rights and duties in relation to the 
German Reich, and were treated in direct accordance with their stratified 
status. In the United States ethnic background (or ‘race’) was used from the 
late 18th century until the middle of the 20th to establish and regulate 
citizenship with both Native Americans and African Americans being excluded 
at different times. 
 
Anthropology and Refugee Studies 
Following along in tandem with the trajectories of globalisation, mechanised 
warfare, and climate change, the spatial and social displacement of peoples 
has been markedly increasing since the mid 20th Century. This number 
contains a large contingent of legally classifiable refugees. The steady increase 
of refugees in the world’s global population seems to suggest a self-delimiting 
area of study for anthropologists. Maliki (1997) argues against the validity of 
studies focused on ‘refugees’ as a categorisation of people, as she states that 
each instance of ‘uprooting’ is the realisation of a unique set of historical and 
political circumstance and experience. To deal with them as victims, as 
persons knowable only through their need - ultimately dehumanises and 
dehistoricises the refugee (as cited in Colson, 2003:2).  
 
However Bascom (1998) states that while personal circumstance and 
experience are relative, uprooting and its aftermath are structuring events; 
and that people can be expected to react in a very human way when suffering 
the wrenching loss of displacement - which creates commonalities across 
experiences and responses, and provides rich ground for study (as cited in 
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Colson 2003:3). Colson (2003) addresses the fact that the question may be 
asked (by the subjects) as to what right social scientists have to study their 
suffering and displacement. She argues that (in the case of refugee studies) 
while one answer would point to the old argument that good research should 
inform policy and lead to its betterment - perhaps a more realistic argument 
would be, “since any one, including social scientists, may be uprooted, we 
want to know what to expect and how one learns to live with the uncertainties, 
the loss of trust, and the indignities that you are experiencing and surviving.” 
(2003:3-4).  
 
It is from these points of departure that this research takes its tone in the 
treatment of refugees. It is acknowledged that ‘refugees’ are not a 
homogenous group, dehistoricised, depoliticised, stripped of agency and cast 
upon the mercy of the NGOs and nations that receive them. But rather, the 
term is used as a broad legal or descriptive rubric that includes within it 
people from a myriad of different personal histories, political backgrounds, 
socioeconomic statuses, understandings and beliefs, that are united by some 
common experiences. Also, as the nature of Earth is rapidly changing (both 
literally, and socio-politically), displacement and arrivals are a theme that will 
heavily characterise the nature of the human experience in the future, and 
thus, this is a crucial area to try and understand.   
 
In the anthropological tradition thus far a great deal of attention has been 
paid in the field of migration and refugee studies to the experience of refugees 
in camps (for example Gabiam 2016), the sense of loss, of homeland and self 
that comes with the label ‘stateless’ (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016, Ghosh 2016), 
and the difficulties inherent in arrival, and resettling in new social and 
cultural landscapes (Robertson, Wilding, and Gifford 2016). However, there is 
somewhat of a lacuna in the research, as less attention has been paid to the 
reactions and experiences of host nations in relation to the arrivals of 
refugees; with Colson stating that  “a great deal more research needs to be 
carried out on what happens to those who willingly or unwillingly become 
hosts, whose lives are changed by the arrival of the uprooted” (2003:11).  
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The Refugee Crisis: 2015 and Beyond 
The idea of refugees as a serious matter for global consideration began 
appearing more visibly in the western consciousness, and mainstream media, 
in 2015 with the rise of what has been titled the refugee ‘crisis’. This particular 
crisis refers to the increased flow of refugees that Europe experienced from 
2015. The majority of these refugees originate from Syria, and are fleeing their 
country’s civil war. Syria is a country composed of a diverse ethno-religious 
population. Sunni Arabs make up a little over 60 percent, along with 
Christians (10-12 percent), Shiites (similarly about 10-12 percent), Druze 
(approximately 6 percent), and other ethnic minorities such as the Kurds and 
Armenians (Carpenter 2013:1). 
 
The Assad family has held power for more than four decades through the 
support of the Alawite and Christian minorities, along with the Druze and 
other smaller minority populations. The 2011-12 rebellion (largely influenced 
by the Arab Spring protests) was partially motivated by the Sunni Arab desire 
to overthrow the ‘minority rule’ regime (Carpenter 2013, Ostrand 2015). The 
Arab Spring protests were kindled by protests in Tunisia - which resulted in 
the authoritarian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali resigning suddenly, and 
fleeing to Saudi Arabia. This inspired activists in other countries to mobilise 
and protest similar authoritarian regimes, to differing levels of success. 
Protests calling for Assad’s removal were violently supressed, resulting in 
multiple human rights violations, and developing into a prolonged civil war.     
 
The Syrian civil war illuminated global relational schisms, having a corrosive 
effect on the ‘West’s’ relations with Russia and China – as disagreements 
about how to handle the fighting in Syria produced vehement accusations and 
recriminations on both sides. The United States (under Barack Obama’s 
administration) accused Russia and China of remaining on ‘the sidelines’ of 
the Syrian conflict, as the dissolution of the Assad Regime would not benefit 
Russian or Chinese National interests – both having long-standing economic 
and strategic ties with Assad’s government (Carpenter 2013). The ‘West’ (or 
the USA and its NATO allies) originally adopted the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
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doctrine.29  On the other hand Russia and China appeared to subscribe to the 
Westphalian system, which generally warns against outside interference 
(especially by the ‘great powers’) in the internal affairs of other nations.30 
From the perspective of Moscow and Beijing the Western partiality towards 
forced regime change created an even greater potential for increased chaos in 
the Middle East. There was also the worry that US policy surrounding Syria 
was simply an attempt to advance American policy preferences and those of 
its allies (Carpenter 2013:10).    
 
There are two main ways for Syrians to achieve protection in ‘Western’ states 
outside the immediate region. The first is to travel (legally or otherwise) to a 
nation and attempt to claim asylum there. The second involves being selected 
as a refugee for resettlement from a country of first asylum. The main 
difference between these approaches is the location of the person at the time 
of application: “Refugee determinations and resettlement decisions are made 
while the person is outside the destination country. In contrast, a person 
seeking asylum submits an application while they are physically present in or 
at a port of entry in the territory where they are requesting refuge” (Ostrand 
2015: 258). While no country is legally obliged to resettle refugees, nations do 
have an obligation to provide protection as far as possible if they are UNHCR 
signatories. 
 
The movement of refugees is not a new phenomenon in Europe due to its 
geographical location and interconnectivity. Historically the aftermath of the 
World Wars displaced many. However in 2015, the sheer volume of asylum 
seekers presented an unprecedented set of issues surrounding how to deal 
with an influx of people en masse. With 487,000 people arriving on Europe’s 
Mediterranean shores in the first half of 2015 alone (Holmes and Castañeda 
2016: 12).   
																																																								
29 Outlining that when a regime systematically oppresses and brutalises its 
population, global powers have an obligation to take actions to protect the 
citizens of the regime, and if necessary depose said regime – however this 
doctrine has been followed somewhat unevenly. 
30 However Russia has been accused of conducting airstrikes and other 
military operations in the region since 2015. 
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Between 2015 and 2017 the numbers of asylum seekers only increased, and 
according to the UNHCR 2017 was witness to some of the highest levels of 
displaced peoples ever recorded. The global population of displaced people is, 
as of 2020, estimated to be as high as 65.6 million, with refugees making up 
22.5 million of this total, and Syrian refugees making up 5.5 million of that. 
Other large groups of refugees have fled violence in Palestine, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Myanmar. Not all of these peoples are seeking 
asylum in Europe, with Africa playing host to the largest number (30%), the 
Middle East and North Africa close behind (26%), and Europe and the 
Americas both at about 16% (UNHCR, September 9, 2017). Within Europe, 
Germany received the highest number of asylum applications, with 476,000 
registered claims (and over a million who have actually been counted as 
arriving in the country), with Hungary and Italy close behind (BBC, 4 March, 
2016).  
 
Holmes and Castañeda (2016) argue that the situation can be framed as a 
‘crisis’ in the sense conceptualised by Antonio Gramsci - in which we are in a 
state of uncertainty, or flux (concerning both present and future) where “the 
old is dying and the new cannot be born” (1971:276, as cited in Holmes and 
Castañeda 2016:13). This crisis highlights the shifting fields of social, political, 
geographical, material, symbolic, and spiritual ground that are in motion. 
How asylum seekers are treated reveals a great deal about fears surrounding 
otherness and change within the neoliberal paradigm of limited good (dictated 
by ontological insecurity). While many of the structural and humanitarian 
problems inherent in the crisis directly arise from policies whose aim it was to 
control and confine migration since the 1980’s (Hess et al. 2015 as cited in 
Holmes and Castañeda 2016:13), somehow the locus of blame (and also 
responsibility) has escaped these powerful actors and policy creators in the 
USA and Europe, and instead comes to rest upon the displaced people 
themselves. This is painfully apparent in the narratives of fear that have been 
directed against refugees in Germany and the USA. However, an examination 
of this crisis can:  
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help us learn a great deal about how the responsibility for suffering is 
shifted: how fears of cultural, ethnic, and religious difference are 
mobilized; and how boundaries of social categories are made and 
unmade, [and] sorting people into undeserving trespassers versus 
those who deserve rights and care from the state (Holmes and 
Castañeda 2016:13, emphasis added).  
An exploration of the refugee crisis has much to reveal about the purpose and 
methods of ethnography for socio-cultural anthropology, about future modes 
of engagement, about how to deal (and hopefully - how to better deal) with the 
shifting planes of the world we inhabit, identity construction, where fears 
come from, how fear is treated - and ultimately what this says about us as 
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Chapter 3: Historical Narratives of Fear 
Narratives of fear in Germany and the USA surrounding the refugee 
population throughout the ‘refugee crisis’ have tended to be characterised by 
similar patterns. Here I seek to understand the emergence of these narratives 
in Germany and the USA through examining historical instances in which 
other fearful narratives arose to dominate the social topography. I argue that 
each nation has developed certain topoi that characterise their fearful stories 
throughout time, creating (and created by) a cultural emotional residuum of 
fear. I do not intend to suggest that there is only one narrative, or experience, 
of fear in these nations. Rather, an attempt is made to map the emergence of 
resilient, reoccurring narratives which are reflected by pockets within the 
populations - and which ultimately influence their understanding of self and 
other  
 
Narratives of Fear in Germany 
Folk Tales and Morality: The Brothers Grimm 
German narratives of fear have been marked by the sharp ideological desire to 
protect and maintain a German national identity. In order to trace this back to 
the root, I examine an important step in the construction of the Germanic 
cultural legacy – the stories of the Brothers Grimm.  
 
This section explores somewhat outside the pattern of the rest of the 
narratives that are discussed here, as the tales collected by the Brothers 
Grimm are fictional, imbued with elements of fantasy and magic.  
The other narratives that are present in this chapter (and the narratives that 
are discussed throughout the rest of this research) are for the most part, 
grounded in non-fiction (although often encompassing elements of fiction, 
through rumour and exaggeration). However, these stories illustrate much 
about the development of a collective cultural residuum of fear that exists in 
certain facets of German society. Furthermore, they paint a picture of the 
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evolution of German nationalism, which goes on to heavily inform future 
narratives.   
Folk tales and fairy tales have always been dependent on customs, 
rituals, and values in a particular socialization process of a culture. 
They have always symbolically depicted the nature of power 
relationships within a given society. Thus, they are strong indicators of 
the level of culture, that is, the essential quality of a culture and social 
order (Zipes 1979:40). 
 
Folklore is a tradition that both mirrors and shapes the fears, anxieties, hopes 
and values of any given society. It is a widely held belief that fairy and 
folktales31 are not to be simply taken at face value, but rather that their 
purpose lies in the fact that they communicate higher truths; be they 
emotional32, religious, philosophical, allegorical or symbolic (McGlathery 
1991, Blackwell 1987, Tartar 2003, Warner 1995, Zipes 1979, 2006, 2013, 2015 
and Calloni 2016). While these tales communicate truth, it is important to 
simultaneously note the relativity of meaning, and to recall that the 
interpretation of these tales is always subject to social, cultural, political and 
moral shifts. Thus to truly understand folktales, one must situate them within 
the context that they were written or told. As Marina Warner puts it in the 
introduction to her 1995 book From the Beast to the Blond: “I began 
investigating the meanings of the tales themselves, but I soon found it was 
essential to look at the context in which they were told, at who was telling 
them, to whom, and why” (1995:xii emphasis added). An examination of the 
																																																								
31 Tatar gives definition of folk and fairy tales: folk tales are historically oral 
narratives that are shared among ‘the folk’; they usually have a realistic setting 
with naturalistic details. Fairy tales on the other hand, are both oral and 
literary and are set in a magical fictional world where preternatural events 
often occur (2003:33). However very few of the tales contained in the 
Grimm’s collection adhere rigidly to either description, indeed the Grimm’s 
called their stories Märchen or “little tales”, a term that encompasses all types 
of folk and fairy tales. Since there is no word equivalent to Märchen in 
English, I use fairy and folktales as overarching categories to cover the 
spectrum of tales presented by the Grimms. 
32 Folktales prove to be a particularly emotion-laden form of narrative. 
Mohammad (2011) created an emotion-word analyser, which showed that 
folktales (he used the Brother’s Grimm collection as an example) have a much 
higher density of emotion-words than any other kind of fiction writing. 
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Märchen collected by the Brothers Grimm illuminates fears that were held by 
the volk (in the earlier collections), and also reveals the fears of the 
bourgeoisie reflected through the transformation and manipulation of these 
stories in the progressive editions.       
 
The very creation of the collection of these stories was (in part) motivated by 
fear, fear over the loss of cultural identity. Great social and political change 
occurred in the early 19th century in the Germanic region. This area went from 
being part of the Holy Roman Empire, to Napoleon’s Empire, to becoming the 
German Confederation. Germany originally consisted of over 300 states, with 
unique dialects and regional identities. The post-Napoleonic efforts towards 
unification were grounded in the notion that shared language and shared 
cultural heritage could forge a Germanic community that would develop into a 
political nation (Seago 2001). The brothers were passionate about this cause, 
and felt that the true unifying aspect of German culture was German language, 
and specifically that German language and tradition were best exemplified 
through tales of the past. The Grimms feared that if these tales were to be lost, 
it would signify the loss of a shared culture and future. It was the Grimm’s 
ideological and philological intention to recover folktales so that they could 
breathe new life into the German cultural legacy.  
While the stories that are touched on in this section come from the Grimms’ 
tradition, it is important to note that the brothers - rather than being the 
outright creators of these tales - rather functioned originally as transmitters, 
or re-tellers of existing narratives. Very little (even arguably none) of the 
original content was their own (McGlathery 1991). The Grimms were part of 
the Romantic movement in Germany. Their initial focus was to contribute to 
the Naturpoesie (ancient folk and oral literature) rather that Kunstpoesie (the 
body of literature that emanated from academic and creative writers), And 
thus they set about collecting the stories of the working classes, whom they 
believed embodied the true German spirit. The Brothers Grimm captured 
these stories (many of which had enjoyed different incarnations orally) in 
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written form.33 The written ‘fixing’ of these tales in print changed the stories 
somewhat - as it not only highlighted one version of the tale, but also lent the 
literary version a sense of authority. While the Grimms’ collected tales are 
contemporarily understood as being predominantly for children, presented as 
Kinder- und Hausmärchen, young ones were not originally the intended 
readership. The Grimm’s collections of tales were predominantly designed to 
provide narratives of self-education for adult readers.34 The Brothers Grimm 
called them ‘children’s tales’ because of the nature of truth that the tales 
emitted.  
Rölleke (2011, as cited in Zipes 2013) asserts that the first edition of the 
Grimms’ tales is in many ways the most important, as the brothers did not 
visit vast changes on the tales, but rather transcribed them as they were 
delivered them. Thus this 1812/15 collection of tales contains more of the raw 
essence of the oral tradition, revealing the wishes and concerns of the 
informants, and is a more useful tool in examining the cultural concerns of the 
people of that time.35 However, critics have argued that the tales that were 
collected did not always come directly from the volk; rather, that the brothers 
had relayed tales told to them by all sorts of people, with many contributors 
being from the educated, upper-middle classes like themselves, as well as 
from the more rural communities (Zipes 2013).36 Subsequently doubt is cast 
																																																								
33 In oral tradition, stories are tailored to an audience in a given time or place 
(written or recorded stories also contain this element, however with much less 
a degree of immediacy, they reflect broad social and cultural trends of the 
time, whereas oral stories are often ultra specific and reflective of the 
particular individuals who are hearing the tale). 
34 The brothers argued that their tales were not meant to be overtly didactic 
but rather, that moral and other lessons flowed organically from the tales 
(Zipes 2015:44). 
35 This draws on the work of the prominent folklorist Jack Zipes who in 2014 
published an English language translation of the Grimm’s earliest edition. 
Zipes’ aim was to translate the original tales as closely as possible, as existing 
English versions of the tales were based almost entirely on the 1857 edition 
which by that time had been significantly edited by the brothers (specifically 
Wilhelm).   
36 Blackwell (1987) also states that the Grimms took these tales mainly from 
female informants (oral tales often being shared and held among women, 
passed down from mother to daughter), and then proceeded - for the most 
part – to erase female voices from the stories, reducing women into two main 
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on whether these tales can actually be understood as communicating the fears 
of the volk. I would posit that the ‘true’ origin of these stories is incredibly 
hard to pinpoint, and that they have continuingly been formed and reformed 
(Kyritsi 2004). They stem not from one particular source (the German rural 
peoples), but are informed by many traditions (drawing from Indo-European 
sources). I suggest that the scope of the linguistic and thematic changes that 
occurred within the progressive incarnations of the collections reveals that the 
original versions were better aligned with working class experience, and that 
they were increasingly manipulated to express and reflect upper-middle class 
and elite sensibilities. Thus I see the first two volumes as predominantly an 
expression of the volk experience.     
 
The fears that emerge in these early editions speak to hunger, the harsh 
treatment and abandonment of children, and violent death. At the heart of 
most of the Grimm’s fairy tales lies the ideological struggle for power and 
autonomy. This ideological struggle bleeds into the other German narratives 
of fear examined in this research, and is one of the foundational aspects of this 
particular German cultural residuum of fear.  
 
More than seventy-five percent of the Grimms’ tales involve the manipulation 
and exploitation of young people (Zipes 2015). Those whose lives are put at 
risk because of adults (“Hansel and Gretel”, “Snow White”, “Rapunzel”, “The 
Maiden Without Hands”), young protagonists who are set in conflict with 
their parents or step parents (“The Juniper Tree”, “Little Brother and Little 
Sister”, “Little Lamb and Little Fish”), sibling rivalry (“Mother Holle”, “The 
Singing Bone”), dangerous predators (“Little Red Cap”, “Fitcher’s Bird”), and 
kings and queens who abuse their power (“The Devil With the Three Golden 
Hairs”, “All Fur” - which also contains fears of sexual abuse and incest).  
Hunger and loss of livelihood is also a common concern in the earliest 
collection (“The Children of Famine”, “Simpleton”, “The Long Nose”, “The 
Virgin Mary’s Child”). These themes express real-life fears of physical, 
domestic and sexual abuse, poverty, political oppression and coercion 
																																																																																																																																																														
types, ugly and vindictive old hags, and innocent (but useless) virginal 
maidens). 
Chapter 3 | Historical Narratives of Fear 
	 44	
(Boudinot 2007, Calloni 2016). These same themes dominate German 
xenophobic narratives surrounding refugees post Merkel’s open-border 
policy, in which some Germans express fear of violent attacks by refugees, link 
Islam to sexual deviancy and sexual assault, voice concerns about increasing 
‘real German’ poverty due to amplified competition for limited resources, and 
worry about ‘ethnic replacement’. As one Twitter user ‘Corrion’ remarked on a 
German thread, “The condition of entry for economic migrants should be 
sterilization where ever they go these arabs [sic] have dozens of children each” 
(Corrion 2017). Another commented on a Youtube video titled “Germany’s 
complicated relationship with refugees”: “…The new majority (those from the 
middle east will change this country forever.) [sic] Now I’m not saying no non-
white immigrants but there needs to be safe guards in place to keep the 
culture and its [sic] people around” (RedX1652 2017).    
 
While the fears captured in the early work of the Grimms still remain in the 
1857 edition, the stories themselves had been so manipulated that the original 
concerns were overshadowed by those of the German upper and middle 
classes. The brother’s collection underwent 17 incarnations in their lifetime 
(between 1812 and 1857). Through these editions the Grimms both 
consciously and unconsciously integrated their own moral compasses, which 
were heavily influenced by their staunch Calvinism (Tatar 2003). As 
discussed, the brother’s ultimate aim was to curate a sense of ‘German-ness’ 
through these stories, which they believed exemplified the essence of German 
culture. Through progressive editions they increasingly focused emphasis 
explicitly on the actions and traits they deemed as ideologically and culturally 
expressive of German norms and values, rather than relying on the implicit 
lessons in the original versions. These ‘ideal’ qualities differed between the 
gender roles, with an emphasis being placed on passivity and self-sacrifice for 
girls, and competitiveness and material success for boys (Zipes 1979:4). These 
‘traditional’ ‘ideal’ qualities for the genders would be taken up, and expounded 
upon by the National Socialists.   
 
The bowdlerisation of the tales was also partially driven by their audience, 
which was predominantly the upper and middle classes, as well as the 
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children of these groups. Thus the brothers were under pressure to rework the 
tales in a way that would be seen as suitable for children. This resulted in the 
softening of violence, and the near removal of sexual themes, producing 
stories infused by “sentimental Christianity and puritanical ideology” (Zipes in 
Grimm and Grimm 2014:xx). 
 
Take for example the story of “Little Red Cap” (more commonly known as 
Little Red Riding Hood, or Rotkappchen). The 1812 version is a simple tale 
that starts with a young girl going to take provisions to her grandmother. 
“Come little Red Cap take this piece of cake and bottle of wine and bring them 
to your Grandmother…Go directly there”, “Well the Grandmother lived in the 
forest, half an hour from the village, and as soon as Little Red Cap entered the 
forest she encountered the wolf” (Grimm and Grimm 2014:85).  Over time, 
through the Grimms’ progressing versions, the tale takes on cosmic 
dimensions, replete with Christian overtones of the struggle between good and 
evil, and reinforced with bourgeoisie socialised notions of female sexuality. 
 
 In the Grimms’ 1857 version Little Red Cap is no longer simply a village 
maiden, rather she is the embodiment of innocence: “Once upon a time there 
was a dear little girl who was loved by everyone that looked at her”, and must 
learn to fear her own curiosity and sexuality. “Come Little Red Cap…set out 
before it gets hot, and when you are going, walk nicely and quietly and do not 
run off the path, or you may fall”, but Little Red Cap disobeys her mother, led 
astray by the wolf: “See little Red Cap, how pretty the flowers are about here – 
why do you not look around?”; “and so she ran from the path into the wood to 
look for flowers” (Grimm and Grimm 1972:139 -140).  In this version the tale 
has been reworked to reflect German bourgeois Biedermeier (Victorian-esqe) 
morals and ethics, focusing mainly on sexual repression (Zipes 1979). Here 
the dark woods37 represent immorality, and one (young females) should not 
																																																								
37	The woods, or the forest, are heavy with symbolism within the German 
zeitgeist. They are intrinsically tied to deep notions of German Nationalism, 
from folk tales to Nazi Germany, and speak to the theme surrounding the deep 
connection to German land and soil that informs conceptions of German 
identity: “the long undeniable connections between the mythic memory of the 
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stray from the straight path, lest they risk the consequences, while the wolf 
represents the devil, or sexually starved males (if you are not ‘nice’ and ‘quiet’ 
and if you stray from the path, the wolf will swallow you). The theme of sexual 
aggression, perpetrated by an ‘outsider’ on the bodies of German women and 
girls is one of the main narratives of fear that has arisen about refugees in the 
German context.   
 
Bottigheimer (in McGlathery 1991) argues that the success of the Brothers 
Grimms’ published collections ultimately represented a yearning in the 
middleclass, middle-aged adults in nineteenth-century Germany to return to 
the ways of the volk: “The craving was for some idealised, immutable rural 
community that had not been prostituted by industrial modernity” (Schama 
1995: 117). This suggests that the brothers’ fear of the loss of the ‘German 
essence’ was mirrored in the wider society. While the 1812 and 1857 editions 
marked changes, themes that remained consistent displayed a respect for the 
home, the family, class structure, patriarchal order, and the ‘simplicity’ of 
rural life. Class structure was unchangingly rigid in the folktales, the upper 
and lower classes are for the most part depicted favourably: “The entire cast of 
characters in this world is precisely determined: kings, princes, faithful 
servants, and honest tradesmen – especially fishermen, millers, colliers, and 
herdsmen, who are closest to nature – make their appearance” (Grimm and 
Grimm 2014:4). However merchants, innkeepers, doctors, clerics, and Jews, 
often feature as the antagonists (“Sesame Mountain”, “The Three 
Journeymen”, “The Devil’s Sooty Brother”), painted as figures of greed  
(Snyder 1951:215). These characterisations echoed the anxieties surrounding 
the changing social fabric of Germany, which was moving from a ‘traditional’ 
feudal society to a capitalist economy.38  
 
																																																																																																																																																														
forest and militant nationalism have created a zone of great moral angst in 
Germany” (Schama 1995: 119).			 
38 Tönnies highlighted the distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
in 1887. These concepts roughly relate to ‘community’ and ‘market society’. 
Tönnies argued that pre-modern society was characterised by Gemeinschaft, 
while Gesellschaft dominated capitalist societies. Weber proceeded to build 
upon these ideas in Economy and Society in 1921 (in Waters 2007).  
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The negative framing of a particular group that is seen to represent change, 
(and therefore a threat to German national identity) is a theme that dominates 
the genealogy of this German emotional residuum of fear from folk tale, Nazi 
propaganda, Cold War era Berlin, and remains embedded in the narratives 
that surround refugees. One Twitter user who goes under the name ‘Wilhelm 
Grimm’, and the handle @grimm_grimm1 (along with a picture of the 
historical Wilhelm Grimm), posts xenophobic tweets about refugees. One such 
thread posted on the eleventh of March 2018 reads “Niemand sagt dass 
Flüchtlinge an allen Problemen der Welt Schuld sind, die EU, NATO und Co. 
gibt es schließlich auch noch, aber es lassen sich nun mal Tendenzen, 
besonders in Kriminalität feststellen. (No one is saying that refugees are to 
blame for all the world’s problems, after all, the EU, NATO and the like still 
exist, but trends can be observed, especially in crime). Wilhelm Grimm added: 
Und noch was warum kommen diese Leute ausgerechnet nach 
Deutschland, und nicht in ein anderes Land (stell dir diese Frage mal 
wirklich)? Für mich ist das einfach nur eine Inkaufnahme, durch 
Merkels Einladung entstandener Probleme, wie z. B. mehr Sexual- und 
Gewaltstraftaten. (And why do these people come to Germany of all 
places, and not to another country (really ask yourself this question)? 
For me, this is simply the arrival of problems caused by Merkel's 
invitation, such as more sexual and violent crimes) (Wilhelm Grimm 
2018). 
  
The fears that are captured and transmitted in the collections of the Brothers 
Grimm express not only the struggles of the common people, but also the 
German bourgeoisie. They both communicate ideological fears, which are 
rooted in the struggle for power, and loss. The fears of the volk articulate to 
poverty and abuse, where as the fears of the middle class predominantly 
revolve around puritanical sensibilities and the loss of ‘Germanic identity’. 
These fears provided the base of the palimpsest of German nationalism. 
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Nazi Germany: The Rise of Propaganda, and ‘International Jewry’ 
While the Brothers Grimm were writing against the backdrop of German 
unification and its opponents, the fragility of German nationalism reached its 
zenith in Nazi Germany. The National Socialist Party used a specific 
propaganda campaign, based on the German nationalist ideals of Blut und 
Boden (shared blood and soil), 39  a nationalism informed in part by the folk 
and fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm40 to dehumanise the Jewish people, who 
they believed held the greatest threat to the German ‘way of life’ through the 
global spectre of ‘international jewry’, a threat which encompassed changing 
ethnic demographies with the onslaught of global capitalism.    
 
When it comes to defining propaganda, general conceptions paint propaganda 
as the manipulation of unsuspecting populations through controlled 
information, in the service of iniquitous political ends. Jowett and O’Donnell 
(1992) however see it as less black and white. In their view propaganda is a 
neutral set of techniques, and can be used in the serving of either positive or 
negative ends: “propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape 
perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a 
response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist”  (as cited in 
Bytwerk 1998:158).  
 
Jacques Ellul on the other hand views propaganda as “a set of methods 
employed by an organised group that wants to bring about the active or 
passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically 
unified through psychological manipulation and incorporated in an 
organisation (1968: 21). He argues that whether its ends are demonstrably 
good or bad is almost irrelevant, for the use of propaganda always poses a 
threat to society. Ellul views propaganda as far more than merely the attempt 
																																																								
39 Rudolf Darre coined the term ‘Blut und Boden’ (blood and soil) as the Nazi 
motto. He had been directly inspired by the tales of the Grimms (Schama 
1995:82). This slogan is still used today by white nationalist groups 
throughout the West. 
40 As well as other ‘items’ of ‘German culture’; such as the art, philosophy and 
music of other famous Germans (whether willing or no) including sculptor 
Arno Breker, philosophers Heidegger and Nietzsche, and composer Richard 
Wagner. 
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of leaders to manipulate an unsuspecting populace; he argues that the 
propagandee is by no means simply an innocent victim. Rather, that for any 
campaign of propaganda to be successful, there must already exist a place for 
it within the collective social consciousness; and that the propagandee 
provides the active psychological component of the process. Indeed, Ellul goes 
so far as to argue that oftentimes the propagandee does not simply lend 
themself to the process, but that they even derive satisfaction from it. Mass 
media news narratives, and social media communication that surround the 
refugee ‘crisis’ could similarly be read this way. 
 
In the 1930s Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno of the Frankfurt School, 
concerned by the looming spectre of fascism, suggested that developments in 
the psychological and economic configuration of the family were changing in 
such a way that made authoritarianism increasingly natural (in Marcus and 
Fischer 1999:120). Horkheimer and Adorno also suggested that the shift 
towards the production of culture on an industrial scale further enforced 
authoritarian trends. They argued that within a technological society, the 
father loses his didactic and economic role. Children’s identities are therefore 
formed in school and “through the propaganda of the state and mass media” 
(Marcus and Fischer 1999:120). This leads to the experience of emotions and 
intellects that are increasingly reliant on reinforcement through repetition by 
other members of the wider group; the ‘majority’ thus become “increasingly 
rigid and intolerant, and dependent on strong authoritarian leaders” (Marcus 
and Fischer 1999:120).41   
 
																																																								
41	As Marcus and Fischer observe, for Horkheimer and Adorno “unlike much 
other social science of their time and since, their probes into the nature of 
industrial society arose from a lucid and self-conscious vision of the historical 
moment in which they were writing. The heightened sense of the 
predicaments and crises of the present is a distinctive mark of periods when 
cultural criticism as a function of social theory is salient. Furthermore the 
Frankfurt school pioneered politically sensitive approaches to the study of the 
family and the culture industry as a means for understanding mass culture in 
modern societies” (1999:120). Good social theory must be situated self-
reflexively and sensitively within the temporal and cultural context in which it 
is written. 
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My understanding follows on from Ellul, Horkheimer and Adorno. 
Propaganda is not just a top-down expression of and exercise of power - 
rather it relies heavily on the involvement of the people.42 Propaganda is most 
successful given repetition and saturation. Effective propaganda operates on 
two interconnected timeframes: short-term (which is conducted within a 
specific timeframe), and long-term (appealing to more closely held attitudes, 
perceptions, and beliefs). Propaganda is successful when it contains an 
amalgamation of effective communication, some element of truth, and most 
importantly - the effective cultivation of ‘generic shared attitudes’. To put it 
another way, the audience is not passive, for the propaganda message cannot 
be created out of thin air, but rather it must build upon preconceived 
perceptions and beliefs. The synchronic nature of propaganda relies upon the 
active involvement and participation of its receivers.   
 
General contemporary public conceptions of propaganda tend to 
conceptualise it as something confined either to the pages of history, or to the 
streets of totalitarian dictatorships. However propaganda can appear at any 
time, in any place. David Altheide (2013) argues that US news coverage has 
been dominated by ‘propaganda of fear’ for more than a decade (233). As a 
result many Americans feel fear and hostility towards refugees and 
immigrants that appears entirely disproportionate. In the German context the 
government-sanctioned response of Willkommenskultur (loosely translated to 
welcome) drew accusations of propaganda after the tide of public opinion had 
turned (Adam 2015). 
 
																																																								
42 Ellul’s understanding of the way propaganda works is mirrored in Arendt’s 
concept of horizontal power, outlined in On Violence (1970). Power is usually 
understood to be power over (x). Arendt sees power as more of a horizontal 
concept, one that grows out of individuals acting together and persuading one 
another. “Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in 
concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and 
remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of 
somebody that he is “in power” we actually refer to his being empowered by a 
certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from 
which the power originated to begin with (potestas in populo, without a people 
or group there is no power), disappears, “his power” also vanishes” (Arendt 
1970:44). 
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Propaganda was one of the central pillars upon which the Nazi party was built. 
Hitler saw propaganda to be of the utmost importance, stating: “Propaganda, 
propaganda, propaganda. All that matters is propaganda” (as cited in Welch 
2014:1).  Nazi propaganda has predominantly been portrayed as a totalitarian 
centralization of information. However I argue, following on from Ellul 
(1968), Kallis (2005), Herf (2006), and Welch (2014), the narratives that were 
central to Nazism (often based around the manipulation of fear) were not only 
top down -but also bottom up.  
 
In 1933 the Party created the Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und 
Propaganda (The Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, 
or RMVP) of which Joseph Goebbels was head.  Through the use of both 
short-term and long-term appeals Nazi propagandists translated fundamental 
party ideology into a continuous narrative - an easily accessible framework of 
of good and evil43, through which Germans could make sense of both 
historical and current events.  Crucial to the Nazi use of propaganda was the 
centrality of emotional appeals, with Hitler remarking that for propaganda to 
be truly successful - it must draw on the emotions, primarily love, fear, and 
hatred (Welch 2014). Nazi propaganda, and the narrative it sought to convey 
was able to be assimilated by the German populace, as it stemmed from the 
pre-existent tradition of German Nationalism, and was shaped by (and in turn 
helped to shape) the cultural collective emotion of German fear.    
 
Goebbels originally started out with confident and congratulatory propaganda 
on the superiority of the Aryan race, and the German cultural tradition. This 
tactic quickly changed however to relying predominantly on ‘fear appeals’, 
through the creation of ‘negative discourses’, (things that the German people 
should be afraid of and that would befall them if they strayed from the path 
that the National Socialist party had outlined). Nazi rhetorical fear appeals 
were rooted in fears about the loss of an identity as a distinct race, and the loss 
																																																								
43 Gombrich (who spent years studying  Nazi propaganda) wrote that Nazi 
propaganda created a mythological world by “transforming the political 
universe into a conflict of persons and personifications” (Gombrich as cited in 
Herf 2008:2). 
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of nationalistic power and control through foreign influences. Fear arousal (in 
these cases) depends on the triggering of pre-existing emotional reactions 
(Casmir 1968). Thus, safeguarding the Vaterland against the prospect of 
collapse and chaos (bought about by the Jews or the Communists) 
increasingly became the message inherent in Goebbels’ efforts (Kallis 2005:5).  
 
The output of Nazi propaganda cannot be understood simply in terms of 
Hitler and Goebbels’ control and manipulation over strategy and production; 
rather it may be seen as a snarl of threads, ideas, discourses, initiatives and 
narratives that were tied together only by nebulous objectives: to ensure Nazi 
political and cultural domination, and to sustain the staying power of the 
German front to win the war. The Party used a variety of methods through 
which to dominate thought and information. Making use of the ‘culture 
industry’ of media, entertainment – and also the social structure – through 
which to disseminate their message.44 Xenophobic narratives regarding 
refugees have been disseminated in much the same way.  
 
The National Socialist regime in Germany had at its heart ideological 
utopianism. That is to say, it was concerned with “the right and the duty of the 
volk to pursue and fulfil a vision of what constituted the ideal fatherland” 
(Kallis 2005:65). This was the ideal that congratulatory propaganda drew 
from. The particular National Socialist vision of the utopian Vaterland 
consisted of three separate elements. The first was the social, which included 
discourses of domestic and cultural regeneration, the marginalisation of the 
Volksfeinde (Jews, socialists, and other minority non-conformist groups or 
																																																								
44 This new social structuring revolved around a monopoly of National 
Socialist controlled organisations, such as the ‘Labour Front’ (focused on 
providing Germans with labour intensive, productive work, and also 
bolstering the standing of the worker within German society). It relied on 
initiatives such as ‘Strength Through Joy’ (a program which outlined -and to 
some extent dictated- how good Germans should spend their leisure time), 
and the Hitler Youth to further a sense of community. The overarching idea 
was to compulsorily involve individuals so completely that they no longer had 
any time to themselves - and thus any time to think for themselves. 
Concomitantly the National Socialist party highly discouraged an emphasis on 
academic knowledge, research, and thought. School curriculums were 
reshaped to concentrate on practical skills and the development of the 
personality. 
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ethnicities), and ultimately - the realisation of a complete social organism with 
a single will and conception of national interest.  The second was the external 
aspect, that is, the territorial regeneration, which would be created by the 
unification of the culturally consolidated people, (and the German land and 
soil), and would create a strong, rejuvenated nation-state.  The third aspect 
was the universal aspect, the missionary role that the nation would assume on 
the international political stage: to further its cultural and historic mission, 
civilising Europe and restoring it to its rightful place of power within the 
global community (Kallis 2005: 66).  
 
The National Socialist depiction of German unity drew its power from an 
idealised past, rather than from the actual present, or recent history. German 
society pre-Nazism was in a state of flux.  
Unemployment and inflation accelerated the loss of legitimacy caused 
by the collapse of the monarchy after World War I. The older 
generation was bewildered by the rapid cultural changes while young 
people rebelled against the authority of their discredited elders 
(McLaughlin 1996: 254).  
The stage was set for a shift in power. 
 
Erich Fromm was a German psychoanalyst and sociologist and also related to 
the Frankfurt School. Fromm presented what he viewed as the origin of 
Nazism in his book Escape from Freedom (1941). He believed that surrender 
to a higher power (in this case National Socialism) was a relief for many, for 
freedom (and the power of autonomous choice and agency) can actually be a 
terribly heavy burden to bear. Fromm argued that Nazism was not a uniquely 
German problem, but rather, that it could have occurred anywhere in Europe 
(a sentiment echoed by both Arendt (1951) and Bauman (2000)). Fromm 
suggested that potential for such a crisis lies at the heart of every modern 
state. His thesis was that human existence is characterised by “the need to be 
related to the world outside oneself, the need to avoid aloneness” (1941:34), 
and that modernity did not meet any of these needs. Rather, Fromm 
suggested, within modernity the individual was increasingly isolated. 
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However, through the act of submission the individual may find belonging, 
becoming a part of something larger. 45 
 
Although Nazism is often thought of by some as a temporary aberration in the 
history of a nation, it was, in fact, based upon strands of intellectual thought 
that go back at least a century. Nazi propaganda was built upon the concept of 
das Volk (the folk), Volkskultur (folk culture), and Volksseele (ethnic soul). As 
Naithani remarks: “The poetic nationalism of the romantics transformed into 
fascist nationalism” (2014:18). Indeed the Nazis viewed the work of the 
Grimms as integral to their understanding of an idealised German culture. 
Ideologists of the Third Reich hailed the Grimms’ texts as ‘sacred’, a mirror of 
pagan virtues, and a reflection of the fighting spirit of the Germans.46 Party 
official Alfred Eyd announced in 1935, "The German folktale shall become a 
most valuable means for us in the racial and political education of the young"  
(in Kamenetsky 1977:170).  
 
The Nazis cultivated the ideas of a shared culture, shared land, and the 
importance of a strong community. Party members were organised in groups 
based upon age and gender, and sang folksongs to further reinforce their 
sense of togetherness.47 Through an emotional appeal to the idealised past, 
The Party emphasised all that Germans stood to lose. This made the fear 
appeals all the more pertinent, all the more poignant.48Fears of the ‘loss’ of 
																																																								
45 Fromm’s analysis of the human need for belonging through submission 
owes much to Dostoyevsky’s 1821-1881 The Brothers Karamazov (1950) (in 
which eliminating the individualised self also eliminates the burden of 
freedom). “Human self-consciousness, the awareness of oneself as distinct 
from nature and also from other humans is what makes man’s fear of isolation 
so powerful” (McLaughlin 1996: 249). 
46 They saw the tale of “Little Red Cap” or Rotkäpppchen as a symbol of the 
German people terrorised by the Jewish Wolf, and “The Jew in the Hawthorn 
Hedge” as natural treatment by the German spirit against the ‘intruding’ 
Jewish aliens (Tatar 2003:41, Dégh 1979). 
47 However this scheme did not actually succeed in breaking down the social 
and class stratification systems in German society, which still remained for the 
most part, despite the efforts of the Party in promoting a cohesive concordant 
community. 
48 Some have argued that the Nazi regime had completely transformed 
German society into ‘a landscape of terror’. That while Jews (and other 
‘undesirables’) and ‘Germans’ had two separate trajectories of experience, they 
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‘Germany’ due to changes in ideology and ethnic makeup also characterise 
xenophobic discourse regarding refugees. One Twitter user RandBerliner 
posted on the eleventh of December 2017: “SPD will den Familiennachzug der 
Flüchtlinge und die CDUCSU die "atmende" Obergrenze.... Es werden eher 
noch viel, viel mehr werden. Gute Nacht Deutschland kann ich da nur sagen. 
(SPD wants to allow refugees to rejoin their families and the CDUCSU wants a 
“breathing” upper limit….There will be many, many more. I can only say good 
night to Germany)” (RandBerliner 2017). 
 
As has been well documented, the negative discourses of Nazi propaganda 
revolved around the demonization of the Jewish people.49 The Jews were the 
unifying aspect of the strands of German propaganda, which on a macro level, 
painted a righteous young Germany as being locked in a battle against the 
forces of all that were evil – personified by the Jew. Hitler denounced the 
Jews as an ‘alien’ group within the German Nation50, and the sole cause of 
Germany’s problems. In Mein Kampf, he portrays the Jews as an eternal 
‘fungus growth’, on the German nation, a parasitic organ that caused decay, 
disease, and even death (1945). The ‘outsider’ as linked to death and disease is 
a theme that some of the more virulent opponents of Germany’s refugee 
																																																																																																																																																														
were both victims, as the effect of the Nazi rule had restructured social reality 
in such a way that it was completely saturated by fear of the Party (Frydel 
2016: 166). The conception of the Nazi ‘terror state’ reappears regularly in 
post-war cultural products and academic works to explain the perceived 
passivity of the German population. Wolfgram (2006) calls the idea of the 
Nazi terror state a myth however. By this he does not mean that it ‘isn’t true’, 
rather that how it has been told, only holds half of the truth: “ a myth is not 
necessarily wholly untrue but, rather, is a specific narrative about the past 
invested with political meaning and power” (Wolfgram 2006: 210). The use of 
this notion as an exculpatory excuse to explain away German citizens’ 
passivity is too mono-dimensional, and distorts the fact that many ordinary 
German citizens themselves were integral, and indeed active, in the creation 
and perpetuation of the state of fear. It also does not account for the many 
Germans that were opponents and dissidents of the regime.  
49 Originally ‘the enemy’ was both Jews and communists/Bolsheviks, however 
this narrative was briefly suspended after the Germans struck a deal with the 
Soviet Union in 1939. 
50 Deutsch and Yanay (2016) suggest that we are not always simply afraid of 
what is unknown - but rather it is sometimes that which is close to us, and like 
us, that truly terrifies us. Their article uses the Nazi regime to discuss the 
complex and close relationship between fear and intimacy. 
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program similarly propound. In 2015 self-described “conservative right – 
journalist – photographer” Twitter user, Florian Machl used a banner (the 
main image on his twitter homepage) depicting zombies, with accompanying 
text that read “Refugees, tell your families GO HOME” (FMachl 2015).     
 
While it is generally understood that the demonization of the Jews was 
grounded in racially-based fear, I posit that the fear at the heart of this 
narrative was ideological, and stemmed from anxieties surrounding the loss of 
Germanic culture and identity, themes that had previously defined silos of 
fear that reappeared and expanded in pockets of German Society.51  
 
In the last years of the Nazi dictatorship, the construction of a negative mega-
narrative appeared, that of the Jewish Bolshevik plutocratic alliance, or 
‘international Jewry’. This mega-narrative was prompted by the UK’s 
declaration of support for the Soviet Union (during the Second World War), 
and tied together several of the recurrent themes of Nazi propaganda, such as 
anti-westernism, capitalism52, bolshevism, and Jewishness. This narrative 
coincided with the parallel introduction of the Final Solution, which 
represented a step up in the ‘anti-Semitic’ theme in the party-led discourses.    
 
Herf (2006) similarly argues that Jews were designated for elimination by the 
regime because Nazis regarded them as the most powerful threat to Germany 
politically and ideologically. He contends that the Nazis believed that 
‘international Jewry’ controlled the USA and the UK, and was the root of 
capitalism, and antithetical to the very essence of ‘German-ness’. Herf found 
that Nazi threats to annihilate ‘Jewry’ were almost always paired with the 
claim that this was a defence precaution, because otherwise ‘the Jews’ 
																																																								
51 It is important to note that fear does not characterize or homogenise these 
cultures. Indeed Nazism was hardly a universally popular model within 
Germany even at its peak, with only 43.9% of Germans voting for the party in 
1933. 
52 The link between Jewishness and capitalism was a widely held idea, one 
that is touched on in the collections of the Brothers Grimm, and further 
fleshed out in Werner Sombart’s book - The Jews and Modern Capitalism 
(2017) [1911], which argued that the Jews as a group were the major ‘social 
carriers’ of modern capitalism. 
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intended to destroy them (the Germans). Take for example Goebbels’ speech 
in 1943: 
One looks around the camp of our enemies: where one looks, Jews and 
more Jews…The international Jew is the glue that holds together the 
hostile coalition. He hits with his world-wide connections the bridges 
between Moscow, London and Washington. The war derives from him, 
he wages it from the background…We face here the most dangerous 
enemy of the world (Goebbels, ‘Uberwundene Winterkrise’, 5/6/1943 
in Kallis 2005: 85).   
This was the ultimate motivation behind the Nazi’s systematic targeting of the 
Jewish people. As Herf continues: 
From the foundation of the Nazi party to Hitler’s rantings in a Berlin 
bunker in 1945, the key themes in the regime’s anti-Semitic story line 
were righteous indignation about victimisation at the hands of a 
powerful and evil foe, promises of retaliation, and projection of 
aggressive genocidal intention onto others. The core of Hitler’s attacks 
on the Jews in Mein Kampf and of Goebbels diatribes in Der Angriff in 
the late 1920s did not focus on racist biology. To be sure a great deal of 
sarcasm was directed at the stereotyped Jewish body. But the core of 
the assault concerned what “the Jew” or “Jewry”, identified as one 
political actor, had allegedly done to Germany (2006:37).   
Like the fears encapsulated by the Brothers Grimm before them, Nazi 
anxieties revolved around ideological and existential ideas of nationalism and 
loss.  
 
The comparison between anti-Semitisim and Islamophobia creates public 
angst in Germany, with some arguing that the horrors of genocidal anti-
Semitism should not be morally relativised at all. This position is 
understandable, especially if claims were made that refugees and Muslims in 
Germany were, or are, being treated similarly to Jews in the Holocaust 
(Schiffer and Wagner 2011). However, to compare is not to equate. In order to 
study the German morphology of fear, anti-Semitism must be examined as a 
derivation to help understand new forms of German xenophobia, for these 
histories of fear shape future discourses and understandings. Similar patterns 
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are visible in both anti-Semitic and Islamophobic narratives, with parallel 
metaphors and ideas being used to incite hatred against Muslims and refugees 
as were used to de-humanise and ‘other’ the Jews in German history. Some 
have gone so far as to express a desire for the ‘removal’ of Islam through the 
mass deportation of refugees. German nationalist Florian Machl tweeted “All 
jenen, die behaupten #Massenabschiebungen wären nicht möglich sei gesagt: 
#Masseneinreisen waren auch möglich. Was sich in eine Richtung bewegen 
kann, schafft auch die andere. #wirsindmehr. (To all those who claim 
#massdeportations are not possible, let me say: #massimmigrations were 
possible. What can move in one direction, may also go in the other. 
#wearemore)” (FMachl 2018). 
 
 As Sabine Schiffer and Constantin Wagner observed in 2011: 
We know today that the destruction of the Jews in the Third Reich 
would not have been possible without a decades-long and centuries-old 
preparatory anti-Semitic discourse. Based on the historical imperative 
to deconstruct racist [and xenobhobic] discourse before it is too late, a 
racist discourse that threatens to become highly dominant in society 
must be exposed as such. To this end, we must also expose and analyse 
the occasionally frightening parallels to anti-Semitic discourse (Schiffer 
and Wagner 2011:83).  
 
Further Internal Divisions: The Second Berlin Crisis and the Erection 
of the Berlin Wall 
Rather than ending with the collapse of the Third Reich, these ideological 
fears continued to accrete within imbricated pockets of German society during 
the Cold War. Post war divisions in Cold War Germany played on pre-existing 
anxieties of ideological difference, but also added another layer to the 
palimpsest of this German cultural fear. This new fear arose from the horrors 
of the recent fascist past, as Germans tried to distance themselves from the 
shadow of the Holocaust. 
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In the aftermath of war, Berlin became the site of the agon between capitalist 
and socialist ideals. By late 1946, amid deteriorating relations between the 
Soviet state and the Western allies, the lines dividing Germany had been 
drawn up. “In the unstable post-war period Germans sought explanation, 
placed blame and established clear boundaries to provide themselves with an 
identity as a community of fate (Schicksalsgemeinschaft)” (Hilton 2010:479).  
 
By the dawning of 1949, Germany had been divided into four territories split 
between Russia, the US, England, and France. In late 1949 Germany was 
rearranged into two, as the Allies took joint control of their sections, creating 
the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublic Deutschland), commonly 
known as West Germany. In 1949, the Soviet Zone of Germany became the 
German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik), or East 
Germany, which was considerably smaller. Berlin lay in the heartland of what 
was East Germany, but was divided into two parts (between the allies, and the 
Soviets) as Germany was divided. Subsequently West Berlin became a western 
outpost in the midst of East Germany. This partition of Berlin drove a block 
between both United States and Russian relations, as well as relations 
between East and West Germany.  
 
The division of Germany (and collaterally Berlin) was hardly a seamless one, 
as Major describes:  
In a battle costing 304,000 casualties, the Red Army finally encircled 
the city in late April 1945, street‐fighting its way to the garrison's 
surrender on 2 May. An orgy of raping and looting followed, confirming 
many Germans' prejudices about ‘Asiatic barbarism’. Yet, although the 
Soviets' blood sacrifice fuelled later moral claims to all Berlin, for the 
moment the Allies honoured their wartime agreements. In July 1945, 
as American and British troops withdrew from captured Saxony and 
Thuringia to allow in the Red Army, western Allied contingents entered 
their sectors of Berlin. (2009:27)  
 
Post-war Germany was characterised by instability and a lack of basic items 
such as food and shelter, and imbued with a profound sense of loss as 
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Germans struggled to understand and explain their world. Many saw 
themselves as victims - primarily of the Third Reich, and then of the Allies and 
Soviets.   
 
Once again the narratives of fear that were promulgated at this period in 
German history were ideological in nature. During the Cold War, Germany 
became the site upon which the tensions between the two dogmas of 
capitalist-democracy, and communism were played out (this was often 
referred to as the ‘Cultural Cold War’). Berlin provided a microcosm of Cold 
War politics, offering a comparative example of the ideologies functioning 
side-by-side. This presented a unique situation - as the targets of the 
competing capitalist and communist messages were not simply the 
inhabitants of Berlin, or even Germany - but the wider world. For, each side 
saw the control of Berlin (and Germany) as essential in the effort to 
substantiate the verity and legitimacy of their own ideological and political 
model. Thus, Berlin became the stage upon which capitalism and communism 
were publicly performed. 
 
The narratives in this instance stemmed almost entirely from the competing 
super-powers and their proxies. At the closing of the war the Communist 
regime was operating on several assumptions: (1) that German public opinion 
would reorient itself towards the left in the face of defeat, (2) that a separate 
West German state would not survive as it was isolated, and would be unable 
to feed itself, (3) that due to national pride, German masses would be 
resentful of, and hostile towards the Western Allies, and (4) that capitalism 
was about to experience a gravitational collapse, and implode in on itself like a 
dying star (Spilker 2006:6). Eastern Authorities painted West Berlin with the 
capitalist brush. They presented it as a cesspool, a ‘swamp’ filled with black 
markets, greedy over-consumption, spies and loose women (Major 2009) 
(emphasising the changing gender roles, rampant sexuality, greed, and excess 
that they believed dominated the capitalist model and the wider western 
world). The East also claimed that socialism was more aligned with the 
Germanic spirit of the volk, as ties to land and tradition were of utmost 
importance, and that the West and capitalism represented a threat to these 
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German ideals (Nothnagle 1999). The GDR (German Democratic Republic) 
also used the tales of the Brothers Grimm as a way of trying to unite Germans 
in the aftermath of the war, in an attempt to reclaim the stories from the 
Nazis. In this context they were reworked to emphasise and introduce the 
ideas of class struggle (Callow 2019). 
 
The Western Allies on the other hand attempted to subvert possible German 
resentment, and foster positive associations with the capitalist model by doing 
their best to keep West Berliners warm and dry. Their aim was to present a 
beacon of western consumerism, liberal democracy, and ‘freedom’ in the 
midst of communist occupation. They characterised the East as the (worst) 
result of communism; a state controlled, poverty-stricken, dreary existence, 
marked by the death of freedom and individuality. 
 
Once again, propaganda was the main channel through which these narratives 
were communicated. As Ellul (1968) affirms, all propaganda systems (be they 
totalitarian, democratic, or communist) are essentially alike - in that they 
represent a threat to humanity. Both East and West Berlin used similar 
mediums through which to promote their message, concentrating on a variety 
of mass media such as newspapers, fliers, posters, and both relied heavily on 
the use of radio.53 
 
However, the execution of the East’s and West’s propaganda campaigns were 
quite different. While Nazi propaganda had self-consciously relied on the 
manipulation of emotions rather than an appeal to the ‘intellect’, GDR 
propagandists did not think that they had to manipulate the emotions of the 
masses, as they felt that the strength of the ‘truths’ of communism would be 
enough to embed the necessary adherence to the ideology within the minds 
and behaviour of their citizens.54 
																																																								
53 Radio signals were far harder to intercept than the physical artefacts of 
propaganda, thus could reach and influence ‘the other side’ (Schlosser 2015). 
54 However, Soviet propaganda was relentlessly dull. Repetitive and boring 
newspapers were filled with long articles that party officials could barely get 
through, let alone ordinary party members. In 1955 an internal party report 
summarised the problem: “The newspaper in general is uninteresting, boring 
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The GDR followed the pattern of Marxist-Leninist bifurcation of 
informational emphasis. The creation and maintenance of the party message 
was split into two components: propaganda and agitation. Propaganda 
according to the standard GDR definition was “the systematic spreading and 
thorough explanation of political, philosophical, economic, historical, 
scientific, technical and scholarly knowledge and ideas” (referred to as Kleines 
politisches Wörterbuch) (in Bytwerk 1998: 158).55 Agitation referred to “that 
part of political leadership of the society by the party of the working class 
through which the ideas of the party are brought to the masses” (Bytwerk 
1998:158). Propaganda dealt with matters in depth, and agitation made them 
attainable to the masses.  
Both NS [National Socialist] and GDR propaganda established a 
centralised control of the media, placed emphasis on oral agitation, 
structured the lives of everyday citizens as to engage them in a 
continuous stream of activity, attempted to avert every expression of 
disagreement or dissent, and balanced propaganda with fear (Bytwerk 
1998:158). 
 
Like the Nazis before them, the GDR attempted to control all aspects of life. 
They exerted their influence over both the macro level of information, and the 
micro level of social and community structure, and through coercion were 
successful at eliminating competition. However, the GDR ultimately accepted 
perceived submissive adherence rather than passionate commitment (Bytwerk 
1998:158). 56   
 
																																																																																																																																																														
and barely readable; the lead articles are dry as dust” (in Bytwerk 1999:405). 
This method of propaganda was thus endured rather than embodied by most 
of the population. 
55 Another important difference between the Nazi and Soviet regimes was that 
the GDR was purporting Marxism-Leninism, in the hopes of bringing it to the 
whole world, whereas Nazism was aimed at specifically the German-Aryan 
population, therefore it did not need to present itself as a universal system. 
56 Foucault mines the depths of the relationships between, and uses of fear, 
control, and self-censorship in his excellent Discipline and Punish ([1975] 
2012). 
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The West was less overt in their propaganda practices, but relied heavily on 
the use of television and radio to disseminate their messages, with far more 
GDR citizens watching West German news (which about 80% could receive) 
than their own (Bytwerk 1999). The West used radio57 as their primary 
method of communication, and created a continuous campaign aimed at 
undermining the communist regime. Radio and television were excellent ways 
for the West to communicate their messages to citizens of the East, as 
broadcast signals were far harder to intercept and control than physical 
artefacts of propaganda.     
  
The West balanced their propaganda with concomitant factual information, 
which could be read as neutral. This was in direct contrast to the broadcasting 
style of the State Radio Committee (which was the East German counterpart) 
who relied on pure and heavy-handed propaganda (Schlosser 2011). The West 
focused their propaganda predominantly around the failings of communism, 
rather than so explicitly extolling the virtues of capitalism. One of the main 
accusations that the West levied at the East was regarding the lack of freedom 
that citizens experienced in a communist state.  
 
The lack of freedom under communist rule was the most dominant theme of 
Western (predominantly American-led) propaganda. Belmonte (2008) has 
remarked on the uniqueness of American propaganda, arguing that the US 
was a nation that funded and created propaganda for foreigners, but never for 
its own citizens.58 This notion is one that has been contested, especially in the 
																																																								
57 The primary broadcast operation in Berlin for the West was the RIAS (radio 
in the American Sector). 
58 I would disagree with Belmonte here.  I argue that the USA, throughout 
history (even if production is decentred) has created a narrative of who and 
what Americans are - and are not - that can be seen as a deep, far-reaching, 
temporally expansive propaganda campaign. It is one that has provided the 
very backbone of the (North) American story. Berry and Sobieraj suggested in 
2013 that propaganda had become more and more prevalent in the United 
States with the rise of talk-shows, and the decline of trust in the traditional 
news media. These talk-shows rely heavily on ideologically extremising 
language, and often peddle stories that are not based in fact. They suggest a 
link between these changes in media commentary with the growing tribalism 
in politics and political discourse. This trend has continued into the present, 
deepening the divide between ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ bases. Many fear-
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Trumpian era, where accusations of propaganda have been levied across both 
sides of the political aisle, and towards both traditional and social media 
content alike.  
 
While the Americans accused the Eastern regime of a lack of freedom, 
remarking on the ways in which communism structured the very nature of 
society, it is important to note that West German society and community were 
simultaneously implicitly structured by the realities of economic inequality, 
access, and power that capitalism produces and reproduces.  
 
While Western propaganda was distinct from East German methods, both in 
organisation and tone, “the ultimate goal of encouraging individuals to see 
and understand the world in an ideologically specific way was in fact the 
same” (Schlosser 2011:619). While the messaging of these opposing ideologies 
was generally vastly different, there was a theme that echoed throughout both 
narratives. The East and the West similarly attempted to link the ‘other side’ 
to the Nazis. Wolfgram (2006) proposes that since the conclusion of WWII, 
Germans have sought to distance themselves from the spectre of Nazism, ex 
post facto drawing distinctions between ‘Nazis’ and ‘ordinary Germans’ that 
were not nearly so clear or sharp in actuality. Nazism has become almost a 
category of abstract, mythical evil, akin to a monster from the tales of the 
Brothers Grimm - rather than a regime perpetrated and reinforced by actual 
individuals.59 Thus, to paint the ‘other side’ as Nazis was a calculated and 
successful fear tactic peculiarly targeted at the German people. The utilisation 
of this fear tactic illuminates the desire of many Germans to be distanced from 
Nazism, and demonstrates the collective cultural guilt that some Germans felt 
and continue to feel in relation to the spectre of National Socialism. Several 
opponents of Chancellor Merkel’s 2015  ‘open door’ policy similarly express 
																																																																																																																																																														
based stories on these conservative talk-shows often revolve around 
immigrants and ‘illegals’ coming in to the States through the southern border, 
which provided Trump with the fertile ground needed to amass support for 
his own border wall.  
59 Although, as previously noted, a minority of Germans voted for the Nazi 
party in 1933, and many Germans were active dissenters and opponents of the 
regime.  
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fears of being tied to Nazism because of their anti-immigration stances, with 
one on Twitter remarking: 
Und jedem Deutschen wir pauschal unterstellt, dass er ein Nazi ist, 
wenn er nur sagt wir haben zuviele falsche Flüchtlinge hier die sollten 
abgeschoben werden. Das ist erst eine schwere Last und das im eigenen 
Land.(And every German is accused of being a Nazi, just for saying we 
have too many bad refugees here who should be deported. That is a 
heavy burden to bear for caring about one’s own country) (HPZ53xx 
2019). 
While another tweeted:  
Wenn man 2015 eindringlich gewarnt hat, dass die massenhafte 
Einwanderung von Flüchtlingen zu riesigen Problemen führt, wurde 
man in die Nazi-Ecke gestellt. Jetzt zeigt sich: Alle Kritiker hatten 
sowas von recht! #bamf #flüchtlinge (If you forewarned in 2015 that 
the mass immigration of refugees would lead to huge problems, you 
were put in the Nazi corner. Now it turns out: everyone who said this 
was so right! #bamf #refugees) (polimart1 2018). 
  
Despite the best Cold War efforts of Eastern authorities to convince citizens of 
the superiority of communism, conditions in East Germany were considerably 
worse than those in the West (Steege 2007). By 1961, 2.6 million (of 17.5 
million) residents of East Germany had crossed over to West Germany – 
through Berlin (Taylor 2007). Strikingly, the majority of those that made the 
move from East to West were young and well qualified. This presented a 
sizeable problem for the East, as it was losing a large number of young 
professionals, who would have otherwise been the backbone of the workforce.  
 
This massive loss of East German citizens was predominantly what led to The 
Second Berlin Crisis (1958-61), which culminated in the erection of the Berlin 
Wall on the 13th of August 1961. Few historical changes occur literally over 
night.60 “Part of the Wall's fascination is that it was a primordial, almost 
fairytale solution to a modern problem, more akin to the Brothers Grimm 
																																																								
60 The second Berlin Crisis was the first properly televised world crisis (Taylor 
2007). 
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than the late twentieth century” (Major 2009:2). The attempt to use a simple 
physical solution to address complex multifaceted problems was ventured 
once again by President Trump in the USA, 40 years after President Ronald 
Reagan had implored in Berlin: “Mr Gorbachev, tear Down this wall” (Reagan 
1987); as the Trump administration endeavoured to erect an even larger, more 
expensive border wall to stop the arrival of ‘illegals’ into the USA through the 
southern border. During the Cold War the Socialist Unity Party erected the 
Berlin Wall, and East German propaganda justified it as a means of 
protection, to keep the Unkultur out. But the East lost its appearance of 
ideological parity with the construction of the wall, with many seeing it as a 
way, rather, to keep its citizens in.61  
 
German reactions towards refugees during the ‘crisis’ and its aftermath have 
differed between what used to be Eastern and Western Germany. The old 
population of East Germany has tended to be less open to refugees and 
foreigners in general, possibly due to the closed nature of East German society 
during the Cold War. “There are still areas in former East Germany and East 
Berlin where foreign-looking persons had better not venture, because they risk 
being attacked by neo-Nazis… Nationality by descent is still firmly anchored in 
the German self-conception of the older generation” (Adam 2015:453).  
 
																																																								
61	People have always tried to make borders a physical expression. However, 
the physical state border is only one facet - in Eastern Germany there were 
many other invisible borders, which every citizen (regardless of social or 
economic class) was aware of. These other borders were diffuse and often 
overlapping, and created border zones, and grey areas. Before the 
construction of the wall Germans showed their disregard of the warring 
ideologies by drifting in-between the East and West. Fearful narratives about 
‘the other side’ were predominantly promulgated by the super powers and 
their proxies; for everyday Germans it was daughters and sons and cousins 
and parents and friends who were on ‘the other side’. Neither regime really 
had the complete assimilation and compliance of the populace, and Berliners 
(and Germans alike) still used their everyday power to shape their own world. 
Berliners were not just passive victims or beneficiaries of regimes, but through 
everyday actions continuously either subverted or enforced the structure and 
contours of the society that the superpowers imposed on them. Thus as Hilton 
(2010) argued, material desires of ordinary people affected the political and 
ideological designs of the super powers in Cold War Berlin. 
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During the Cold War, the West named the wall Schandmauer, or “Wall of 
shame”, and Americans used its construction to one again link the Eastern 
regime to Nazism: “West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt, for example, compared 
the barrier to a ‘concentration camp’, and similar descriptions of East Berlin 
as the ‘biggest concentration camp of all time’ soon became standard in the 
West German media” (Ahohen 2011:42). In the context of the United States, 
the Trump administration’s wall (and the harsher immigration reforms, and 
increasing use of detainment camps that arose along side it) drew similar 
criticism, linking human rights violations occurring at border detainment 
facilities with concentration camps (Obeidallah 2019).     
 
The Berlin Wall was the site of almost two hundred deaths in total. In addition 
to this, hundreds more were wounded, and thousands were imprisoned in 
harsh conditions as a result of escape attempts over the course of the wall’s 
existence (Taylor 2007). The crystallization of this sentiment is captured by 
the words of a West German labour union leader who argued that “a system 
that needs these methods to maintain control of the people is inhumane and 
does not have the right to rule over a population of seventeen million” (As 
cited in Ahonen 2011:43). 
 
In the East however the Wall was referred to as Antifaschistischer 
Schutzwall— “the anti-fascist protection rampart” — and was intended to 
guarantee the security of the East German people. In the Eastern narrative, 
the building of the Wall had been a necessary measure to protect Eastern 
citizens from Western aggression and fascism. The East similarly tied the 
West to Nazism, and argued that the mass immigration from East to West was 
due to ‘sinister machinations’ of the Western regime, and amounted to 
Menschenhandel, (loosely translated to human trafficking).62 East Germans 
(they maintained) were being lured over to the West by false promises, or they 
were being forcibly coerced. To quote the ruling Socialist Unity Party’s (SED) 
official newspaper, Neues Deutschland, “spy headquarters in West Germany 
and West Berlin” had been conducting “systematic recruitment of citizens of 
																																																								
62 Human trafficking is a theme that re-appears in contemporary anxieties 
surrounding the southern border in the USA. 
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the German Democratic Republic and organizing downright ‘human 
trafficking’” (as cited in Ahonen 2011:44). As in the West, violent deaths at the 
wall became focal points for rhetorical accusations aimed at the ‘other side’.  
 
While the narratives of fear utilised in post-war Germany by the competing 
East and West were ideologically different, there also existed several parallels 
between the two, such as the attempt to paint the other with the Nazi brush, 
and the focus on deaths at the wall as proof of the rival’s violence and cruelty. 
Both used the Wall to bolster narratives of their own legitimacy, and used 
Berlin as the stage upon which communism and capitalism competed.   
 
Through an examination of key moments in Germany’s history, it is possible 
to map the development of the German emotional residuum of fear that exists 
and expands in some imbricated clusters of German society. This fear is 
characterised by anxieties surrounding the perceived ‘loss’ of Germanic 
national and cultural identity, as seen originally through both the stories – 
and the work of the Brothers Grimm. It was apparent in the attempts of the 
Nazis to ‘protect’ the ‘purity’ of the Aryan race from the threat of ‘international 
Jewry’. In the Cold-War era the angst surrounding German identity 
continued, and was highlighted by the battle between socialism and capitalism 
that was played out in the city of Berlin. The narratives of fear that emerged 
during Cold-War Berlin contained another element woven into this German 
fabric of fear – the desire (for some) to distance themselves (especially on the 
Global stage) from a genocidal fascist past. These are the themes that 
comprise this particular German emotional residuum of fear, and have 
coloured (in part) the xenophobic reactions in Germany’s contested and 
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Narratives of Fear in the USA 
Captivity Narratives and ‘Savage Indians’: Colonialism and the Seeds 
of Systematic Racialisation in North America 
The themes that characterise the residuum of fear that exists and extends in 
particular pockets and various polarities of society in the United States are 
predominantly built on racism. This history of racist fear stretches back to the 
European colonisation of the Americas. When Columbus first landed in the  
‘New World’ (what is now the Bahamas) in 1492, the western hemisphere had 
an estimated population of well over 100 million people. Just two centuries 
later, the population was reduced by 90 percent, and was continuing along the 
path of rapid deterioration (Churchill 1997:97). These numbers are illustrative 
of a near population annihilation, rather than a simple decline.  
 
Colonisation is at its heart a form of external control that includes the 
subordination of rights of those that are indigenous to the land. While some 
very early relationships between settlers and the indigenous peoples were 
based on mutually beneficial trade relations63, the peaceable nature of these 
relationships had no chance of lasting, as the whole endeavour to the 
Americas was part of the European mercantile expansion. Mercantilism 
(arguably a pre-cursor to capitalism) was governed by zero-sum thinking: 
captured best by the saying "your gain is my loss" (or conversely and more 
accurately in the American context - "your loss is my gain"). Under this 
ideology, it was believed that trade could not be a mutually beneficial practice, 
but rather that one group would ultimately control power and resources (the 
Europeans), and the other might only be controlled (Indigenous peoples).  
 
These differing views caused a huge amount of suffering for the Indigenous 
peoples, as the Europeans saw ownership of land as of the utmost importance, 
while for some Native American peoples, land, plants and animals were often 
considered sacred and far beyond the concept of property. This lead to a wave 
																																																								
63 In the Antilles genocide began almost as soon as the ‘settlers’ landed. 
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of decimation of the Indigenous peoples, through disease and purposeful 
annihilation (Heart and DeBruyn 1998).64  
 
The colonists went about attempting to eliminate the indigenous way of life, 
which did not fit within their understanding of the world. They saw the people 
as being as wild and threatening as was the new landscape (Ross 1998, 
Huhndorf 2001). The purposeful creation of a European population65 for their 
‘Brave New World’ was set in place through the use of several methods. The 
first was the elimination of the indigenous populations themselves (which was 
attempted to differing degrees), and the second through the elimination of 
indigenous ideologies, epistemologies, philosophies and other ways of 
understanding and being in the world, facilitated by the ‘civilising’ and 
‘missionary’ process.     
 
The coloniser’s understanding of Native Americans intersected with the 
emergence of ‘scientific racism’, which placed groups on a linear scale of 
development, from ‘savage’ to ‘civilised’ (McClintock 2013)66 .The settlers 
																																																								
64 Churchill argues that the treatment of the Native Americans at the hands of 
the colonisers was a holocaust, but one that is for the most part either denied 
(in scope), or explained away as an ‘unfortunate’ or ‘unintended’ consequence 
of the process of colonisation (such as the mass deaths that the indigenous 
people experienced in reaction to the sicknesses that the colonisers bought 
with them). It has historically been the assertion of scholars of the Americas 
that the devastation of the populations of indigenous peoples was primarily 
the result of disease rather than conscious and purpose-driven killings. 
Churchill argues that while this may have some truth to it, it is also the case 
that the colonising regime created the conditions for these mass deaths to 
occur, and that these deaths benefitted the overall mission of the ‘civilising 
process’ of the Americas (1997). 
65 Of course there was some variation between how the UK, France, Spain, and 
Portugal set about accomplishing this. 
66 This notion of ‘savagery’, and stagnant development was applied later on to 
the characterisation of African Americans. This revolved around the 19th 
Century idea that savages were childlike, and in need of constant ‘guidance’ 
and control by western masters. Savagery was not only used as a signifier of 
race, but was also seen as a characteristic apparent in differing degrees within 
other marginalised groups in society: those who were mentally ill, convicts, 
and women. All these people or groups were deemed to be less evolved or 
‘degenerate’ in comparison to the average European man (Jahoda 2015:xv). 
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understood the indigenous people to be at the ‘savage’ end of the scale67 while 
‘they’ were diametrically opposed, being ‘civilised’. Jahoda (2015) locates the 
persistent identification of the ‘savage’ racialised Other with cannibalism, 
violence, sexual abandon and animal drives. Francis Parkman (the most 
celebrated American historian of the 1800s) described the Native Americans 
as man, wolf, and devil all in one (Churchill (1997: xvi). Indeed, in The 
Declaration of Independence, which is considered to be one of the founding 
documents of the USA, Native Americans are referred to as “the merciless 
Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished 
destruction, of all ages, sexes and conditions” (1776, as cited in Chomsky 
2015:11).68  
 
Churchill (1998) contends that both American historical writing and American 
fictional writing surrounding the Indigenous peoples of this time fuse fact and 
fiction, so that what results is neither fact or fiction, but rather a canon of 
myths. The same can be said of much of the information that proliferates on 
social media platforms today, including the narratives that surround the 
bodies of refugees.  
 
An historical example of this tradition, and a precursor to the refugee 
situation may be found in captivity narratives. These captivity narratives mark 
an important step in the colonists’ construction of the ‘Indian Other’.  The 
narratives were purported to be the relayed first hand experiences of Anglo 
																																																								
67	I must here note that I do not mean to present the indigenous people (and 
in subsequent discussion African Americans and Muslims) as hapless and 
helpless victims in the history of the United States, and to thus rob them of 
their agency. I recognise that North American power dynamics were and are 
constantly contested, changing and shifting. However to present Euro-
Americans and minority groups as having equal footing in this would also be 
misleading. 
68	Chomsky argues however that the violence that the Founding Fathers 
reference in this document was a direct result of the indigenous population 
responding to the genocidal attacks visited upon and against them by the 
colonial Puritans and other Europeans. Europeans showed (through example 
in their treatment of indigenous communities) that European-style warfare 
was a process not at all against the mass extermination of women, children 
and the elderly.  
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settlers who had been seized by the ‘Indians’.69 They were a style of exposition 
that captured the coloniser’s fears of the original inhabitants of their new 
home. The stereotyped ‘Other’70 that emerges in these narratives was 
influenced by, and helped to propagate the early tradition of racial 
categorisation.  
 
Captivity was a practice that both the settlers and the Indigenous peoples 
utilised. However, this is not accurately reflected in either the narratives, or 
the works of history from this time. In numerical terms the number of Native 
Americans who were captured (and oftentimes enslaved by the Euro-settlers) 
far outweighs the number of settlers that were captured by the native peoples, 
and indeed the number of captives that were traded between indigenous tribes 
themselves. Capture narratives are both exclusionary, and appropriative. This 
reinforces once again the relationship between narratives and power. These 
texts produced - not simply reflected- a sense of ‘otherness’. In this way 
“hegemony over truth and knowledge replaces troops and guns as the relevant 
tool of colonisation” (Churchill 1998:14).71 
																																																								
69	Some argue that captivity narratives can be seen as early examples of 
ethnography, because they contain some of the hallmarks, namely that the 
authors were ‘outsiders’ who lived with the group that they were recording. 
However to view these narratives as ethnographies simply plays into the 
discipline's colonial legacy, reasserting troublesome assumptions “regarding 
temporal and spatial distances; the textually constructed nature of 
representations of lived experience; problems of subject-object relations; and 
the problematic grounds of foundational concepts such as fields, cultures, and 
peoples” (Ben-Zvi 2008: xvii) seeing captivity narratives as ethnographic 
works reinforces this legacy. 
70 By using the term ‘Other’ in a collective sense, I do not mean to reinforce 
conceptions of cultural homogeneity. The use of the ‘other’ in this chapter and 
beyond is not meant as a cultural classification, or an ethnic delineation. 
Rather I employ the term as a relational construction of identity, an analytical 
category through which - and in opposition to – the (North) ‘American 
identity’ has been defined. 
71 The definition of hegemony here follows on from Gramsci’s theory of 
cultural hegemony, in which power may be exercised and reinforced as much 
through language and cultural texts as through physical force (Ives 2004). 
While Gramsci developed the concept of cultural hegemony in tandem with 
discussions of the modern secular capitalist state, he also used the concept in 
analyses of certain pre-capitalist communities. These texts - while being pre-
capitalist - align with the concept of cultural hegemony, as the narrative of the 
‘savage’ and ‘uncivilised’ Indian was (and in some instances still is) 
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The captivity of Mary Rowlandson provides a window into colonisers’ fears of 
the indigenous people’s savagery and unnatural violence. It also provides an 
introduction to another reoccurring aspect in American fear narratives. The 
‘other’ as diametrically opposed to the Christian God.72 This is a theme that 
continues to characterise the ‘Other’ in the North American tradition. It 
reappears in relation to African Americans, Muslims, and in the fears 
surrounding ‘illegals’ and refugees. In 2019 Twitter user Susan Kennedy 
lamented the state of New York City on the 29th of September, “Under 
Democrat control, NYC is no longer the City of @RudyGuiliani. It’s a cesspool 
for illegals & moral decline, where police officers are attacked by savages & 
Democrat politicians…NYC has broke with America’s Founding Christian 
Principles [sic] #RIP” (Kennedy 2019). 
 
Mary Rowlandson’s narrative is part of the earlier capture narrative tradition, 
which was heavily influenced by puritanism. These narratives generally 
followed the formula of a female captive who battled the threats of the harsh 
wilderness and its’ ‘savage’ inhabitants. Inherent in these female-focused 
narratives is the puritanical idea that, while ‘all men are created equal’, 
women (being the original sinners), were closer to nature, and thus had more 
in common with the ‘savage’ than did colonial men. This serves as reminder of 
the power discrepancies apparent within even the dominant group, and 
emphasises the unequal European American experience of colonisation 
between the genders. 
 
Mary Rowlandson (along with her three children) was captured during the 
conflict known as King Philip’s (or Metacom’s) War. Rowlandson describes 
the ‘Indian’ attack: they were “butchered by those merciless heathen, standing 
																																																																																																																																																														
reproduced in cultural life through all channels of communication and 
education; for this was the narrative best suited to furthering the aspirations 
of land and resource domination and control of the colonisers. 
72 Slotkin (1973, in Strong 2018) proposes that capture narratives are the first 
literary traditions of the USA, and that they contain a distinctly American 
mythology, based on a cultural variation on the universal archetypal pattern of 
the heroic quest.   
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amazed with the blood running down to our heels” 73  (Rowlandson (1682) as 
cited in Woodard 1996:115). After her capture she travels with these “ravenous 
beasts” into the “vast and howling wilderness” (Rowlandson 1682:n.a).  
Throughout the text Rowlandson (1682) characterises her captors, especially 
when they act collectively, as bestial and diabolical. They appear as "wild 
beasts of the forest",  "ravenous wolves", "a company of hell-hounds", “roaring 
lions and savage bears”, and she consistently refers to them as “barbarous 
creatures”.  Rowlandson speaks fearfully of their strange customs, 
highlighting their barbarity at every level. She describes their food as “filthy 
trash”, and depicts them as scavengers who scrounge off the superior English: 
“the Indians quickly spread themselves over the deserted English fields, 
gleaning what they could find”.  
 
This depiction of the ‘Dark Other’ as barbarous, similar to scavenging animals 
and insects appears again used against African American slaves in the 
antebellum era, and later when describing Muslims post-9/11. The words of 
Mary Rowlandson are not too dissimilar to some vehement anti-immigration 
tweets posted by citizens about refugees and ‘illegals’:  “it’s time to deport all 
illeagals [sic] and criminals. These savages do not know gow [sic] to behave in 
civilised society” (Loraine McCowen 2017); “They remind me of a pack of out 
of control Hyenas. I wonder how many were criminals who were released out 
of the prisons, how many are illegals, or how many are refugees. These people 
are savages. They don’t belong in America!” (Leigh Storz 2019).   
 
Rowlandson also draws heavily upon Christian allegories to tie her captors to 
the devil: “This was the dolefullest night that ever my eyes saw. Oh the roaring 
and singing and dancing and yelling of those black creatures in the night, 
which made the place a lively resemblance of hell”. Not only were their actions 
																																																								
73 However things not as black and white as the literal reading of the text 
would have us believe. As the subtext shows us that Rowlandson’s 
relationships with the ‘Indian captors’ is far more complex than the stark 
separation that she would have us believe, as she learns to fend for herself, 
forges interpersonal relationships, and sometimes receives acts of kindness 
from her captors.       
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devilish, but their appearances too were “as black as the devil”.74 Rowlandson 
also repeatedly makes note of their ‘unnatural’ violence: “Oh, the hideous 
insulting and triumphing that there was over some Englishmen’s scalps that 
they had taken (as their manner is) and bought with them” (scalping was 
hardly unique to the tribes, the English employed this custom as well), they 
“rejoiced in their inhumane and many times devilish cruelty to the English” 
(Rowlandson 1682). 
 
Although Rowlandson experienced several instances of kindness from her 
captors, she simply saw these as God working through them, rather than as a 
result of any ‘humanity’ or agency of their own. She was ransomed back to her 
husband, and reunited with her surviving children not three months after her 
initial capture. In spite of this, the prevailing message of her narrative is the 
strange and cruel savagery of the Native peoples: “little do many think what is 
the savageness and brutishness of this barbarous enemy”; “I was in the midst 
of thousands of enemies, and nothing but death was before me” (Rowlandson 
1682).   
 
Rowlandson’s narrative provides examples of the characterisation of the 
‘Indian Other’ as a savage and animalistic ‘beast’ who was closer to the devil 
than to God, but does not provide us with examples of the other common 
trope deployed in the othering of Native Americans, that of their abhorrent 
sexuality.75  Aberrant, ‘unnatural’, or excessive sexuality is one of the themes 
that characterises the ‘Dark Other’ in fear narratives in the United States. 
Native Americans, African Americans, Muslims, and refugees are often 
portrayed as overtly, or menacingly sexual. In contemporary narratives of fear 
refugee men are often seen to be potential rapists of white women, and 
abusers of brown women (Rettberg and Gaijala 2016). 
 
The native people in the eyes of the colonisers were marked by their sexual 
perversity. According to the Dominican cleric Bernadino de Minaya: “Their 
																																																								
74 Dark skin as a difference signifier is the unifying physical trait across all 
conceptions of the American ‘Dark Other’.  
75 This is probably due to the fact that its’ narrator was female and to discuss 
such things would be unbecoming, and outside of Puritan ideals. 
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marriages are not sacrament but a sacrilege. They are idolatrous, libidinous, 
and commit sodomy. Their chief desire is to eat, drink, worship heathen idols, 
and commit bestial obscenities” (as cited by Smith [1624] 2015:5).   
 
The capture narrative of John Smith provides us with insights into this facet 
of the Indian Other. While Smith’s language does not so explicitly deal with 
the perverse sex and sexuality of the Indians, his actions (and in some 
instances – lack thereof) provide edification. Smith’s is one of the earliest and 
most in/famous captivity narratives. In his 1624 General History of Virginia 
he outlines his capture by members of the Powhatan Confederacy, and 
subsequent rescue from death at the hand of his captors by Powhatan’s 
daughter Pocahontas (although Strong (2018) has argued that Smith likely 
misinterpreted what was in fact an adoption ceremony) .76 
 
Smith was captured not far from the settlement of Jamestown by the 
Pamunkey Indians, and was eventually somewhat adopted by them. Smith 
locates the impetus behind this as being due to Pocahontas’ fondness towards 
him - although it was probable that Powhatan hoped to encompass – through 
Smith- a consolidation of English power with his own (Bryant 2018). While 
Smith was treated reportedly with relative kindness due to his semi-adoptive 
status, he (like Rowlandson) nevertheless painted his captors as ‘savage’ and 
un-godly, noting how – in both look and deed - they were worlds away from 
the English settlers: “Powhatan, more like a devil than a man, with some two 
hundred more as black as himself…” (Smith in Strong 2018:51).  
 
Smith regularly referred to his captors as “barbarians”.  He, like Rowlandson 
emphasised the violent nature of the Indians by describing the horrors that 
befell captives that were of no use to the tribe, noting how one of his male 
companions was tied to a tree, with the skin being peeled away from his face 
and head, where upon he was disembowelled and then burned (Strong 
																																																								
76 The story of John Smith and Pocahontas is arguably one of the most 
recognisable narratives of colonial and indigenous relations in contemporary 
American culture thanks to the 1995 Disney movie Pocahontas which portrays 
an almost entirely fictionalised romance between the two, and presents a 
sterile and ‘civilised’ picture of colonialism.    
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2018:57). While for the most part early colonisers would have been exposed to 
violence, or at least the idea of violence as carried out in the name of the 
process of colonisation, the violence that Smith described would be seen by 
European Americans as ‘gratuitous’ and ‘unnatural’, once again furthering the 
notion that the native people were less than human and more than cruel.  
 
Much has been made in later retellings of the story about the ‘special’ 
relationship between John Smith and Pocahontas, but Smith maintains in his 
own recounting that the relationship that he and Pocahontas shared was never 
sexual, although he describes the indigenous women as being overtly so.77 
“Women figure as the epitome of sexual aberration and excess…given to a 
lascivious venery so promiscuous as to border on the bestial” (McClintock 
2013:22).78 Smith marked their nakedness: “young women came naked out of 
the woods, only covered behind and before with a few green leaves”, referring 
to them as “wench[es]”, communicating how he witnessed a scene of thirty 
young “nymphs”, naked, dancing and “falling into their infernal passions”, 
trying to tempt him “crowding, pressing, and hanging about him [Smith]”  
(Smith 1624 as cited in Strong 2018: 61). Through his refusal of sexual contact 
with any native woman Smith served the two-fold purpose of reinforcing his 
role as a ‘good’ Christian man, and confirming the notion that division 
between colonisers and indigenous people was impassable.  
 
Fears in the USA surrounding refugee flows arriving from the southern border 
developed from the blueprints of Caucasian colonisers’ original fear of the 
indigenous peoples. The conservative rallying cry of ‘America First’ has often 
																																																								
77 Edward Said in Orientalism argues that the sexual subjugation of ‘Oriental’ 
(and other colonised) women by Western men stands for the pattern of power 
between the East and the West (1995). However discussions of sexual 
domination in this context serve primarily as a metaphor, and introduction to 
other (male-dominated) dynamics of colonial authority and control. 
78 Here I must note that while both Native men and women were subjected to 
the characterisation of sexual aberrance, this categorisation did not affect men 
and women in the same way (Lugones 2010). Native women bore the brunt of 
this damage, being ‘less-human’ twice over, existing at the intersection of race 
and gender; being both female (lesser than men), and ‘Indian’ (lesser than 
European). As Andrea Smith reminds us “the issues of colonial, race, and 
gender oppression cannot be separated” (2015:4).  
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been pulled apart for its irony. Many of the refugees attempting to find safe-
haven in the United States come from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, 
and are often descended from indigenous peoples, who occupied the Americas 
long before European colonisation. These people are attempting to flee the 
social and political unrest in their own countries, an unrest bought about – in 
part – by subversive US manipulation of Central and South American 
governments, and brutality in the name of imperialism, capitalism and 
hegemony (Chomsky 1985). 
 
As the stories of John Smith and Mary Rowlandson exemplify, the colonial 
captivity narratives reveal the origin of the tradition of racialised ‘othering’ in 
the USA. Othering in the North American context revolves around ideas of 
savagery, violence, and unchecked sexuality. These narratives were used to 
create a sense of shared community and identity between the Anglo-settlers. 
This shared identity was constructed in opposition to the ‘Dark Other’, to 
reinforce the coloniser’s sense of self, superiority, and belonging. In the words 
of Roy Harvey Pearce, the ‘Indian’ “became important for the English mind, 
not for what he was in and of himself, but for what he showed civilized men 
they were not and must not be” (1965 as cited in Strong 2018:8). These stories 
do not simply document the emotions, and map the experiences of colonial 
women and men, nor do they simply describe the relationships between white 
and brown, and black people. Rather, they are about how these very categories 
of gender, whiteness and blackness emerged. 
 
Paternalism and Proslavery in the Antebellum South 
In the USA there is a long history of the oppression of those of African origin. 
The United States practised 246 years of slavery and almost a century of near-
slavery in the form of Jim Crow segregation.  As has been touched upon in the 
previous section, when the colonisers came to the Americas, capitalism was in 
its early stages. This mindset contributed to the fearful framing of the 
indigenous peoples who were both exterminated and exploited in order to 
consolidate land, resources, and power. This extortion of resources enacted on 
the backs of a marginalised group continued with the introduction of the 
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trans-Atlantic slavery system, which transported some inhabitants of Africa to 
a life of coerced bondage in the States.  Over the span of four centuries, slavery 
in the USA created immense amounts of both profit, and political power for 
Euro-Americans. While this system benefitted some, it amounted to immense 
suffering for the African American slave population.  The slavery system of 
coerced labour arguably existed originally and primarily as a means to achieve 
financial gain. However, slavery was heavily impacted by social, emotional, 
and cultural (as well as fiscal) significances. The ideology of proslavery was 
based on imperialistic, nationalistic79, religious, and racist80 principles (Young 
2006). 
        
Some have argued as to whether European coloniser’s early conceptions of the 
Native Americans and African Americans were really ‘racially based’ in a 
contemporary sense, stating that slavery was commonly practiced throughout 
time and space81, and thus there was no need to rationalise it or defend it82 - 
																																																								
79 Though in the South, eventually in secessionist form. 
80 On race: In referring to ‘race’ I am using the language that is still dominant 
in describing physical differences between groups of people. However the 
notion of race as a defining biological fact, a self-evident truth, has been 
debunked again and again. The classification of people into ‘races’ is not 
something that happens for no reason, but is rather a result of social, political, 
economic, and material conditions (the same can be said of gender). I 
continue to use the word however, for while race is not a truth in terms of the 
categorisation of concrete and unchanging biological differences, race – as 
defined by physiological differences - is still very much a truth in terms of 
lived experience (both historical and contemporary) (Villarosa 2019). I follow 
on from Fields (1990), Feagin (2010, 2019), Jordan (2013), and am 
predominantly influenced by hooks (1981), Wolfe (2006), Yancy (2016) and 
West (2017), in seeing race not as an element of human biology, but rather as 
something that is purposefully created, recreated, and enforced through 
everyday actions and cultural, political, and social institutions. The experience 
of race touches all facets of what it means to be human. It is an identity that 
not only informs how others see you, and how you see yourself,  - but one that 
shapes the very possibilities that can be imagined for oneself. 
81 However, slavery had died out in Western Europe almost a thousand years 
prior, and was virtually non-existent before it was revived again in the 
Americas. Slavery was originally conflated with indentured servitude.  
82 Some argue that issues of class trump race in proslavery concerns. But the 
civil rights movements of the 1960s and 70s saw a shift in perspectives on 
slavery scholarship, with an emphasis on black voices and experiences of the 
time, which had hitherto been largely overlooked in academia (prior to this, 
Chapter 3 | Historical Narratives of Fear 
	 80	
and that early colonists constructed their identity in terms of nationality and 
religion. However, as has been touched on, the early national identity of the 
colonisers, and the reaffirmation of Christian values were constructed in 
opposition to the ‘Indian Other’. An analysis of the historical material reveals 
the reoccurring use of both physical and cultural characteristics to 
differentiate these groups; and the creation (based on these characteristics) of 
a distinction between superior and inferior peoples in a social hierarchy83, 
that ultimately served to justify the continued grasp of power and control by 
the hands of those who were supposedly superior (Feagin 2010:41).   
 
For some, slavery in the USA presented a paradox, how to intellectually and 
morally reconcile their understandings of themselves as ‘good Christians’, and 
their reliance on a system based on bondage, inequality and abuse? In order to 
rationalise the fact that European Americans with their Christian probity – 
the inhabitants of a land where ‘all’ were ‘created equal’ (as per the 1776 
Declaration of Independence) – could command and continue this bloody 
																																																																																																																																																														
treatises against colonialism and racism in the academic realm had 
predominantly been written by white European men - see the ‘Négritude’ 
works of Aimé Césaire’s (2001) [1950] Discourse on Colonialism and Sartre’s 
Black Orpheus (1948)). These black scholars’ voices emphasised the fact that 
racial prejudice preceded, mandated and subsequently justified the coerced 
bondage of the system (Young 2006:6). 
83 Indeed the very language used to define these groups: ‘black’ and ‘white’ 
reinforce these ideas. “White and black connoted purity and filthiness, 
virginity and sin, virtue and baseness, beauty and ugliness, beneficence and 
evil, God and the devil” (Jordan 2013: 7). So the very words used to describe 
these groups contain and evoke both emotional and moral divisions. Racism 
in the US is apparent even in legal matters, and the rhetoric of the law paints a 
picture of white innocence and black abstraction (Ross 1990, Feagin 2010). 
Higginbotham (1998) argues that colonial court cases reveal how racial 
hierarchy was quickly and firmly established within the letter of the law by 
creating a clear European-American superiority, and African-American 
inferiority in all social areas, and advocating for the public punishment of 
those who violate or transgress these understandings, and the rationalisation 
of these understandings through framing that places heavy emphasis on the 
physical (colour) difference, and religious ideas.  Nineteenth century 
proslavery legal rhetoric grounded arguments in the denial of the humanness 
of the slave, reducing them to mere chattel (see 1856 Dred Scott v. Sandford 
that designated black Americans as “beings of an inferior order” (as cited in 
Feagin 2010:33)). 
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bondage on such a scale, it was entirely necessary to view and construct those 
of African origin as a dehumanised other. 
 
Southern White attitudes towards slavery in the antebellum era were far from 
united. There were vast differences in how the upper and lower South felt 
about the institution of slavery (Sinha 2003, Ford 2009). The lower Southern 
States operated slightly outside of the main narrative of proslavery.  Slavery in 
the antebellum Deep South was for the most part facilitated through 
paternalism. Christian values (especially in the wake of The Second Great 
Awakening) necessitated the dehumanisation of the slaves in order to justify 
such an institution, but also simultaneously provided the moral undergirding 
for a stratified yet ‘cohesive’84 society.  
 
Paternalism held within it racist assumptions that assumed a child-like 
mentality of African Americans, and a failure to be able to self govern, without 
the ‘guidance’ of white masters. Within this frame of thinking, slavery was 
transformed into a ‘domestic institution’ which held the idea of the master-
slave relationship as being ‘organic’, and the belief that slavery comprised a 
natural element in the social hierarchy, and even the family unit (Genovese 
1974, in Young 2006). Slavery through this prism was held to be benevolent - 
and was believed to be as beneficial for the ‘blacks’ as it was for their masters 
(of course this was a view held by the masters rather than the slaves). When 
the southern secessionist John Calhoun was asked if he would ever liberate a 
slave he reacted in horror “Ah you know little of my character, if you believe 
me capable of doing so much wrong to a fellow-creature” (in Genovese and 
Fox-Genovese 2011:4).  
 
The paternalist masters also viewed it as their moral imperative to convert the 
‘heathen’ Africans to Christianity in an attempt to control thought as well as 
labour.  In 1796 William Graham observed: “Christianity was never designed 
to alter the political civil status of men, but only to bring them to the love of 
God” (in Young 2006:169). Inherent in the missionary aspirations was the 
																																																								
84 Cohesive for European (especially wealthy, land owning European) 
Americans. 
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idea that slaves were not originally of God in the way that their masters 
were.85 Some believed that The Bible provided an explanation as to the very 
existence of the African ‘race’, and a justification of slavery, seeing the origin 
of Africans in the story of Ham (Whitford 2017).86 The original story appears 
in Genesis 9 and 10, in which after The Flood, Ham had looked upon his 
father Noah’s nakedness (interpretations of the meaning behind this have 
been widely debated, with some taking the act at face value, and others 
arguing that it was a veiled reference for an act of sexual immorality)87, and 
upon waking, Noah cursed Ham’s son Canaan, and decreed that all his 
descendants would be forever slaves. For many Christians, this provided more 
than enough scriptural evidence for the existence and continued practice of 
slavery.   
 
Paternalism was fundamental to the social structure of the Deep South. 
The lower South had progressively deepened its involvement with slavery 
through the cotton boom, which prompted slavery to spread from the fringes 
and coastal areas of the South, till it was an integral part of both economy and 
social structure, with slaves outnumbering whites in several counties. By 1830 
slaves accounted for more than 40 percent of the population of the lower 
South (Ford 2009). Therefore, the characterisation of slaves as a fearsome 
figure would have acted as an inertial force on the continued functioning of 
society.  
 
The dominant overarching ideology of proslavery however, was built upon 
fear. Proslavery functioned upon racialised understandings of the ‘African 
																																																								
85 The other way of understanding Africans within a Christian framework was 
through romantic racialism, (similar to the tradition of the ‘noble savage’) 
which professed the idea that African Americans’ childlike and docile nature 
made them innocents, and thus better Christians than Caucasians. A literary 
example of this attitude is presented in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin ([1852] 2009).  Romantic racialism was also the impetus behind some 
of the abolitionist sentiment of the North, rather than simple egalitarian 
values (Rozett 1976, Fredrickson 1987). 
86 Although Jordan (2013) argues that the curse of Ham was used primarily as 
an explanation of the race and ‘colour’ of Africans, rather than as an 
explanation of slavery. 
87 This ties into the characterisation of the hypersexualised ‘libidinous’, 
‘lascivious’ nature of Africans which is addressed further below. 
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Other’ as a latent threat, one that could only be contained through the 
institution of slavery. Through this lens slaves were also painted as ‘savage’, 
but contra to paternalist understandings, their ‘docile’ nature was viewed as 
being entirely contingent on their enslavement, rather than as a naturalised 
trait, with Samuel A. Cartwright remarking that “the negro must, from 
necessity, be the slave of man, or the slave of Satan” (as cited in Yancy 
2016:5).88  In his argument for slavery Thomas Dew maintained that Africans 
were naturally vicious and violent, naturally inclined towards criminal 
tendencies and that they were not even human – but rather “brutes” and 
“machines”, characterising the black population as a whole as a  “monstrous 
evil” (1849:52).  
 
Dew then goes on to make reference to an occurrence that he believed 
confirmed all of his arguments – the rebellion led by Nat Turner: “It is well 
known, that during the last summer, in the county of South Hampton in 
Virginia, a few slaves led on by Nat Turner, rose in the night, and murdered in 
the most inhumane and shocking manner, between sixty and seventy of the 
unsuspecting whites in that county” (Dew 1849:4). This description presents 
an example of the fears of slaveholders and white civilians - that the ‘African 
Other’ was monstrously violent - and that below the surface, vengeance 
glowed “in the breast of the savage” (Dew 1849:11).89 The degree to which 
																																																								
88 This view was so ubiquitous that it was even apparent in the law. In a 
preamble to South Carolina slavery law, white lawmakers once again 
described the enslaved as of “barbarous, wild, savage natures, 
and…constitutions laws and orders, should in this Province be made and 
enacted for the good regulating and ordering of them, as may restrain the 
disorders, rapines and inhumanity, to which they are naturally prone and 
inclined” (as quoted in Jordan 2013:110). As Feagin describes “Here the terms 
“barbarous, wild, savage” not only conjure up notions of African Americans as 
uncivilised, but also views of the latter as dangerous, rebellious, and criminal 
– a distinctive racial stereotyping relating to emotional white concerns about 
African Americans rebelling against enslavement, against good “laws and 
orders” “(2010:47). 
89 Nat Turner’s Confessions did nothing to dissuade these stereotypes of the 
violent and ‘savage’ nature of the slaves, however it may have gone some way 
in dispelling the myth of the ‘contented slave’. Confessions is a description of 
the enaction of, and motive behind the revolt. Turner states that one of his 
chief objectives was to inspire widespread panic in the South. “Twas my object 
to carry terror and devastation wherever we went” (Turner 1831 in Pelletier 
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slaves actually offered violent revolt to their shackles has been readily 
debated, however what does become clear, is that there were many more 
rumours of revolts than actual revolts (Jordan 2013). Fears of uprising were 
exaggerated far beyond the proportions of their danger, and showed more 
complex and deep-rooted anxiety surrounding the nature of relationships 
between whites and blacks. These rumours served to both rationalise and 
facilitate the continued enslavement of black Americans.  
 
The exaggeration of the threat of violence from the ‘Dark Other’ is a theme 
that exists in the reporting of the ‘refugee crisis’ in the United States, where 
hyperbolic reports of violent ‘mobs’ and ‘caravans’ approaching the southern 
border dominated the (predominantly conservative media coverage). By 
exaggerating the ‘threat’ of danger in these instances, fears are heightened. 
Fear causes people to react rather than to act (Bar-Tal 2001). Once the public 
has been turned into a reactionary body, it becomes relatively easy to control 
(Engles 2010). 
 
Slavery was seen as not only the balm to black violence, but also to the ‘threat’ 
of black sexuality. African Americans, like Native Americans before them were 
painted as aberrantly and overtly sexual. The effect of this characterisation of 
the hypersexuality of Africans had differing consequences in the experience of 
both female and male slaves. Like the Native women before them, African 
women experienced the ‘least human’ status, their bodies being an aberration 
of both the white and male categories.90 Accordingly, they received multiple 
levels of abuse and degradation. Since black women were viewed as being 
‘lascivious’, it was therefore assumed that they were incapable of being raped. 
Indeed for most of US history, it was not illegal to rape a Black woman, as 
																																																																																																																																																														
2015:45).  Turner described the murders, including the killing of an infant 
“sleeping in a cradle”, which would have most shocked the white audiences 
and reinforced the notion that blacks were in some ways ‘inhuman’. It is 
important to note that the Confessions were not penned by Turner himself, 
but were rather transcribed by a white man, Thomas R. Gray, and only 
published after Turner’s execution, so the question remains as to the extent to 
which Turner’s actual words are represented. 
90 The experience communicated poignantly in Sojourner Truth’s 1851 speech 
‘Ain’t I a Woman’ (in Kennedy 1992). 
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their status as ‘property’ came before their status as human.91 This applied to 
both white and black assailants, with George v State ruling that a male slave 
could only “commit rape upon a white woman” (in Pokorak 2006). “From the 
perspective of whiteness, the black body is criminality itself. It is the 
monstrous; it is that which is to be feared and yet desired” (Yancey 2016:xxx).   
 
Black men were viewed as being lascivious also, but it was generally 
understood that slavery kept their natural impulses of assault in check. In the 
antebellum era, while a slave accused of rape was prosecuted far more publicly 
and harshly92 than a white man accused of the same, he at least (usually) had 
the semblance of a trial (Somerville 1995). Slaveholders believed that the 
deviance of black male sexuality was realised through freedom, literacy and 
education.93 Real terrors about black men raping white women predominantly 
emerged in the postbellum period. This can be seen in the shift in the 
treatment of black alleged criminals and rapists (or just black men in general) 
with a precipitous rise in southern vigilante lynch mobs visiting unspeakable 




91 It was necessary to construct an explanation for why a white man would 
have sex with his racial inferior, As Pokorak explains, this cognitive 
dissonance lead to the creation and continuation of the myth of the insatiable 
black woma: “by creating the narrative of the temptress slave white men could 
absolve themselves of both their desires and their abuse of black women by 
claiming to be victims of the female slaves’ power” (2006: 10). 
92 Sociologists have often observed that governing bodies use punishment 
primarily as a tool for social control, and a performance of power. Thus the 
strength and length of the punishment is often unrelated to the crime patterns 
(See Michelle Foucault’s ([1977] 2012) Discipline and Punish). 
93 The Baptist clergyman, John Roach Straton published an article in 1900 in 
which he drew an unscientific correlation between the infrequency of blacks' 
raping white women before the Civil War, and the general illiteracy of slaves. 
He further observed that, after emancipation, while black literacy increased, 
so did black crime. “Such claims ‘proved’ that education and freedom made 
blacks sexually dangerous and provided the underpinnings for political 
disfranchisement and social segregation of black southerners in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” (Sommerville 1995: 487). 
94 Ida B. Wells’ The Red Record ([1895]1991) provides a horrifying window 
into the practice and extent of lynching in the post-bellum era. 
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Anxiety around sexual violence and transgression is a reoccurring theme in 
the fearful racist narratives that arise in USA immigration discussions, as 
Twitter user “DMA” posted on the 14th of September 2019: “Finally the good 
ppl [sic] of this Country what [sic] something done to protect their young girls 
and women from these illegal savages raping them! Deport all illegals now!” 
(DMA 2019). 
  
In the antebellum era the ultimate fear embedded in the proslavery 
movement, in which all the other fears were housed, was the idea that 
emancipation would ultimately lead to a loss of both power and resources 
controlled by the white man, resulting in a society that was overrun and over-
ruled by blacks. In the eyes of Dew, allowing African Americans their freedom 
would lead to a great increase in their population, threatening white citizens 
and presenting “one of the most blighting curses that could scathe the land” 
(1849:52). It was partially this threat, which the spread of slavery precipitated 
that contributed (for some) to the North’s motivation behind the Civil War, 
not simply pure abolitionist ideals - which are more readily touted (Rozett 
1976, and Fredrickson 1987).  
 
Fears of being ‘overrun’ by the ‘Dark Other’ similarly characterise discourse on 
the ‘threat’ of ‘illegals’. As one user “Mad as H__” tweeted, “#illeagals [sic] are 
taking over our country & it is ok with WASHINGTON, they also want all 
MUSLIMS in this country just ask #IDAHO” (Mad as H__ 2015). 
 
Ultimately the framing of the ‘African Other’ in the antebellum South was 
based on fear. The narrative of the ‘African Other’ simultaneously distorts, 
caricaturises and dehumanises the lives of African Americans, and sadly is the 
continuing backbone of racial relations in the USA. The demonisation of 
African Americans added another layer to the cultural residuum of fear, 
cementing the fact that while the ethnic identity of the ‘Dark Other’ may vary, 
their symbolic role as the embodiment of the forces of danger or evil remains 
the same (Woodward 1996:115). 
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Post 9/11 Rhetoric: The Speeches of President Bush, and the 
Crystallisation of the Muslim ‘Enemy’ 
The ‘Dark Other’ appeared again to threaten the American consciousness 
many times in the period between the antebellum era, and the new 
millennium. Racial tensions, systemic inequality and abuse of blacks by whites 
continued through postbellum and reconstruction era, found new forms in the 
‘separate but equal’ years of Jim Crow. Nixon’s ‘war on drugs’ was a racist dog 
whistle that targeted in particular young black men, and decimated 
communities of colour (Alexander 2011).  Native Americans continued to be 
demonised and stripped of rights and land. Han Chinese were subjected to the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and anti-Chinese sentiment ran rampant 
during the Cold War with the Red Scare and McCarthyism, and Japanese 
Americans were forced into internment camps during World War II after the 
attack on Pearl Harbour.  
 
However, when it comes to unpacking this cultural residuum of fear in the 
United States, the fears circulating around Muslim bodies in the aftermath of 
9/11 add a crucial piece to the puzzle. This is an event that remains in living 
memory for the majority of Americans, and thus characterises and colours the 
views and fears of the nation in an even more intense, and visceral way. This 
example of racial othering sets the scene for narratives surrounding refugees 
in two other ways; introducing the global news media apparatus as a key 
element in the production and proliferation of such narratives, and through 
explicit presidential rhetoric used to create a common enemy. The 
relationship that was fostered in the wake of 9/11 between fearful narratives 
being told by the President, and the constant coverage of these stories by the 
media created a landscape of fear for many Americans, and acts as a direct 
precursor to the social and political climate of the Trump era reactions 
towards refugees.  
 
On the morning of September 11, 2001, an American Airlines jet crashed into 
the north tower of the World Trade Centre. This was closely followed by a 
second plane, which flew into the second tower, confirming that this was no 
accident. Shortly after, the Pentagon was hit with a third plane, and a fourth 
Chapter 3 | Historical Narratives of Fear 
	 88	
crashed just outside of Pittsburgh, without reaching its targeted destination. 
Two thousand, nine hundred and seventy seven people were killed, and nearly 
six thousand more were injured. This became the largest attack on American 
soil from an external adversary, eclipsing Pearl Harbour.  
 
Less than an hour after the planes hit, President George W. Bush addressed 
the nation from Emma Booker Elementary School in Florida, which he had 
been visiting. In this short statement Bush set the stage for a pattern of 
language that would eventually build to the justification of war. He described 
the event as a “tragedy” and “a difficult moment for America”, and “an 
apparent terrorist attack”, drawing the nation together in the face of violence.  
I have spoken to the Vice President, to the Governor of New York, to 
the Director of the FBI, and have ordered that the full resources of the 
federal government go to help the victims and their families, and to 
conduct a full scale investigation to hunt down and to find those folks 
that committed this act (Bush 2001: as cited in Silberstein 2004:3-4) 
 
Here Bush relies on the use of I, and the active voice, enforcing his power, 
agency, and leadership. With his statement that he will ‘hunt down’ the ‘folks 
that committed this act’ he identifies an enemy, and implies that violence 
against said enemy is the only path of recourse.         
 
Bush spoke to the public through media channels a further two times that day, 
each instance clarifying his rhetorical posture of a nation at war: “Make no 
mistake: The United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for 
this cowardly act”, “The resolve of our great nation is being tested…We will 
show the world that we will pass this test”(as cited in Silberstein 2004). Here 
Bush once again identifies an enemy, that is pitted against the collective ‘our’ 
America. An America that is ‘great’, while the enemy is ‘cowardly’.     
 
By the time of his evening prime-time address from the oval office, the “war 
on terrorism” narrative had emerged. The event was no longer a ‘tragedy’, but 
rather an attack on the very heart of America. 
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Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under 
attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims 
were in airplanes, or in their offices; secretaries, businessmen and 
women, military and federal workers; moms and dads, friends and 
neighbours. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable 
acts of terror (in Silberstein 2004: 3). 
 
Again the President evoked a shared sense of citizenry, and appealed to the 
main symbol of America’s utopian ideal, freedom.95 Through the use of “moms 
and dads, friends and neighbours” he made the victims personally relatable to 
any and all Americans, and conjures a collective emotional identity of loss. 
Through invoking the symbol of ‘freedom’ Bush rallied Americans around this 
abstract ideal that resonates deeply within the creation mythology of the 
United States. The concept of freedom in this context is the epitome of ‘good’, 
contrasting it directly with the ‘evil’ and ‘despicable’ terrorists.  
 
“America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for 
freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from 
shining”. Bush then concludes with a prayer, Psalm 23: “even though I walk 
through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for you are with me” 
reminding Americans that they are a nation that is backed by God (9/11 News 
Coverage: 8.30 pm: Bush Oval Office Address).96  
 
With this, Bush rendered the world into Manichean opposites. These speeches 
paint a binary world, with the USA on one side (good), and the ‘terrorists’ on 
the other (evil). Presenting a stark dichotomy of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘good’ and 
																																																								
95 Which has never been an ideal that all in America can achieve, and is 
subject to uneven access. Freedom in America has always been conditional. 
96	Throughout Bush’s speeches on 9/11, a second lesser dichotomy appears, 
running parallel to that of ‘good/God’, ‘evil/devil’. That is the dichotomy 
between ‘savage’, and ‘civilised’. Collet (2009) maps this pattern.  The 
terrorists (and by conflation and extension - Arabs and Islam) are painted as 
being completely ‘un-developed’ and ‘un-civilised’, in stark comparison to the 
USA which is portrayed as a beacon of ‘civilisation’. The idea of the ‘Other’ 
being developmentally ‘behind’ European Americans is, as this chapter has 
discussed, a hallmark of this particular racist fear which rests on patterns of 
demonisation and dehumanisation.  
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‘evil’, ‘God’ and ‘devil’ is hardly the invention of the Bush administration, but 
rather has been a tool utilised by centres of power through time and space. It 
is rare however, that divisions are presented in such stark moral opposites, 
and un-nuanced terms. Presenting the world as a battle between good and evil 
instead harks more to fictional stories (indeed Chomsky (2003) argues that 
Bush’s post 9/11 speeches plagiarise both ancient epics and children’s tales). 
 
During his Presidency, Donald Trump continued and furthered this legacy of 
speaking directly to his constituents about a shared ‘enemy’, simplifying 
complex situations and issues such as immigration and asylum into a one-
dimensional conflict. On the 6th of March 2016 before he was elected, he 
tweeted “Nobody will protect our Nation like Donald J. Trump. Our military 
will be greatly strengthened and our borders will be strong. Illegals out!” 
(Trump 2016).  
 
President Bush’s speeches in the aftermath of 9/11 were squaring the nation 
off for a cosmic battle. All that remained necessary was to locate the enemy. 
By the time that Bush spoke on the 20th of September - a shift had occurred in 
the vernacular, away from an abstract ‘evil’; locating instead a physical evil in 
human form, with the use of words such as ‘evildoers’, ‘evil folks’ and 
‘barbarism’. In his September 20th speech Bush positioned the ‘evildoers’ as 
being of Middle Eastern origin - naming al-Qaida as the group responsible for 
the attacks, and tying them to the Taliban.97 Bush stated: “al-Qaida is to terror 
what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is 
remaking the world—and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere”.98 
																																																								
97 The Taliban is a Pashtun political movement concentrated in Afghanistan, 
while al-Qaida is a global terrorist movement with the United States as their 
primary target. These two groups have differing, and oft-times competing 
ideologies and goals. Despite this, their conflation dominated both official 
governmental narratives and the media representations. 
98 Chomsky (2003) argues that motivation behind the attacks was more 
complex than simply the combination of the desire to promote Islamist 
extremism and a simple ‘hatred of America’, and ‘hatred of freedom’, but 
rather due to their resentment and rejection of official US policies (which 
some have argued primarily stem from continuing control and access to 
Middle Eastern oil, rather than paternalist instincts towards protection and 
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Through this amalgam of different Islamic groups, Bush places a blanket of 
blame, simultaneously defining and de-individualising the ‘enemy’: “we will 
make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and 
those who harbour them”. This kind of vernacular also homogenises and 
characterises reactions against refugees. On the 1st of March 2018 Twitter user 
“ConservativeTht” tweeted “For those cheering Illegal Aliens crossing our 
Southern Border: consider how many are Drug Smugglers or Terrorists with 
Evil intent…” (ConservativeTht 2018). 
 
Post 9/11 image construction of the ‘enemy’ progressed with the 
characterisation of the terrorists as barbaric and animalistic (Bloodsworth-
Lugo and Lugo-Lugo 2010). Bush stated that to escape, “the terrorists may 
burrow deeper into caves and other entrenched hiding places”, and that the 
US would “starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive 
them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest”. Here the 
terrorists are presented as a dirty and de-humanised swarm that would scurry 
to ‘caves’ and other dark and ‘barbaric’ places to escape. 
 
The news media also played an important role in the post 9/11 construction of 
the enemy.99 The dissemination of eyewitness accounts of the attacks helped 
produce a visceral sense of national tragedy and fear. It was also through these 
channels that the President’s speeches were communicated to the wider public 
audience. The media age reshaped the role of the presidency. Pre twentieth 
century, the president was a mostly silent role (in terms of limited media 
circulation), but from the middle of the century onwards (sparked by WWII), 
public speeches by US presidents were to rise by five hundred percent. 
Increase in presidential visibility and oration lead to the ubiquitous idea that- 
as Hart puts it, “speaking is governing”(in Silberstein 2004:2). This power 
and persuasion of the President in turn relies heavily on access to the media. 
																																																																																																																																																														
‘development’ of local communities) which constrain their agency and deny 
them the freedoms to which they also aspire. 
99 Indeed it has been argued that terrorism is a phenomenon that is made for, 
and by the media age. Former diplomat David Long notes: “The media’s 
mission to cover the news and the terrorist’s ability to ‘create’ news have led to 
a symbiotic relationship between the two, one in which the media not only 
convey the news, but help the terrorist create it” (in Silberston 2004:2). 
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The symbiosis between President and media apparatuses reached epic 
proportions in the United States during the Presidency of Donald Trump, 
despite Trump labelling the media the ‘enemy of the people’, and his constant 
denunciations of ‘fake news’. ‘Conservative’ and ‘liberal’ news is increasingly 
divided and divisive, conservative media seemingly supported the president 
regardless of what he said or did, and Fox News in particular has been likened 
to the state-sanctioned propaganda stations of dictatorships. On the other side 
of the aisle ‘liberal’ stations such as CNN and NBC covered the president in 
the same dogged manner, although refuting instead of reaffirming his words 
and actions. Either way this particular president dominated screens and 
airwaves like no president before him, as he and his administration churned 
out ‘newsworthy’, emotionally charged incidents at an alarming rate, feeding 
the profit motive in the private media industry.    
 
The North American media in 2001 was also partially fuelled by market-
driven imperatives when they pre-emptively set the stage for the 
concretisation of a Muslim ‘enemy’, by publishing profiles of suspected 
attackers (the majority of whom were either Arabic or Muslim), before the 
government issued a statement identifying the terrorist groups. This 
purposeful vilification, dehumanisation and homogenisation of a diverse 
group of peoples had real-life implications and effects on both the National 
and International stage.  
 
On the macro level, the public attitude towards the ‘Muslim terrorists’ made 
space for the ‘War on Terror’ (or Afghanistan), which resulted in a huge loss of 
life, and that might not otherwise have been publicly supported. The attacks of 
9/11 lead to the Bush administration’s policy response: the ‘National Security 
Strategy of the United States’. The defining element of the strategy was the 
‘Bush Doctrine’ which rejects “the traditional military posture of defence and 
deterrence in favour of a policy of preventative intervention” (Dunmire 
2009:196). Under this policy the US claimed the right to pre-emptively use 
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military force100 against an adversary to prevent future hostile actions101 thus 
self-sanctioning the war. On the micro scale, the USA experienced an almost 
immediate, exponential surge in hate crimes against people who ‘appeared’ to 
be of Arab or Muslim decent (Byers and Jones 2007). This lead to the deaths 
of not just Arabs and Muslims, but also Sikhs and South Asian immigrants, 
identities that the ‘Dark Other’ narrative in the eyes of the attackers, also 
subsumed.102  
 
Ostensibly then, the identification of a monolithic ‘evil’ Muslim ‘enemy’ (as 
outlined in presidential rhetoric) was accepted almost seamlessly into the 
social consciousness of some in the USA. Jack Shaheen (2003) posits that this 
is because the image of the ‘Muslim terrorist’ already existed in North 
America. He argues that American pop culture and mass media has created 
and sustained stereotypes of an ‘evil Arab’. These stereotypes have 
constructed all Muslims as Arabs, and all Arabs as terrorists - condensing a 
vast array of peoples, ideals and beliefs into a dark caricature. And slowly, 
over time, embedding this shadowy Muslim into the American cultural lexicon 
of fear, filling the role of American enemy that had (for the most part) lain 
open since the conclusion of the Cold War. 
 
																																																								
100 The President stated; “There’s no telling how many wars it will take to 
secure freedom in the homeland”; giving legitimacy to continued aggression, 
for without addressing the underlying grievances that spark the threat of 
terrorism, ‘securing freedom’ through the eradication of threat is a virtually 
unending mission (Chomsky 2003:118). 
101 Although, as Chomsky (2011) notes, the use of ‘preventative’ force is hardly 
a recent development within US foreign policy; prior administrations (from 
Reagan to Bush I) have co-opted Article 51 of the UN Charter to justify the use 
of force in “self-defence against future attack” (119). 
102	The True American (2014) by Anand Giridharadas tells the story of both 
parties of one such encounter. The book details the origin and experience of 
Raisuddin Bhuiyan, a Bangladeshi immigrant to the states who was shot in the 
face ten days after 9/11, and those of his attacker, a white supremacist named 
Mark Stroman. Stroman shot two other immigrants (who did not survive) in a 
post 9/11 ‘revenge’ attempt. Stroman was apparently targeting ‘Arabs’, 
although all three of his victims were of South Asian decent. Bhuiyan forgave 
his attacker and ultimately waged a public and legal campaign to spare him 
from death row. 
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Shaheen contends that images on the big (or little) screen are a hugely 
powerful tool in the creation and perpetuation of stereotypes. He mapped over 
900 films, and found that in all but a scant few cases Arabs were portrayed as 
‘Public Enemy #1’. In Hollywood’s shadowy caricature the ‘Arab’ is depicted as 
‘sand-niggers’, and ‘towel-heads’,  “brutal, heartless, uncivilized religious 
fanatics and money-mad cultural ‘others’ bent on terrorizing civilized 
Westerners, especially Christians and Jews” (2003:172).103 This expression 
was repeated in the State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002. 
Repetitive representations present them as animalistic, unnaturally violent 
brute murderers, and sleazy rapists who are abusers of women; all the familiar 
tropes that appear throughout time and space and have come to characterise 
the American experience of the ‘Dark Other’ that is the back bone of this 
particular cultural fear.   
 
As discussed through the exploration of the Brothers Grimm in the German 
context, these fictional narratives have immense power to shape social 
attitudes and beliefs, and construct a prism through which people view the 
world, themselves, and others. Cognitive science research suggests why it was 
so easy for some Americans to invoke these fictional narratives as concrete 
explanations of the 9/11 attacks. As has been discussed, human beings make 
sense of the world through conceptual frameworks, such as narratives. When 
we encounter new information, we search for signifiers that fit within familiar 
stories. As humans we hold multiple narratives, sometimes even competing 
narratives about the same issue. However, once one story is activated in 
someone’s mind, it becomes very difficult to stray from that path (Royal 2011). 
This proves the same on a collective emotional level. Societies that are 
engulfed in fear are hindered in attempts at more peaceful relations with the 
‘other’, as such a fearful orientation proves to be both a psychological and 
cultural blockade (Bar-Tal: 2001). 
 
																																																								
103 Bush’s post 9/11 rhetoric actually directly references the Hollywood 
construction of the Arab enemy. In his September 12th speech he declared, 
“Make no mistake about it: we will win” which is a line from the movie The 
Siege, in which the villains were Islamic terrorists (Merskin 2005). 
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The strategic language of President Bush in his post 9/11 speeches was 
grounded in connection to universal notions of enmity. Specifically, portrayals 
of the ‘enemy’ were described with rhetoric that drew from, and referenced 
the stereotype of the Arab-Muslim-terrorist, a narrative of fear that was pre-
existent in cultural artefacts and understandings. Opinion surveys conducted 
over a decade later show that terrorism is still regarded as one of the States’ 
top three priorities in the eyes of the public (Altheide 2013:233), showing how 
deeply this fear was ingrained within the cultural consciousness. 
 
The endurance of this fear of terrorism is likely due to the fact that it builds 
upon the very foundation of the cultural residuum of fear that exists within 
certain corners of society in the United States, the fear of the ‘Dark Other’. As 
has been discussed, these American narratives of fear have centred around the 
practice of ‘racial othering’. While the identity of the ‘others’ in this narrative 
have shifted and changed through time (be they Native American, African-
American, or Muslim), the tropes with which they are fearfully painted have - 
for the most part - remained the same. The ‘Other’ appears in these narratives 
as savage, violent, animalistic, and sexually deviant.  The location of a ‘Muslim 
Other’ built upon this narrative tradition. All of these factors resulted in the 
crystallisation of a Muslim ‘enemy’, a concept that has directly informed the 
reception of refugees in the States during the global refugee crisis and beyond.      
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Chapter 4: Narratives of Fear of Refugees 
In this chapter I very briefly examine two monumental changes in social channels 
of communication and narrative - the rise of mass media, and social media. A 
wealth of knowledge exists relating to the study of mass media, while academic 
concentration on social media forms of communication is still an emerging field. 
Here it is not my aim to add to this body of knowledge, these forms of 
communication are simply examined through an attempt to uncover the ways in 
which these mediums have impacted the production and dissemination of fear 
narratives. Discussion then moves on to examining the narratives of fear 
surrounding refugees in Germany and the USA. 
I propose that both countries, throughout time, have developed a collective 
cultural emotional residuum of fear that accumulates and extends in certain silos 
of German and US society, and that these fears inform the xenophobic and racist 
narratives within the contested and complicated reception of refugees in both 
nations.       
 
Mass Media and the (Re)creation of Social Fears 
Fear narratives, as examined in the previous chapter, can contribute to a society’s 
central beliefs, and colour the prism through which these people view both 
themselves, and others. These central beliefs (and the narratives that they are 
composed of) are disseminated through a society’s institutions and channels of 
communication (Bar-Tal 2001:606). However, these channels of communication 
are constantly changing and evolving. The rise of mass media104 has played a 
crucial role in shaping the ways in which these culturally specific narratives of 
fear are created, recreated, and disseminated in both Germany and the USA. 
 
The media are, and have been, integral to the cultural production of knowledge. 
																																																								
104 When using this term, I refer to the proliferation of print news, radio, and 
television news, sometimes referred to as ‘global news media’, or as Appadurai 
(1990) termed it, the ‘mediascape’. 
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Historically, print media has been relatively independent in a democratic 
society.105 Indeed - in the United States, freedom of the press is enshrined within 
the First Amendment of the Constitution.106 However, the relationship between 
private and public interest within the media has always been somewhat blurred. 
A development that further pressed the boundaries of this relationship was the 
introduction of television capabilities. The dissemination of video footage 
permanently changed the media ecology. Video broadcasting provided citizens 
with a sense of immediacy and involvement in media events. Originally, this 
technology was owned and controlled by the state, and therefore the state set the 
agenda for broadcast journalism, dominating visual news representations.107 
There were, of course disruptions in this pattern of state mandated visual media 
influence. The Vietnam War was America’s first televised military conflict, and 
the nightly images of graphic violence, terror, and death contributed to the 
widespread protests and the counterculture of the 1960s.108 In general though, 
broadcast news media provided a channel through which government aims could 
be almost immediately communicated (implicitly or explicitly) to the public.  
 
Further changes in technology and social structure gave rise to the advent of mass 
(or ‘global’) media. The way that ideas, messages and images are disseminated 
and communicated has been revolutionised, as constraints of time and distance 
																																																								
105 Benedict Anderson, in his seminal work Imagined Communities (1983) argued 
that newspapers were (and are) an essential ingredient in the creation of the 
nation state, as they foster a sense of shared national identity through treating 
readers across the country as part of a unified group, with common values and 
goals. 
106 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances” (US Constitution, Amendment I in Jones 
2011:29). 
107 The links between imagery, power and control are manifold. In Orientalism 
Said proposes that Western hegemony has been constructed on the visual 
paradigm (1978). Following on from this The Violent Image by Neville Bolt 
(2012) presents an interesting account of how ‘insurgent’ and marginalised 
groups have, and continue to co-opt the power of imagery to challenge and 
disrupt hegemonic norms and flows of power. 
108 Following this the US went to great lengths to ensure that they controlled the 
images circulated of subsequent conflicts, see Taylor’s War and the Media: 
Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War (1992). 
Chapter 4| Narratives of Fear of Refugees 
	 98	
have collapsed. Media is now constantly accessible109 to (almost) everyone, 
regardless of temporal and geographical 
considerations.110  Mass media has become a ubiquitous part of everyday life; this 
landscape is the primary medium through which many people in Germany and 
the USA access knowledge and news, and it is through this medium that Germans 
and Americans often access information on refugee flows. 
 
Some journalists have claimed that news is simply a mirror held up to reality 
(Mikelson 1972, in Patterson 2000). However, news, like all other forms of 
cultural communication - is constructed. News is based on narrative. It is not just 
an objective list of events, but rather combines a cognitive ordering of events with 
a moral ordering of responsibilities, serving as a reminder of social mores and 
norms (Schudson 2005:123). Importantly - news is shaped by both perspective, 
and audience. For news to be ‘successful’111 it must contain a degree of 
verisimilitude, and resonate with consumers. Dayan and Katz see the relationship 
between audience and media as iterative, “not simply a linear relationship but 
one that is circular and systemic” (1992:225). People are also situated within 
subcultures (often defined by where people are located within the framework of 
economic and cultural power), and this shapes their understanding of, and 
relationship to the news (Katz in Liebes, Curran and Katz 1998:18), much as it 
shapes their experience of emotion.    
 
News narratives generally reflect social order and the communication processes 
within that order. Altheide (2013, 2018) argues that while this may have been the 
																																																								
109 Kellner (2019) provides an examination of the evolution of the media ecology, 
focusing on how ‘the spectacle’ of mass media dominates social and political life 
in the contemporary era, while Skovmand and Schrøder (2016) depart from the 
beaten track of mass media analysis - which tends to be pessimistic about its 
effects on culture – and propose a more nuanced examination, centred around 
audience interaction with these cultural products, rather than the treatment of 
the media industry as a monolith. 
110 It is important to note however that this access is increasingly constrained, 
policed, and re-territorialised in several countries, most notably China and 
Russia. In a context where states increasingly forge links between cyberspaces, 
governance and foreign policy, the politicisation of informational and media 
access has heavy implications for internal and global relations (Yang 2014, 
Nocetti 2015). 
111 What constitutes ‘success’ in the media arena is discussed in further detail 
below. 
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case with ‘traditional’ media, the introduction of mass media, with its almost 
constant presence in public life, means that news stories no longer reflect cultural 
meaning, but rather simply transmit mass media accounts. “These days, for the 
majority of people, the mass media shape identities and narratives” (Altheide 
2018:7). In mass media communication the aim is no longer to educate the 
public, but rather to evoke emotion (Schudson 2005:122). However, the aim is 
not simply to elicit any emotion. Collectively people tend to be more interested in 
negative or sensational news, news about crime or violence, as fear and anger are 
‘base’ emotions that are easier to solicit en masse. Thus, more focus is targeted 
towards these stories, and emotions in order to keep the public’s interest (Brants, 
Hermes and van Zoonen 1997).112 The presidency of Donald Trump lends itself 
perfectly to this cycle: “Trump is a definitive product of mediatized politics 
providing the spectacle that drives ratings and affective media consumption, 
either as part of his populist movement or as the liberal resistance” (Jutel 
2019:256). 
 
In this way mass news media is a perfect vehicle for the reproduction of fear 
narratives. Indeed Altheide’s (2018) argument pivots on the fact that through a 
constant bombardment of fear-inducing, fear-driven news, fear has become a 
dominant public perspective in the United States. These news stories revolve 
around sensationalism, stress events rather than process, and thrive on conflict 
(Liebes, Curran and Katz 1998:14).113 Thus, mass media framing of stories is a 
																																																								
112	Horkheimer and Adorno of the Frankfurt School warned of the rise of the 
‘culture industry’ (popular culture, reproduced in its millions and disseminated 
throughout the market in the form of Hollywood, radio, music, and photography. 
“Horkheimer and Adorno suggested that these means of mass culture were 
connected to the increasingly authoritarian family, which fed on a regression 
from independent thinking to fantasy that could be manipulated for commercial 
and political ends. Adorno worried that insofar as mass culture is subject to the 
pressures of the market, what succeeds is what has greatest sales, what thus 
appeals to the lowest common denominator, and hence what is least likely to 
stimulate critical thinking, differential response, or mature flexibility which 
comes from dealing with nonstereotypic situations and difficulties.” (Marcus and 
Fischer 1999:121) 
113 Media treatment does not focus on addressing systemic problems that cause 
incidents  (such as racial violence, opioid addiction) but rather focuses on the 
individual ‘criminals’ involved in the particular incidents. “Focusing on the 
individual rather than structural causes of any incident reinforces the neoliberal 
narrative of individual responsibility” (Wrenn 2014: 349). 
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conscious process. Selective media representations of events often select out 
limited aspects of a complex issue, rendering it salient for mass communication, 
and through this process promoting a narrow reading of that issue. As seen, 
narrative frames are form-giving, providing meaning to what might otherwise 
seem meaningless: “a particular frame structures the thinking process and shapes 
what people see, or do not see in important societal settings” (Feagin 2010:10).   
 
For Altheide (2018) the main instance of fear in media representations resides in 
the coverage of ‘crime’ and ‘terrorism’. These news stories chime with the echoes 
of the American leitmotif of the ‘Dark Other’. Inherent in the historical  news 
coverage of ‘crime’ in the US is the link between crime and African-Americans (be 
it implicit or explicit). This link was fostered as early as slave-holding times, but 
was solidified in the minds of the American public through Nixon’s ‘war on 
drugs’, and the concomitant media coverage.114 Crime, as discussed further below, 
is also closely tied to ‘illegals’ in media representations, with references to ‘gangs’ 
conjuring up threatening images of Blacks and Latinos.  
 
The emphasis on the threat of terrorism in the news bleeds on from the 
discussion of narratives of fear surrounding 9/11. Much has been written on the 
symbiotic relationship between terror spectacles and the media (Bolt 2012). It is 
an established fact that these events would have much less of an impact without 
the amplification provided by the media coverage. Unfortunately these are the 
kinds of event (those that elicit ‘24 hour coverage’) that garner most media 
involvement. As Howie (2012) reminds us, the aim of these kinds of attacks is not 
primarily to cause mass deaths, but rather through their visibility, to induce panic 
in the rest of the population: “Terrorists terrify by being witnessed. If they do not 
terrify and are not witnessed, they are not terrorists” (Howie 2012:49).115 
																																																								
114 Nixon’s ’71 ‘war on drugs’ (or the fight against “public enemy number one”), at 
a time when drug use as a whole was comparatively low, was really a dog whistle 
for the continuation of the targeting of Black Americans by the law and order 
enforcers (Alexander 2011, Davis 2019). The life-consequences of these narratives 
that tie crime to African-Americans is clearly evident in their disproportionate 
representation within the prison system. It is a vicious cycle. 
115 Howie argues convincingly that terrorism is a facet of the process of 
globalisation, as it is performed in a way that is meant to emotionally transcend 
the boundaries of the affected countries. 
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Terrorists (in conjunction with the media) are extremely successful in the 
execution of their aim, as terrorism is still regarded as one of the top threats to 
the nation in the eyes of the American public, ranking much higher than issues 
such as providing universal healthcare, dealing with gun violence116, or protecting 
the environment – all issues that represent a far greater direct impact on the lives 
of Americans than terrorism. “American citizens’ consciousness and speech about 
the ‘terrorist threat’ is a product of the propaganda of fear that has defined a 
plethora of U.S. news coverage for more than a decade” (Altheide 2013:233). 
Howie found that people in Western societies (such as the US and Germany) hold 
the general view that Islam and terrorism are inextricably intertwined, and that 
the aim of Islam is to destroy the Western way of life (2012). While the identities 
of the perpetrators of crime and terrorism are not always explicitly stated in the 
news, due to overarching cultural narratives, their imagined (‘dark’) identities 
linger in the margins of the spaces around the story.117  
																																																								
116 Interestingly gun violence in the USA – often perpetrated in contexts primed 
to produce the maximum amount of terror (at schools, theatres, night clubs, 
places where people expect to be safe) is often not painted as terrorism (or, not 
painted as terrorism if the perpetrator is white). Predictably, post-tragedy 
coverage invariably gives way to discussions of the offender’s mental health, 
particularly in cases involving far-right shootings (Taylor 2019). 
117	In a similar vein to Anderson (1983), Dayan and Katz argue in their classic, oft 
cited work Media Events that the media can also reinforce a sense of belonging 
with a group, not simply by identifying, and vilifying out groups, but through the 
promotion of social ceremony - what Dayan and Katz (1992) call ‘media events’. 
These consist of the broadcasting of three categories: ‘contests’ (in sports or 
politics, such as the Olympics, or the Watergate hearings, or the Trump 
impeachment hearings), ‘conquests’ (political or scientific, such as man landing 
on the moon), and ‘coronations’ (which document the rites of passage of famous 
individuals). Dayan and Katz emphasise the importance of these ‘media events’, 
in integrating and reconciling society, reaffirming the social mores and norms, 
and legitimating its institutions. Media events are understood to be ceremonial, 
and play an important part in collective social life. However, these ‘media events’ 
serve to reinforce the status quo of the establishment, thus they could be seen as 
first and foremost serving institutional interests, rather than those of the public. 
Also, Katz goes on to argue in his later works, such as No More Peace (2007), that 
media trends have retreated from ceremonial ‘media events’, and moved 
emphasis towards the broadcasting of ‘disruptive events’ such as disaster, war, 
and terror.  He states that this is because of the change in technology and 
broadcasting organisation. Channels have multiplied exponentially, and because 
of this there is fierce competition (making it less likely that they unanimously join 
with establishments in national celebration). Additionally, television equipment 
has become more mobile, and readily accessible. “These institutional changes (1) 
have scattered the audience and undermined the shared experience of 
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As media en masse has moved further from the local, and towards more 
globalised models, criticism has been levied that any attempt to operate under a 
public service model has long since dissipated from media communication. 
Instead, the mass media is almost entirely driven by market imperatives 
(Livingstone and Lunt 1994).  The media industry has been almost completely 
privatised (Bolt 2012). 118 Through controlling news sources, corporate executives 
exert a great deal of influence over both citizens and government, with media 
owners intervening “for corporate self-interest and political gain” (Bolt 2012:137). 
As Livingstone and Lunt argue “the media are a powerful force in contemporary 
society, being increasingly implicated in the construction of political events and 
the management of political decisions” (1994:9). While the corporate agenda is 
often present in the production of news, corporations themselves are habitually 
much less perceptible as the subjects of news stories (Shudson 2005:125). Power 
has been dispersed, and a hardly visible consortia control global events, 
dominating the channels of communication, unfettered by democratic 
constraints.  
 
Criticism of the intentions behind media communication is hardly new. Elull 
argued in 1968 that media forces were at work to secure private profit interests, 
rather than to serve the public. Other theorists of the public sphere such as 
Jürgen Habermas have critiqued mass media as not being truly able to promote 
free and inclusive social communication (1989). Habermas conceives of the 
media as creating a pseudo-public sphere. The mass media has a veneer of public 
participation, when in reality participation is passive, and simply reinforces the 
power imbalance between the ‘lay’ people, and the elites (in Goode 2005). 
Inherent in Habermas’ conception of mass media, is the possibility for an ideal of 
public communication that is unconstrained by institutional control, and that 
																																																																																																																																																																					
broadcasting (2) have taken the novelty out of live broadcasting, and (3) have 
socialized us to “action” rather than ceremony, to a norm of interruption rather 
than schedule.” (Katz and Liebes 2007:159). All of these factors have been 
compounded by the fact that there has been a decline in public perception of the 
credibility of governments (who are co-sponsors of ‘media events’), and trust in 
the media has declined. 
118 With a few notable exceptions such as Al Jazeera, The Guardian, and state 
media such as RNZ, ABC, and the BBC.    
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would provide a true source of critical public engagement, which he regarded as 
of utmost necessity for public participation in democratic political processes.   
 
However, even in contemporary mass mediated society, citizens still exert a 
degree of influence in these flows of media, as audiences exercise their agency 
within defined parameters through their reception of the news, and in choosing 
what to consume and reject.  In this context ‘success’ of a news piece is therefore 
not related to the degree of truth that it communicates, or its attempt to educate, 
but rather is based on its ability to engage with audiences, and yield economic 
returns. This media ecology increasingly relies upon discourses and images that 
make direct appeal to our emotions (Bainbridge and Yates 2014:2), with 
‘successful’ news building on a shared emotional world with its consumers. 
Consequently, media offers meaning “which plugs into society’s central value 
system, itself a consensus” (Bolt 2012:145). The emotions that solicit most 
traction in the public consciousness are those of fear and anger. Thus these are 
increasingly the themes that dominate media representations. In this way, mass 
media has and continues to (re)shape both social expectations and everyday life 
through constant focus and increasing visibility of narratives of fear. This fearful 
framing surrounds the majority of news coverage of refugees, which is intensified 
by market driven imperatives of emotional engagement and sensationalism.  
 
Social Media: New Frontiers? 
The Internet presents a further development within in social communication. 
It has facilitated the compression of the time-space continuum on a scale hitherto 
unseen. The world’s knowledge is available at the fingertips of (most of) the 
global population. It has transformed the way that people consume information, 
and how (and who) they communicate with. The development and increasing 
importance of social media sites such as Twitter, Youtube, Instagram, and 
Facebook (often referred to as ‘Web 2.0’) provide sociotechnological spaces in 
which communication and representations of life are shared. Thus social media 
provides a central site for mapping the expression of these narratives of fear. It 
offers a unique source for studying everyday discourses outside of the scope of 
traditional media (Törnberg and Törnberg 2016).  
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As Bouvier identified, the growing popularity of social media has created a need 
for the consideration of the impact of these channels on the lived social world. 
The question remains as to whether these platforms contribute to society through 
facilitating direct access to information, allowing people to become better 
informed, and to participate more readily in public life (in other words, does the 
Internet represent the actualisation of Habermas’ utopian public democracy)? Or 
does it lead to echo chambers of increasingly insular ideas, values, and 
worldviews; fostering shallow, superficial relationships, and acting as panem et 
circense, distracting the masses from true public affairs, and further disengaging 
them from civic participation?  
 
Social media are composed of interactive formats. Consider the example of 
Twitter119, which is an integrated platform that combines an array of media and 
communication technologies. It is multimodal and intertextual, encompassing 
text, visuals, and links to other sites. Twitter is sometimes characterised as a 
micro-blogging platform. In this space each user shares short messages with the 
public (Twitter has a character cap of 280 per tweet). Each user has a following, 
to which these messages are communicated (although one does not have to be 
following someone to access their posts). Tweets are then retweeted, or 
responded to in a thread underneath the original message. Twitter works with 
hashtags, which are labels that are used to identify and group specific topics. The 
speed of the propagation of messages allows for ‘real time’ discussion of unfolding 
events, which makes it central to the digital media landscape (Kries 2017). 
Content is self-generating, as each communication invites ever more 
																																																								
119 I use Twitter above Facebook, as it is through Twitter that some of the 
examples of narratives that are discussed were obtained. While Facebook is 
generally considered to be the most popular social media platform worldwide, I 
was unable to access it without a profile, where as Twitter is more publicly 
available without a profile (almost anyone can look at Twitter feeds – unless they 
are locked accounts, which is very rare). Also, I felt that Twitter provided richer 
ground to examine discourses surrounding refugees, especially in the context of 
the US, as it was one of the main methods that the political administration of 
Donald Trump used to communicate with the public. Therefore narratives may be 
observed as they were communicated throughout the stratification of power in 
North American society. 
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communications ad infinitum, making it fluid in nature.120 This channel of 
communication is horizontally structured, as production of content is 
decentralised. Anyone can say (almost) anything.121 This is a medium that thrives 
on emotion, and revolves around soliciting a reaction.122  
 
Jutel (2019) terms this emotionally driven media system “affective media”. In 
Jutel’s understanding, affective media do not simply describe social media, but 
rather: 
the manner in which media old and new are driven by the production, 
circulation, performance and qualification of affect. From the labour of 
promoting brands, celebrities and politicians on social media to the 
consumption of traditional content on personalised devices, consumption 
and production rely upon an emotional investment, sense of user agency, 
critical knowingness and social connectivity (Jutel 2019:257) 
 
Social media is also a useful tool for those in positions of power to communicate 
with the public. These channels of communication can be highly cost-effective, as 
millions of users may be immediately reached, and the message may be instantly 
reproduced and shared, without incurring any production or transmission costs. 
Thus it is increasingly becoming the format through which politicians will 
communicate with the public.123 Consequently, Twitter is a rich site for examining 
social interactions, providing a “milieu that is highly conducive to ethnographic 
research” (Postill 2015:171). However, the question remains, in this cacophony of 
ideas, with all these voices - is anyone actually saying anything new?  
 
In a way, social media collapses the inner walls of our personal relationships, in 
that it enables close contact with those from different temporal and social 
geographies. Like this, personal relationships may become semi-public. Creating 
																																																								
120 For more on the fluid nature of neo-liberal post-modernity see Bauman’s 
excellent Liquid Modernity (1999). 
121 For some this may be seen as illustrating the patterns of narcissism in ‘modern’ 
(Western) culture that Christopher Lasch identified in 1979.  As Lasch might see 
it, social media, combined with capitalist culture that pushes individualism above 
all else, has provided the world with grand illusions of punditry for all. 
122 See Fuchs (2017) for a discussion of social media and social capital. 
123 For example, see Donald Trump. 
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and navigating one’s online content has become an integral part of the 
management of identity and social relationships (Bouvier 2015:151). For 
Bainbridge and Yates the rise in the popularity of social media platforms 
“indicates the extent to which the longing for emotional connection takes on 
mediated forms” (2014:3-4). Social media is social – but only in the immediate 
sense. Language and online identity can be transient124, and can be easily 
disengaged from the lived-world experience.125 However, this is not to suggest 
that an analysis of online identity and behaviour should be treated in isolation. 
Rather, it is a comment on the paradoxical way that these spaces concomitantly 
provide anonymity and community, distance and closeness. Social media 
decouples individuals from their real world, and they reconnect in digital 
communities. In the virtual space they form a new Gemeinschaft.126 
 
Of course, the use and effectiveness of these technologies varies dependent on 
social and political context. On the positive side, social media can be a force for 
true Habermassian democratic participation, in which the people utilise this form 
of communication to enable grass-roots social change. 127 Examples of this can be 
																																																								
124 There are some of course who feel their online identity is a more true reflection 
of themselves, and it is in virtual spaces where they feel most at home. 
125 There are increasingly instances where intentions of violence are broadcast 
online, and then carried out in the life-world (for example, the Christchurch 
shooter who published his intention and manifesto online before the attack). I do 
not mean to suggest that social media and cyber connection exists as a distinct 
entity of its own, abstracted from, and unable to influence ‘everyday life’. Rather I 
seek to comment on the way in which smaller socially inadmissible acts of malice 
and violence (such as racist, sexist or aggressive comments or tweets) do not 
come with quite the same social repercussions as they might otherwise garner if 
voiced face-to-face. Of course there are some notable exceptions to this. The past 
five years have been witness to the emergence of ‘cancel culture’ (sparked by the 
Me Too Movement), in which a celebrity or other popular figure is publicly 
shamed in response to offensive comments or actions, made in person and online 
(Romano 2019). 
126 Following on from Tönnies and Weber, Hobsbawm has proposed that 
globalisation has led to human relations being dominated by an increasingly 
remote sort of Gesellschaft, in which people attempt to remake Gemeinschaft ties 
by ‘artificially’ recreating group bonds and identities (2007). 
 
127 Within the Frankfurt School, Theodor Adorno had worried that the spread of 
the ‘culture industry’ would make ‘true art’ (defined as “stimulating critical 
thought through negotiations of the empirical realities from which it arises” 
(Marcus and Fischer 1999:121)) a rarity. Walter Benjamin however was more 
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found in the early German reactions towards refugees in 2014 posted on social 
media, which were predominantly sentiments of welcome and warmth. Social 
media have “empower[ed] citizens to voice opinions and emotions, … claiming to 
facilitate all voices evenly” (Van Dijck 2013, as cited in Kreis 2017:502). For 
example social media helped to organise the Egyptian protests over democracy in 
2011. These forms of media were attacked by the Egyptian Government, yet they 
continued to broadcast, facilitated activism and eventually transformed the 
political climate (Altheide 2013:228). Yet, the point has also been made that 
while viral movements are able to muster rapid support, it often dissipates as fast 
as it appears (Bolt 2012:144). This could be seen to be the case in the German 
context, where early narratives of welcome towards refugees were quickly 
overshadowed by narratives of fear, producing a complicated and contested social 
media reception.  
 
It has also been argued that these technologies, through increased exposure to 
different worldviews, broaden social horizons. Barberá (2014) uses studies based 
on social media in the USA, Spain and Germany to argue that social media 
reduces, rather than increases mass political polarisation. She posits that most 
users are positioned within ideologically diverse networks that they would 
otherwise likely not encounter in their day-to-day, or offline lives. She also argues 
that social media has lead to a more collaborative method of communication that 
challenges the traditional power structure. “One important characteristic of these 
platforms is that they generate social consumption of political information” 
(Barberá 2014:5); the news, and how people experience it becomes a collective 
system, shaped by both traditional institutions (such as media outlets and other 
hegemonic actors), and the wider digital community. This exposure, and the now 
participatory nature of media construction- it is argued- has the effect of 
moderating people’s political beliefs, and challenging media control of social 
discourse. However, Barberá does not discuss the possibility that although social 
media users may be exposed to differing opinions, these opinions may simply 
have the effect of affirming their own ideas through an oppositional stance, and 
																																																																																																																																																																					
optimistic, suggesting that “modern technology would allow groups to express 
themselves and disseminate their particular subcultures” (Marcus and Fischer 
1999:122). 
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thus serve to close, rather than open, world-views. Barberá also fails to fully 
account for social media algorithms. These algorithms control the material that 
individuals are exposed to on social sites, and are based off preconceived 
ideologies, affiliations, and beliefs; and often have the effect of reaffirming 
whatever biases might be held (Ahmed 2012, Sharma 2013, Postill 2015, 
Törnberg and Törnberg 2016, Ahmed and Matthes 2017, Kreis 2017). While it 
may indeed be the case that, through the broader social and political contact 
these platforms facilitate, some individuals are encouraged to think and act 
outside of tried patterns, the majority of research indicates that the overarching 
effect of social media is one of deepening divides: “This new regime of quasi-truth 
thrives on the speed with which viewer and sender are connected, leaving no time 
for reflection, criticism or scepticism, but only time for instant communication or 
miscommunication.” (Appadurai 2021:2).128  
 
Social media may appear to be organic “and as if developing ‘spontaneously’ from 
the ground up, or giving voice to the people. But in reality it involves some very 
specific top-down communication strategies on the part of parties and party 
leaders” (Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak 2018:9). It is also fuelled by 
global capitalist imperatives, and is reflective of broader social and cultural 
patterns and issues, such as globalisation and new forms of power.129 Thus 
																																																								
128	This can be observed especially in the context of the United States, where 
social media, news media, and presidential rhetoric are locked in a feedback loop, 
which has exacerbated the critical fault line. While this divide is commonly 
shorthanded as ‘red’ and ‘blue’, ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’, what it is really about 
is “power and fear…the all-consuming questions of identity, hope for the future, 
and inevitably, race” (Belosa 2018:na).  
129 Take, for example, Facebook Inc. which amasses 2.5 billion monthly active 
users and is controlled by private shareholders (the majority of the shareholders 
of course have no control, but the five main shareholders - company founder and 
largest shareholder and vote-holder by far, Mark Zuckerberg, in particular – 
govern without the checks and balances that are often accorded to such power 
and responsibility). The platform collects and collates data about its users, which 
is then sold to advertising clients who are then able to promote targeted 
advertisements on users’ profiles. In 2019 Facebook was embroiled in debates 
surrounding its public disavowal of any responsibility to fact check the ads 
promoted on its platform (this includes political and medical ads) (Kane 2019). 
These profit-first decisions have insidious, vast, and far-reaching consequences 
on issues such as knowledge production, public trust, and the nature of 
relationships between corporate agendas and democracy. 
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Facebook is an excellent vehicle for hate speech and propaganda130, as it is 
explicitly engineered to promote items that generate strong reactions. 
Vaidhyanathan proposes that Facebook has made a direct contribution to the rise 
of authoritarianism and violent ethnic and religious nationalism being witnessed 
around the world. Not only this, but extant segregations and inequalities spill 
over into the virtual realm. As Sharma put it “social networking relations, modes 
of online communication and digital communities have been revealed to be far 
from race-neutral” (2013:46). This relates to the question as to whether social 
media presents a space that provides an egalitarian environment that nurtures 
alternative discourses, or whether it in fact acts as an ‘online amplifier’ reflecting 
and reinforcing “existing hegemonic discourses, which may result in even 
stronger polarizing effects on public discourses” (Törnberg and Törnberg 
2016:134).  
 
As to the collaborative effect of social media on traditional media forms that 
Barberá (2014) describes, Törnberg and Törnberg conclude instead that 
discourses in traditional media and social media seem to reflect and reinforce 
each other, suggesting that both forms of media are involved in a symbiotic 
relationship that can often result in feedback loops and echo chambers131 to the 
effect of deepening previously held beliefs, and reaffirming emotions. Not only 
are these ideas further entrenched through the combined media cycle, but social 
media often has the effect of intensifying them (Vaidhyanathan 2019).  This could 
be due in part to the sense of anonymity that these spaces are able to provide 
(Awan 2014). Protected in this way, individuals are more extreme with their 
language and their beliefs, untempered by the traditional social gaze, with its 
responsibility and constraints. Ahmed (2012) found that young people who got 
their news from online sources and social media platforms often harboured 
																																																								
130 In his book Antisocial media: How Facebook disconnects us and undermines 
democracy (2019) Vaidhyanathan provides an in-depth analysis of how Facebook 
(and social media sites like it) disconnect us, isolating users into distinct bubbles 
that are increasingly antagonistic towards each other. He proposes that Facebook 
uses emotion to engage its users, so they keep coming back for more, because 
Facebook monetises its users’ attention. He writes of using Facebook, “nothing 
prompted me to think deeply. Everything made me feel something” (2019:43). 
131 Eli Parsier has termed this phenomenon the ‘filter bubble’, describing the ways 
in which social media narrows the field of vision by providing more of what the 
consumers want (in Vaidhyanathan 2019:6). 
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stronger negative opinions to out-groups (such as refugees) than those who got 
their news from more ‘traditional’ media sources.  
 
Similarly, within this social media climate of acceleration everything is simplified 
to respond to waning concentration-spans. Thus there is little over-
problematising of positions, messages are comfortingly predictable, and offer 
instant emotional gratification (Bolt 2012:153). In this way social media has been 
crucial in facilitating the success of right-wing populist movements in Germany 
and the US (and indeed, world-wide): “As has been extensively shown, radical-
right parties strongly gain political capital via online communication of anti-
immigration rhetoric despite often being excluded from traditional media or even 
being denied space in public broadcasting” (Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, and 
Wodak 2018:9).  
 
When it comes to increasingly negative sentiments surrounding asylum and 
immigration, this may be partially due to the fact that these platforms allow right-
wing movements to spread their exclusionary, and anti-immigration rhetoric by 
providing short, simplistic, superficial explanations that are grounded in 
emotion, to simultaneously explain and homogenise this incredibly complex 
socioeconomic and political phenomenon. In this way, narratives of fear that are 
born out of culturally entrenched attitudes and emotions are repeated and 
intensified in the digital realm, spilling back over into the life-world.   
 
Narratives in Germany 
To understand the narratives circulating and sticking to the bodies of refugees, I 
turned to examine reporting on the situation published by ‘traditional media’, as 
well as personal opinions communicated online through social media. Germany 
presented an interesting case study in this instance, as there is a relative paucity 
of social media usage in Germany compared with other ‘developed’ countries 
(according to Hootsuite, a social media management and tracking platform 
[2019], also Vollmer and Karakayali [2018]). Most of the population 
predominantly receives and interacts with news and information from 
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‘traditional’ media apparatuses. Thus I relied more heavily on these mediums to 
follow the German narratives.  
 
German narratives surrounding the refugee ‘crisis’ have been complicated, as 
Germany has tendencies that lean towards both xenophobia and 
Willkommenskultur (culture of welcome). As discussed in the previous chapter, 
fearful moments in the past have often revolved around ideological anxieties: 
“The more a Christian German Leitkultur (dominant/guiding culture) resembles 
a myth, the more it has to be asserted”(Adam 2015:457), as demonstrated 
through the collection of the Brothers Grimm in order to preserve the traditions 
of the volk, and the Nazi’s obsession with ‘international Jewry’ as the biggest 
threat to German culture. A German cultural disposition to ideological fears of 
uncontrolled movement, as illustrated in such Brothers Grimm tales as Red 
Riding Hood and Hansel and Gretel, led to the attempt to constrain the 
movement of Jewish people in WWII, and in the erection and policing of the 
Berlin Wall.  
 
National identity has been of utmost importance in the cultural consciousness of 
some Germans, due to Germany’s fractured past. After the horrors of the Second 
World War however, Germany has made widespread educational attempts at 
addressing its xenophobic history, and this has arguably contributed to the 
attitude of welcome and tolerance originally extended by most Germans towards 
refugees (Adam 2015). 
 
Post re-unification, a general attitude of cohesion has been, for the most part (at 
least publicly) adopted in order to maintain a sense of Volksgemeinschaft.132 
More specifically, in relation to immigration and asylum, a public attitude of 
welcome may stem (at least in part) from the German well of guilt in relation to 
WWII133  (which was bought into stark relief during the Cold War, as the East and 
																																																								
132 Which simply meant, the ‘peoples community’ and denoted a sense of cultural 
integrity before it was co-opted by the National Socialists. 
133 As illustrated in the previous chapter, the beginnings of Germany’s collective 
effort to distance itself from its violent past emerged in the Cold War battle for 
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West both attempted to distance themselves from their Nazi past). The treatment 
of migrants and refugees shifted in the 90’s134, when a newly unified Germany135 
was faced with the arrival of ‘German refugees’ from the former GDR, and 
hundreds of thousands fleeing the war in Yugoslavia. Media coverage was 
markedly sympathetic towards the refugee plight (Vollmer and Karakayali 2018). 
Munzert and Bauer (2013) argue that public opinion in Germany has been 
increasingly depolarised since the 1980s. While they offer no explanation as to 
the occurrence of this trend, it could be influenced by Germany’s historical 
emotional trajectory, which has resulted in the desire to repair divisions in order 
to move on from the fractured past. Consequently, the early German public and 
political reaction to the refugee ‘crisis’ in 2015 was (for the most part) to adopt an 
attitude of Willkommenskultur (loosely translated to welcome).  
 
In August of 2015 Angela Merkel announced that Germany would be admitting 
Syrian refugees even if they had not claimed asylum in the first EU country that 
they had entered (Holmes and Castañada 2016). Prior to this, German officials 
had repeatedly emphasised the EU policy of refugees claiming asylum in their 
first country of entry.  With this attitude written into policy, Germany had 
become, in the words of the Green politician Katrin Göring Eckhardt, the “world 
champion of hospitality”. She also remarked that it was “the first time, she can 
say she is proud to be German” (in Vollmer and Karakayali 2018:124). 
 
For Vollmer and Karakayali (2018) and Rettberg and Gaijala (2016), this 
(initially) generalised receptivity towards refugees was due in part to the emotion 
prompted by the circulation of the image of the dead body of three-year-old Alan 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Germany’s ideological future, as both West and East Germany attempted to frame 
the Other as tied to Nazi sentiments. 
134 Another important moment in German history that shaped general 
interactions with refugees was the reaction towards Turkish migrants in the 
1970’s (see Ozkul 2016).  
135 The differences presented in the reactions towards refugees between what was 
East and West Germany presents a fascinating comparison, with the former GDR 
characterised by a much higher ratio of anti-refugee events (Feltes, List, and 
Bertamini 2018). During the aftermath of WWII the GDR made a (short-lived) 
effort to integrate refugees (predominantly from Vietnam and Mozambique into 
East German society. Backlash was substantial and the integrative policy was 
quickly abandoned, but it left behind a mark on East German Society (Peck 1995, 
Schwartz 2000). 
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Kurdi.136 This image of a child’s body, which looked as if he could be sleeping, 
evoked innocence and solicited the empathy of the German public.137 This 
photograph spoke to a theme that emerged to dominate subsequent discourses 
around refugees in the German context, that of deservingness and un-
deservingness (as discourses evolved these themes would come to be closely 
linked to ideas of Germanness and un-Germanness). Original attitudes of 
welcome were based around the idea that refugees were ‘deserving’, vulnerable 
families and children. This kind of language dominated the media coverage of 
refugee arrivals during the summer and autumn of 2015, with images of children 
and families being received by the German public circulating not just throughout 
Germany, but the rest of the world. Messages of institutional support were also 
strong, with papers publishing articles such as 100 prominente Deutsche rufen zu 
Solidarität mit Flüchtlingen auf (100 Prominent Germans Call for Solidarity with 
Refugees) (Die Welt 30/08/2015), and The Society for German Language 
choosing “Flüchtlinge” (refugees) as “Word of the Year 2015” (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 11/12/2015).  
 
Germany made appeals to the rest of Europe to follow their example, chiding 
those that turned refugees away: Die Osteuropäer haben kein Schamgefühl 
(Eastern Europeans Have No Sense of Shame) (Die Welt 13/09/2015).  
Discourses painted a picture of Germany reaching out to help these people, 
images circulated of refugees holding signs that read “Merkel, bitte hilf mir!” 
(Merkel please help me!), and the motto that Merkel announced in a press 
																																																								
136 Susan Sontag in Regarding the Pain of Others (2003), questions the effect 
that the mechanical reproduction of images has on the sensibilities of a culture, 
arguing that images of suffering transmutes horror and pain into an aesthetic, 
thereby fictionalising it. Sontag argues that through increased exposure to these 
tragic or gory images, we become de-sensitised, and thus more tragedy, gorier 
images, and increased violence are required to draw our attention, culminating in 
terrible consequences for the bodies involved in conflict. Indeed, the image of 
Alan Kurdi was soon forgotten. 
137 Of course, even in the early stages the climate of welcome was somewhat 
contested. There were those that warned against empathy, maintaining that 
Germany was being manipulated. Alexander Gauland, a representative of the 
right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) argued that Germans must 
be able to withstand the plight of “children's eyes” (Vollmer and Karakayali 
2018:129) as while refugees might seem innocent, in reality they represented a 
pressing threat to Germanic identity. 
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conference “Wir können das schaffen!” (We can do this!), reverberated in the 
media and online sentiments. Integration was heavily promoted, with the idea 
that refugees only needed to cultivate their ‘Germanness’ to assimilate into 
society. As one Twitter user “Aras Bacho” proclaimed on the 1st of December:   
  Jeder Deutsche solte #flüchtlinge zu sich nach Hause einladen und diesen 
seine Kultur zeigen: Zum Beispiel zusammen ins Scwimmbad, Resturant 
gehen, Familienessen, Kochen und natürlich auch die deutsche Sprache 
beibringen. So macht jeder was für die #integration! (Every German 
should invite #refugees to their home and show them their culture: For 
example, going to the swimming pool, restaurants, family meals, cooking 
together, and of course teaching them the German language. This way, 
everyone gets something out of #integration!) (Aras Bacho 2019).      
 
While reactions towards the increased flows of refugees were initially largely 
positive138, Vollmer and Karakayali (2018) question the original motives of such a 
response; whether the welcoming attitude was driven predominantly by German 
ego in the guise of empathy, rather than from a true source of hospitality and 
altruism - for succeeding reactions quickly reverted to narratives of fear and 
distrust. Hannah Arendt addresses tensions of this nature in her distinction 
between pity and compassion. Compassion is practical in nature, and is based on 
exchanges and experiences between those who suffer and those who help them. 
Pity on the other hand, she characterises as a peculiarly political procedure, 
which, according to Arendt (1963), is heavily invested with the utilisation of 
emotions in the engendering of an ultimate goal. Through this frame, early 
narratives of welcome, based upon the ‘deservingness’ of refugees seem to spring 
from pity, as public and political discourse was intertwined with considerations of 
																																																								
138  This can be partially explained by the concept of Kommunikationslatenz, 
which refers to the German pressure to publically conform to politically correct 
opinions as opposed to the actual attitude that citizens might privately hold. 
While (for the most part) politically correct opinions are publically upheld, within 
the unarticulated ‘ordinary’ consciousness, xenophobic and anti-refugee 
sentiments are probably higher than what is being communicated or captured 
through opinion and attitude surveys (Adam 2015:450).   
Chapter 4| Narratives of Fear of Refugees 
	 115	
a positive German image on the world stage. This is compounded by the fact that 
sentiments of welcome were quickly superseded by those of fear.139 
 
A specific incident may be isolated as the catalyst for the split in public 
discourse140, which prompted an increase of negative narratives – both in 
magnitude and volume. This is the event(s) that took place in Cologne on New 
Years Eve 2016, when hundreds of (allegedly) North African and Arabic men 
sexually assaulted (including at least 24 cases of rape) women in or around the 
central station. According to the resultant reports, some of the men had arrived as 
refugees. This had the effect of reframing the discourse; it shifted from refugees 
as ‘deserving’ vulnerable families and children, to refugees as un-deserving, 
unable and unwilling to assimilate into German culture.  
 
The national media did not initially report the Cologne assaults for days, until 
outpourings of anger on social media made covering the story unavoidable (The 
Local 5/01/2016). Commenters on Twitter started using the hashtag Lügenpresse 
(lying media), repopularising the Nazi-slur. The hashtags rapefugees, Übergriffe 
(attacks), and refugeesNOTwelcome were also popular choices in relation to the 
events in Cologne.141 One user “BrainwashDo” tweeted on the 4th of February 
2016 “das Deutsche volk ist ein seltsames. während ihre frauen vergewaltigt 
werden, sorgen sie sich darum, nicht als Nazi bezeichnet zu werden, sofern sie 
																																																								
139 I must make clear that I do not mean to suggest that there was no compassion 
in the German reception of asylum seekers (as is partially evident in initial media 
representations, depending on how they are interpreted). Many, many people 
worked (and continue to work) tirelessly to welcome and help refugees integrate 
into German society. Narratives continue to be complex and contested, between 
themes of hospitality and fear. I simply mean to suggest that ‘acceptance’ of 
refugees in Germany, was not quite as widespread and unproblematic as original 
narratives conveyed. And that motivation behind these sentiments and policies 
may have been more convoluted than simple altruistic tendencies. 
140 Borneman and Ghassem-Fachandi (2017) examine the shift in German public 
opinion (using the concept of Stimmung) surrounding refugees on the outcome of 
the 2016 German regional electoral campaigns, which witnessed a marked 
increase in the popularity of the Alternative für Deutschland party.  
141 The first tweet that included #refugeesnotwelcome appeared on 10 August 
2015 “Wer beschützt die deutschen Mädchen und Frauen gegen Anmache und 
Angriffe der sexuell ausgehungerten sog. #Flüchtlinge. #refugeesnotwelcome” 
(Who protects the German girls and women against attacks of so-called 
#Refugees. #refugeesnotwelcome), and in February of 2016 alone, users tweeted 
more than 7000 tweets that included #refugeesnotwelcome (in Kreis 2017:499). 
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an den ubergriffen kritik  äußern”  (the German people are strange. While their 
wives are being raped, they are worried that they will be labeled Nazis if they 
comment on the attack) (BrainwashDo 2016).  Another, “Frank Jamger” declared 
“Germans are slowly wising up. 40% want Muslim ban, 10% want to do the right 
thing an restore a Führer #rapefugees” (Frank Jamger 2016). On a YouTube 
video posted (and since deleted) about the incidents, entitled Mass RAPE in 
Cologne Germany: Refugees STILL Welcome!  The comments section was 
flooded with anger, and threats of violence towards refugees, a commenter “Alex 
A” said “one day we will say enough and bring the hunting of these bastards back” 
(2017). Another comment by “?” presented a diatribe which lamented the loss of 
the German spirit:  
It's such a shame what has happened to the once great country of 
Germany. It's as if the German people are ashamed of being German 
because of the war. Should you not help your fellow man? Surely yes, but 
not if it means at the sacrifice of your own country…The German people 
should be proud of their deep heritage and history… the [refugee] agenda 
is to erode away at a country's core identity, culture, and national pride 
until there is nothing left but a husk of what the country once was (? 2017) 
In the same vein another comment by “RedX1652” declared:  
They're changing it demographically and culturally to resemble the 
country they left. Germany will no longer be Germany if ethic [sic] 
Germans142 become a minority. The new majority (those from the Middle 
East will change this country forever.) Now I'm not saying no non-white 
immigrants but there needs to be safe guards in place to keep the culture 
and its people around. Ethic [sic] Germans should never become a 
minority in Germany for example… (RedX1652 2017).  
 
These comments display a sense of “Malthusian paranoia”—that is, the fear of 
‘overpopulation’. Inherent in these sorts of statements, is the notion that the 
																																																								
142  In 2000 the traditional German concept of a ‘nation by ancestry’ was replaced 
by the ‘birthplace principle’. Under the new principle children of migrants 
automatically become citizens, or can choose citizenship (between parent’s 
country of origin or Germany) for themselves at the age of maturity (Adam 
2015:453). However “Nationality by descent is still firmly anchored in the 
German self-conception of the older generation” (Adam 2015:453).  
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increase in the refugee demographic of the population, will necessarily lead to the 
loss of German identity. Another comment by “Realmatic Schisms”  located the 
threat of refugees squarely within their religion: stating “the problem isn't race, 
the problem is the violent, backward idiotology of islam [sic]” (Realmatic Schisms 
2017). German Political leadership was also implicated in the assults with one 
observer “Danae B.” tweeting on the 6th of January “jeder sah das kommen,bloss 
nicht die Merkel” (everyone saw it coming, just not Merkel) (Danae B. 2016), and 
another, “Pascale” tweeted “I wish #Trump could take Angela Merkel’s place. We 
would be safer here in Europe…the Muslims are really getting violent as numbers 
increase. So if you’re done with Trump, can we have him?” (Pascale 2017). 143 In 
these narratives refugees are represented as undeserving, threatening, and 
ultimately antithetical to German values and identity. All themes that have 
characterised the continuieties in this particular German fear from the Brothers 
Grimm to the Cold War. 
 
The media coverage that eventually ensued similarly represented the attacks as 
an expression of insurmountable cultural alterity; with Jürgen Mathies, the new 
Cologne police chief remarking that many of the perpetrators were from countries 
where they might be familiar with "this behaviour, where women are hemmed in 
and then abused by a large number of men at once" ( in The Local 12/02/2016).  
And The Local (an English language German paper targeted towards ex-pats) 
reporting that: “incidents of this nature… are a blight on large parts of the Arab 
world, where women are socially subjugated” (Luyken 2016). Conservative 
newspaper Die Welt published an opinion piece that argued that German and 
Islamic culture were, and would always be incompatible, with the Pakistani 
German-based author writing: 
I was sure that the migrants' influx would ultimately disturb the harmony 
and balance of German society. I feel that Islamic culture and European 
norms are not compatible… I know many Muslims who have been living in 
																																																								
143 The majority of these social media discourses make heavy use of deictic 
expressions such as ‘our’, ‘we’ and ‘us’. This tacitly reaffirms the context and 
centrality of the speaker, reflects ethnocentricity and simultaneously creates 
‘outsiders’ (in these cases refugees) while implying that these outsiders do not 
belong. 
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Germany for decades, speak fluent German, yet they harbour deep 
resentment against secularism and Western values. (Shams 2016) 
Refugees are depicted as existing in tension with German (specifically) and 
‘Western’ (more widely) ideals.   
 
While immediate public backlash towards such an event is to be somewhat 
expected – the negative discourses surrounding refugees did not abate in the 
following weeks; instead they grew, gaining prominence and momentum within 
the German conversation. This was accompanied by the rise of support for the 
anti-refugee political party The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)144, and also for 
anti-Muslim movements such as the Patriotic Europeans against the 
Islamicization of the West (PEGIDA)(originally founded in Dresden145 in 2014). 
Most Germans do not necessarily consciously fear foreigners, nor do they think 
they hate them:  
Since the Cologne assaults, however, a renewed anxiety of the foreign 
(Fremdenangst) has emerged. Such anxiety is most active and effectively 
mobilized through appeals to unconscious affect. And, as many scholars 
have documented, organizations such as Pegida (Patriotic Europeans 
against the Islamization of the West), invest in turning this anxiety into a 
specific fear of new migrants (Rehberg, Kunz, and Schlinzig 2016 in 
Borneman and Ghassem-Fachandi 2017: 124) 
 This led to tangible and concrete negative consequences for Germany’s refugee 
population themselves, as there was a dramatic increase in Islamophobic, 
refugee-targeted hate crimes across the country, which included physical and 
sexual assaults, and the burning of refugee shelters.146  
 
																																																								
144 However not all anti-immigrant groups should be heaped together with the 
neo-Nazi movement as frequently happens. The AfD party split in 2015 over such 
questions (Adam 2015:448).  
145  In 2015 Dresden had less than 1 percent Muslim residents, and yet emerged as 
the main hub for the PEGIDA movement. This is possibly due to a history of lack 
of exposure to diversity: “Dresden was the only major East German town in which 
West German television could not be received” (Adam 2015:448).   
146 The burning of refugee shelters to ‘send a message’ is a pattern that originated 
in the early 1990s in the former GDR. 
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German xenophobia post-World War II has varied substantially dependent on 
region, with hostility towards foreigners occurring much more frequently in East 
Germany than West Germany, despite the fact that far fewer ‘foreigners’ 
lived (and live) in East Germany than West. This trend has not declined during 
the twenty-five years post unification. In a survey assessing German 
Islamophobia in relation to the arrival of refugees, fifty-eight percent of West 
Germans agreed that “religious practice for Muslims in Germany should be 
seriously limited”, whereas nearly eighty percent of East German residents 
endorsed the statement (Adam 2015:459). Increased xenophobic sentiment in 
former East Germany could in part be due to higher unemployment rates, while 
another factor points to the lack of exposure to diversity in the closed communist 
system. Adam (2015) suggests on the other hand that the political re-education 
campaigns conducted in the West are primarily responsible for the difference, as 
such anti-racist political education was not practised in East Germany (as it was 
argued that a socialist state was immune to fascism): “The whole debate about 
guilt in the West didn’t take place in the East. We see the results to-day in the rise 
of the radical right wing there” (Kahane in Adam 2015:460).  
 
After the Cologne attacks however, fears superseded carefully cultivated anti-
xenophobic tendencies for many Germans. The dominant narrative of ‘the 
refugee’ was no longer one of ‘victimhood’. The image was no longer one of 
women and children, but had been replaced by the image of a man: a man who 
was undeserving, and unable to be German: “The New Year’s Eve 2015 sexual 
assaults on German women in Cologne, activated latent fears and mobilized a 
xenophobic mood—primarily fear of the Muslim male’s sexualized aggression” 
(Borneman and Ghassem-Fachandi 2017: 110). Papers reported on the continuing 
flow of asylum seekers, which were described as an “influx of millions of people 
from the Middle East - the majority of whom are young men” (Luyken 2016). 
People voiced their concern over the perceived gender discrepancy with “Melanie 
Young” commenting on the YouTube video The Night That Changed Germany’s 
Attitude to Refugees, “where are the women and children? why are majority of 
refugees men? what kind of man leaves women, children behind in Syria? I truly 
don’t understand” (Melanie Young 2017).  
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In social media communication refugee men were generally regarded as potential 
rapists of white women, and abusers of brown women.147 The idea that many 
refugees are men, and that they far outnumber women and children is false, as is 
the idea that refugees commit crimes more readily and frequently148 than 
Germans (Rettberg and Gajjala 2016). Yet the narrative that represents refugees 
(and Muslims) as threatening to liberal and democratic values continues to 
persist in German public and political dialogue: “Animosity toward foreigners 
generally has now narrowed to specific groups, particularly against Muslims. 
Alleged incompatible religions and cultural differences have replaced old race 
stereotypes as the main rallying cry of xenophobes” (Adam 2015:452) 
 
On social media, hashtags such as Ausländerraus! (Foreigners out!), a slogan 
commonly used by right-wing movements, refugeesNOTwelcome, and 
Asylmissbrauch (asylum abuse) remained in constant use.149  Ramona Kreis 
(2017) was presented with similar findings in her examination of the negative 
discourse around refugees on Twitter in Germany (among other European 
countries). Kreis found that depictions of refugees are predominantly organised 
around the creation and maintenance of the delineation of Germans as a distinct 
in-group, and refugees are ultimately presented as those who do not belong, those 
that are undeserving, and unGerman:  
																																																								
147 This rings consistent with the findings of Törnberg and Törnberg (2016), and 
is similarly echoed in the context of the United States – however concern over the 
subjugation of Muslim women seems to have less to do with the supposed plight 
of Muslim women themselves, but rather the threats that these perceived gender 
imbalances could visit upon the social fabric of the host countries. 
148 I do not have the skill to unpack the complicated statistics here, but Feltes, 
List, and Bertamini (2018) present a nuanced and detailed portrait of German 
and immigrant crime statistics in the aftermath of the 2015-16 refugee intake. 
They found that the proportion of migrants who were committing serious 
offences was very low, for example only 1.2% of crimes committed by Syrians in 
Germany in 2017 were aggravated robberies. They concluded that “the ethnic 
background is not a crime-inducing factor. More important are the respective 
living circumstances and history of education as contributing factors to the 
development of delinquency” (Feltes, List and Bertamini 2018: 614).  
149 Obviously not all social media content surrounding refugees is negative, 
‘Welcome Refugees’ groups have been established in countries all over the world, 
and have amassed wide-spread support (Rettberg and Gajjala 2016), and social 
media appeals are constantly made in Germany in favour of hospitality and 
integration. 
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Germans construct the foreigner in word and image as something separate 
from themselves, in binary terms that put ‘the German’ in a position of 
authority, one who can often capriciously invoke or destabilise trust 
through symbols of what it means to be German. The rules are constantly 
shifting, unpredictable, and systematically disabling (Peck 1995:113).   
 
Borneman and Ghassem-Fachardi (2017) examined the shift in German public 
opinion, and the rise of xenophobic discourses. They argued that “politics, 
political talk shows, and social media—primarily Facebook, Google, and Twitter—
orient, express, and manipulate moods, but their manipulations work only as they 
build on extant phantasies” (109 emphasis added). The 2016 German regional 
elections saw the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) led by Angela Merkel 
suffering major losses, while the right-wing anti-immigration party Alternative 
für Deutschland (AfD), finished a strong third. The success of the right-wing AfD 
is an expression of the yearning for politics to address and legitimate the growing 
mood: 
In the widely read weekly Der Spiegel, Klaus Brinkbäumer (2016), for 
example, contended: “Merkel has become a victim of Stimmung.” This 
victimization, he argued, represented a “structural transformation” to a 
“postfactual time,” where “truths have less influence on political reality 
than Stimmungen and feelings. . . . Numbers hardly matter, at least not so 
much as fears and hate, such as rumors and mutterings of conspiracy” ( in 
Borneman and Ghassem-Fachandi 2017: 106). 
Public and political narratives surrounding refugees in Germany were able to 
pivot so quickly for some, from welcome to xenophobia, as xenophobic narratives 
are foundational to the German cultural emotional residuum of fear that exists in 
some silos of German society.   
 
German narratives surrounding increased refugee flows during the refugee ‘crisis’ 
have been highly complex and contested. The German context is characterised by 
the volatility and intensity of the clash of opinions between pro and anti-refugee 
sentiments. Germany has responded with “hospitality that is uniquely nuanced 
and conditioned by memories (and some present‐day realities) of xenophobia and 
fascism” (Holmes and Castañeda 2016:14). These tensions speak to the very 
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nature of immigration, in that “although it is one of the oldest social institutions, 
asylum remains a precarious construct in which questions of legitimacy - and of 
‘truth’- continually shift” (Holmes and Castañada 2016:19). Originally in the 
German setting, public and political reactions were overwhelmingly those of 
welcome. However, the topos of fear that dictated historical reactions to 
ideological change - quickly returned to dominate some public narratives. 
Negative discourse surrounding refugees is partially based on the experience of 
receiving asylum seekers, and partially imagined, drawn from deep wells of fear, 
existential anxiety and ontological insecurity. These findings are reflective of the 
rising feelings emerging against immigration and refugee policies, running 
parallel with the rise of nationalism and right-wing populism in Europe and much 
of the Western world. 
 
Narratives in the USA 
Narratives surrounding refugees in the USA have been less contested, more 
convoluted, and emerge as part and parcel of American immigration debates. 
Fearful narratives in the United States context focus around the depiction of 
‘illegals’: a category that conflates and subsumes refugees, terrorists, asylum 
seekers, Muslims, and other (brown) immigrants. Although these categories are 
distinguished by different figurative and legal framing, they are often blurred. At 
the heart of this amalgamation looms the spectre of the ‘Dark Other’, with 
refugees (‘illegals’) acting as the newest iteration through opposition to which 
(some of) America (re)constructs itself.    
 
After the United States was colonised there was a long period in which there were 
no federal immigration laws (1789-1875, with the notable exception of the 
abolition of the international slave trade in 1808). Since that time, the 
immigration system has evolved into one with immensely complicated rules and 
restrictions.150 Many regard immigration policy as one of the most contentious 
issues facing the United States. The salience of immigration policy in the cultural 
zeitgeist may have increased due to the shift in nationalities that comprise the 
																																																								
150 For a detailed and comprehensive overview of US immigration policy and law 
see Heer (2018). 
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majority of immigrants. As recently as the 1950’s more than half of all those 
migrating to the United States were from Europe. 151 However, from the early 80’s 
the number of those migrating to the US from countries south of the border 
(initially Mexico, Cuba and Haiti) rapidly expanded. This rise in land-based 
immigration presented problems with the systems used for documenting flows of 
people, resulting in a relatively large population of ‘undocumented immigrants’ in 
the US (Heer 2018), and contributing to anxieties of changing ethnic 
demographies: “News media are filled with stories in which immigrants are 
denigrated, belittled, and discriminated against. Incidents of anti-immigrant 
prejudice are common, yet often are not recognized as being connected by an 
underlying set of attitudes based on fear” (Yakushko 2008: 37). 
 
The United State’s response to the refugee ‘crisis’ has been very different from 
Germany’s. US reception of refugees from the war zones of Syria and the Middle 
East is tempered by temporal and geographic constraints. However, this is not 
reflected in dominant conservative media152, social media, public and political 
narratives of fear, which all have the tendency to conflate asylum seekers, 
refugees, and migrants, whether they originate from the Middle East or Central 
and South America, under the banner of ‘illegals’. The term ‘illegal immigrant’ 
does not distinguish between migrant categories. In the United States the 
dominant fear-filled narrative surrounding immigration maintains that economic 
immigrants enter under false pretences of ‘asylum’ in order to take advantage of 
the benefits available to American citizens. Like the fearful narratives 
surrounding indigenous peoples, African Americans, and Muslims before them, 
																																																								
151 Non-white immigrants were only able to become naturalised citizens in 1952, a 
privilege that had been accorded to the majority of white immigrants since 1790 
(Yakushko 2008:41). 
152 Kenix and Lopez (2021) found in their examination of news reporting on the 
2018 ‘migrant caravan’, that mainstream news media in the USA, did not report 
from a framing of fear. Similarly, “a Gallup Newspaper Research Journal 42(1) 
survey in December 2018 found that 51% of Americans supported allowing the 
caravan of migrants to seek asylum in the United States (McCarthy, 2018b). It 
was only the second time dating back to 1939 that the majority of respondents to 
a Gallup poll were in support of the United States accepting refugees” (Kenix and 
Lopez 2021:68-69). While Trump and conservative media outlets declared the 
caravan a “national emergency”, these narratives of fear tend to proliferate in 
certain vocal silos of society, rather than being the dominant attitude.    
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the term ‘illegals’ has the successful effect of dehumanising and homogenising 
groups of people, resulting in a gruesome caricature of refugees. Take for example 
this tweet by “Paul E. Gibbs Jr.” on the 3rd of December 2018: “We Don’t Know 
When a Savage Muslim Jihadists [sic] Will Come To Our Door! Or Some Illegals 
From Central America Or Mexico! My .45 [sic] Says You Better Turn Around and 
Leave, Or Come In And Leave On A Stretcher To The morgue!” (Paul E. Gibbs Jr. 
2018). These narratives have tangible, real-world, effects through both the 
shaping of both policy and public attitudes.   
  
Saeed (2007) argues that the fact that these groups are constantly homogenised 
in mass media portrayals implies that racism is at the heart of these matters, and 
that these trends are ultimately rooted in cultural representations of the ‘other’153 
that have been developed over generations. With the continued rise of 
globalisation presenting new challenges to do with policing boundaries and 
belonging, some have argued for the adoption of the understanding of a ‘new 
form of racism’ such as Gilroy’s. Gilroy proposed this model in 1992 (in Saeed 
2007), and posited that a new form of racism had emerged, one that was not 
structured on perceived biological difference, but rather on differences of culture 
and ethnicity; and was organised around ideas of national belonging. However, 
this ‘new racism’ seems to echo the themes of biological racism, as ‘ethnicities’ are 
often ascribed based on skin colour and physical signifiers rather than cultural 
affiliation. Thus I would argue that this is not a ‘new’ form of racism, but rather a 
metamorphosis of racism as it adapts to changing forms and patterns. The 
essence behind it is still the same. Racism has heavily influenced US responses to 
immigration. For John Higham (2002) the USA’s history of immigration 
practices has simply been the expression of a nationalist thirst for power, marked 
by nativism and ethnocentrism. 
 
This attitude has been bought into stark relief under the political administration 
of Trump. Unlike the original German political attitude of welcome adopted 
under Merkel, American politicians (especially on the right - but not exclusively) 
																																																								
153 Although Saeed focuses his attention on the British populace, I believe that 
what he observed is also true of the situation in the USA, where the tradition of 
‘othering’ lies at the very heart of the nation. 
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have played upon and played into their citizens’ fears. The Republican Party – 
exemplified most loudly and visibly by Donald Trump, has weaponised 
immigration.154 Trump built upon the legacy left by George Bush during the 
aftermath of 9/11 through utilising media (and social media) to communicate 
presidential rhetoric, and through this self-supporting system, create and 
demonise an ‘American enemy’. Trump describes himself as a ‘nationalist’, with a 
proclaimed attitude of ‘America First’. One of the main pillars of his election 
campaign was a promise to ‘build the wall’155, constructing a barrier on the 
southern border with Mexico to keep out ‘illegals’.156 He warned against the 
dangers of immigrants in his Campaign launch rally in 2015: “They’re sending 
people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us 
[sic]. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I 
assume, are good people” (Washington Post 10/02/2019).  
 
Upon reaching office he quickly implemented several changes to immigration 
policy, signing an executive order that severely restricted the movement of those 
wishing to travel to the States from several (predominantly Muslim) countries, 
leading it to be referred to as a ‘Muslim Ban’ by many. As Trump himself stated: 
“Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims 
entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what 
the hell is going on” (The Independent 6/05/2016).157 This ‘Muslim ban’ played to 
the fears of terrorism and demonization of Muslims that has remained active in 
the cultural consciousness of the States since 9/11. In a similar vein Trump also 
																																																								
154 Trump has also weaponised Twitter, using it to target groups and people that 
he personally dislikes, and motivating his base from this platform. 
155 As witnessed in the German context with the Berlin wall, the attempt to make a 
physical border in order to constrain the movement of peoples by ‘keeping them 
out’ or ‘in’ seems more of a mythical solution, resonating with emotional needs, 
rather than practical ones.   
156 As has been discussed borders are spaces of heightened anxiety (Douglas 
1966). Ahmed ties border fears to the ontology of insecurity within the political 
constitution. She writes – “it must be presumed that things are not secure, in and 
of themselves, in order to justify the imperative to make things secure” (2013:76). 
157 It is important to note that there was a widespread civic protest in response to 
this, and it was quickly blocked by a federal court, however the Trump 
administration has continued to more subtly push through policies which 
collectively are building towards solidifying the administration’s original 
Islamophobic goal. 
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slashed numbers for refugee resettlement. Obama had set the annual cap for 
accepting refugees to 110,000 for 2017. Trump reduced it to 45,000 in 2018, and 
30,000 in 2019, with reports emerging that the administration was weighing up 
whether to cut refugee admissions to zero (Hirschfeld Davis and Shear 2019) – 
for, as Trump said: “what I won’t do is take in 200,000 Syrians who could be 
ISIS”(Atkin 2016), once again tying Islam to terrorism.  
      
The cruelty of the administration’s policies arguably reached its peak with the 
implementation of family separations. This policy was presented as a ‘zero 
tolerance’ approach, designed to deter illegal immigration. The policy ultimately 
treated those arriving at the border ‘illegally’ -and some of those arriving legally 
to seek asylum - as criminals. Children (as young as still-nursing babies) were 
deemed ‘unaccompanied minors’, and were separated from parents and put into 
government custody, while the parents themselves were sent to jail (or holding 
cells where the wait indefinitely for processing).158 The condition of the holding 
cells and the ‘government custody’ that these immigrants and asylum seekers are 
placed in is dire. Images have emerged of children in cages, reports surfaced of 
lack of food, blankets, hygiene products, and in some cases water. There have also 
been several deaths of both children and adults in US custody while awaiting 
processing.159 Many have called the conditions ‘concentration camps’. In response 
to criticisms levelled at him over these concerns of human rights violations by the 
USA in its treatment of migrants Trump tweeted on the 3rd of July 2019, “If 
Illegal Immigrants are unhappy with the conditions in the quickly built or 
refitted detentions centers, just tell them not to come. All problems solved!” 
(Trump 2019). Encapsulated in Trump’s rhetoric in relation to immigrants or 
‘illegals’ are the themes that have characterised the ‘Dark Other’ since the 
seventeenth century. He portrays them as somehow less-human and ‘savage’. He 
																																																								
158 While harsh immigration laws are hardly new to the United States, the 
unashamed ramping up of deliberate cruelty as a deterrent is (at least in recent 
history) unique to the Trump administration. 
159 At the time of writing, since September 2018, six migrant children have died in 
US custody (or shortly after being released from custody) (CNN 26/05/2019). In 
fact, the number could well be higher, as the government did not make the deaths 
public, and they were only reported on through the use of investigative 
journalism. Moreover there have been many reports of abuse (both sexual and 
otherwise) suffered by migrant women and children while in ‘government 
custody’ (AP News 17/08/2019, NBC 9/07/2019). 
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warns of their inherent violence. They are painted as ‘unchristian’, with potentials 
for sexual deviancy. These tropes are similarly repeated within some currents of 
media and public discourse.  
 
The very word that dominates American discourses surrounding refugees implies 
savagery on some level.  The term ‘illegal’ implies criminality, and yet – most 
immigration and asylum laws are civil and not criminal laws.160 Moreover it is 
often used in conjunction with other dehumanising words, such as ‘swarm’, 
‘flood’, and ‘deluge’. Similar to indigenous peoples, African Americans and Arabic 
Muslims before them, these groups are often likened to animals and parasites 
(Anderson 2017). In late 2018 the news was awash with articles covering the 
‘migrant caravan’161, a group of immigrants from South and Central America, 
making passage on foot towards the USA’s southern border (The New York Times 
26/10/2018). In response to these reports162 one Twitter commenter “Ginger 
Boehne” declared, “illegals, STOP trying to come to the US with your children, 
stay in your OWN countries and learn to help yourselves, grow your own crops for 
food!” (Ginger Boehne 2018), another tweeter “Racial Consciousness”, 
proclaimed: “our own government needs to start asking We The People if we’re ok 
with them letting these parasitic hordes help themselves to our nation” (Racial 
Consciousness 2018).  Another, “LeanderCruise”, worried that the ‘illegals’ would 
de-civilise America: 
																																																								
160 In 2003 the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) Issued this statement “NO-
ONE is an ‘illegal asylum-seeker’. This term is always incorrect. It cannot be 
illegal to seek asylum since everyone has the fundamental human right to request 
asylum under international law” (NUJ, 2005 in Philo, Briant, and Donald 
2013:2). Barbara Kingsolver put it more simply in her novel The Bean Trees 
(1988): “A human being can be good or bad or right or wrong, maybe. But how 
can you say a person is illegal? You just can't. That's all there is to it” (261). 
161 The use of ‘caravan’ also invokes images of other ‘uncontrollable’ mobile 
groups such as bikies, nomads, circuses and ‘gypsies’. All of whom have been 
deemed at some point ‘other’. 
162 Not only are different legal categories of migrant blurred in US discourse, 
countries of origin also converge. In the most recent reports of a ‘migrant 
caravan’ it was quite widely publicised that, although stemming from Central and 
South America, the caravan contained migrants and ‘Muslims’ (possible ISIS 
members from the Middle East who were all trying to gain entrance through the 
southern border). Online conspiracies abounded that either the Democrats or 
George Soros was funding this mass migration. 
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Look at the video of these people. What does it tell you?!! These are not 
Americans. They are barbarians who have invaded America and intend to 
wreck America so that they can feel at home in trashy, tribal communities. 
They will fight each other and kill each other in time (LeanderCruise 
2018).   
 
One anonymous individual commented on a Fox article, Hundreds of migrant 
caravan members found to have US criminal histories: DHS files, that ‘illegals’ 
were just animals, saying: “THAT'S IT!!! Shut down the border and put armed 
military there with order to shoot to kill. Only one, the rest will scurry like the rats 
they are”. On person commenting under the name “argyle58” said, “Like flies, 
they'll keep coming in until you shut the door”, and another person, “A day in the 
life” replied:  “Like cockroaches when ICE shows up they scatter” (June 2019).  
There are often suggestions that ‘illegals’ should be treated more like animals, 
like this tweet from “Mr. Justin”:  
first time, immediate deportation, second time prison in a hard labour 
camp for 2 years followed by deportation, 3rd time bullet to the back of the 
head and hung from the Mexican side of the wall in gibbets as a warning 
what happens to illegals. Watch it stop in a year…(Mr. Justin 2019).  
These words paint a graphic picture of the violence, through genocide, 
‘indentured labour’, torture and lynching that has been visited on the bodies of 
the ‘Dark other’ in the past.   
 
Also compounding notions of ‘savagery’ within these discourses is the theme of 
contagion; as ‘illegals’ are both tied to the spread of disease, and portrayed as 
diseases themselves. One individual “Astro” tweeted163 “our race will rise again, 
we are just going through another dark age. The European/White man will never 
																																																								
163 The Twitter users that I have referenced throughout range in followers from 
tens, to tens of thousands (and if counting Trump, tens of millions). These 
comments might not necessarily have a far-reach, but by including the tweets of 
individuals with only 37 or 183 followers, I am attempting to understand the 
narratives felt and communicated by some ‘ordinary’ (vocal) Americans and 
Germans. Although those who propound these narratives are likely to hold 
‘extremist’ views, the continued support of Donald Trump by the majority of 
Republicans, and the surge in popularity for the AfD suggests that more than a 
small faction of the population hold such ‘extremist’ views. 
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die, everytime [sic] we get knocked down, we come back twice as strong. The 
countless plagues and wars couldn't stop us and this current 'plague' won't stop of 
us either” (Astro 2018); “smalltownandrew” worried, “What diseases are they 
bringing? Border agents are getting sick from protecting the southern border. It 
will disgust you to know what they go through protecting our border! They give 
them to us next!” (smalltownandrew 2019); and “Sunshine AngelLight2U” 
worried on the 3rd of April 2019, “Are these outbreaks due to the illegal invasion? 
Even though you’ve been immunised, u [sic] can still contract this virus! 
#BuildThatDamnWallNow”.  
  
Another familiar refrain that characterised fearful tweets surrounded the 
religious affiliation of immigrants. ‘Illegals’ were often painted as ‘un-Christian’ 
anathemas, antithetical to the morals, values and belief systems on which (they 
felt) America was built. “WitchEnd” tweeted in 2019, “Too many in the West do 
not grasp the bubble most Muslims grow up in. A parallel world where culture, 
history and actions are totally different from ours. This is a very real threat to our 
way of life”164; “Nana Pateker” remarked “Slay the Islamic (pig emoji). They don't 
want or respect any other religions or people and want to spread there [sic] 
cancer across the world” (Nana Pateker 2019). The Islamiphobic comments are 
imbued with an extra element of vitriol, due to the spectre of the events of 9/11, 
which has become a cornerstone in American identity. Post-9/11 depictions of 
Islam have resulted in a metonymic slide, in which the obfuscation of the figures 
of refugee and terrorist constructs a relation of resemblance between the two. In 
response to a Fox news article published online on the 27th of November 2019 in 
which 2020 Democratic presidential hopeful Michael Bloomberg argued that 
immigration enriched the culture of the US, one reader, “Livfreordi” responded:  
Improve our culture?! (I love my culture; if I feel the need to experience 
other cultures I vacation in 3rd world places), our cuisine (tacos, really?), 
our religion (Islamic [sic] is not a religion - it was started by a child 
																																																								
164 While the stereotype surrounding Muslims in the United States assumes that 
Islam is incompatible with the West,  and is ‘uncivilised’ and ‘backwards’; 
according to Saunders (2012) 40% of adult Muslims in the United States, have 
earned a college or equivalent degree, making them the second most educated 
religious group after Jews (61%), and far ahead of ‘average’ (white) Americans 
(29%).   
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abuser), our dialogue (hard for American's [sic] to talk to people that 
refuse to learn English)… If this man things [sic] this is going to get votes it 
shows how out of touch he is with American [sic] that are sick of our 
culture being given away (Livfreordi 2019) 
Here the shadows of several of the intertwining fears that have surrounded racist 
public discourse on immigration in the US converge into one threatening, un-
Christian, un-American ‘Other’.  
 
Another popular talking point surrounding anxieties around ‘illegals’, and closely 
related to their lack of Christian values, concerns their perceived innate proclivity 
to crime and violence (reminiscent of white fears around scalpings by indigenous 
peoples, and violent uprisings by slaves). There is often a tendency to use 
militaristic language when immigrants are described in the news, and words and 
phrases like ‘invasion’, and ‘ranks of migrants’ populate broadcasts and are 
repeated in the online sphere.  
 
The conservative165 media company Fox166 often publishes articles, and airs 
opinions that paint immigrants as threateningly criminal. In response to the 
																																																								
165 Studying news content in the American context presents an interesting task, 
due to the visible gulf in news targeted down the partisan divide. There are 
channels that (purportedly) communicate a more liberal take on the news, (such 
as CNN and MSNBC) and those that are aimed at a more conservative audience 
(Fox). Under the Trump administration, this divide has become much more 
visceral with the ‘liberal’ news accused (by conservatives) of suffering from 
‘Trump derangement syndrome’ (an irrational reaction to Trump that is 
reactionary and not based on policy), and those outside Fox’s target demographic 
(predominantly white, middle aged and older, often rural) arguing that Fox is so 
biased that it constitutes state mandated propaganda. Berry and Sobieraj studied 
the trends that culminated in this media battleground in 2013. They mapped the 
change in American media models in the 21st century towards what they term an 
‘outrage industry’, primarily based on the rise of talk show hosts. They argued 
that talk show hosts play on outrage and utilise name-calling, emotional displays, 
emotional language, mockery, character assassination and ideologically 
extremising language. Berry and Sobieraj found that typical audiences for talk 
shows are fifty and above.  Talk shows are personality-centred (defined by a 
dominant charismatic voice). They use exaggeration, conspiracy theories and 
caricature. These shows are more about validating their audience’s experience, 
rather than providing information. The authors emphasise the appeal to emotions 
utilised by these talk shows. They are quick to note however, that it is not the use 
of emotion that makes the ‘outrage industry’ unique, rather it is the methods 
utilised to provoke emotion that set talk shows apart. Although the authors are 
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caravan of 2018 many articles warned readers of the ‘criminal’ contingent 
approaching the border, (such as Hundreds of migrant caravan members found 
to have criminal US histories: DHS files (Singman 2018 )), and opinion shows 
(which are Fox’s most-watched segments) hosts warned viewers of the ‘type’ of 
people that were trying to gain entry into the US. Take for example the opinion of 
‘Judge Jeanine’ who in a segment published to Youtube on the 20th of October 
2018 entitled “Judge Jeanine border security not a left or a right issue”, says “I’m 
not saying they’re all criminals…” “but who are they?” ‘Judge Jeanine’ then goes 
on to say that some of them are MS13 (a Mexican gang), coming to join other 
members who were “invited in” under the Obama administration, and are now 
“in New York and elsewhere brutally and savagely murdering innocent American 
citizens”. She continues: “I want to know who is a paedophile, who is a sex 
offender, who has no problem beating their wives?” (Pirro 2018). The ‘judge’s’ 
final remarks on ‘illegals’ lead us into the next familiar trope that historically 
characterises the American ‘Dark Other’ -deviant sexuality.  
 
The threatening and deviant sexuality of ‘illegals’ is one of the cornerstones of 
racist narratives surrounding immigrants and refugees in the USA. It is such a 
closely held belief that – as discussed- Trump was able to call Mexicans ‘rapists’ 
in his early campaign, and gather support through this accusation167. This 
sentiment continues to be repeated in social commentary. One Twitter user 
“BelieveThe Children” tweeted on the 31st of March, “We must take lessons from 
																																																																																																																																																																					
careful not to imply a causal relationship, they link changes in media commentary 
to the growing polarization of Congress and the growing incivility and tribalism in 
politics and political discourse. Half a decade later and the trends that Berry and 
Sobieraj identified in talk shows have migrated to the mainstream news, and 
these attitudes are amplified and intensified in online echo chambers. 
166	Jutel argues that Fox’s sensationalistic nature is central to the brand strategy 
“which imagined its journalism not in terms of servicing the rational citizen in the 
public sphere but in ‘craft[ing] intensive relationships with their viewers’ (Jones 
2012:180) in order to sustain audience share across platforms. The ideal Fox 
News viewer is not simply an audience member but an active prosumer that 
watches Fox as part of a broader movement logic that bolster the conservative 
media sphere” (Jutel 2019:257). 
167 Of course he was also widely condemned. Similarly there are many in the 
States fighting against the poor treatment of, and extreme rhetoric surrounding 
refugees and immigrants in the American context. These fearful attitudes are by 
no means universal in America – yet they are widely enough held to hold sway 
over political and institutional function. 
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other countries already experiencing #migrantrapecrisis around the world Anew 
[sic] game being seen is the taharrushGamea [sic] an arab rape game all over 
Europe. Any female not in hijab is game. Please check out the hashtags Also see 
#Rapefugees Do ur [sic] own research” (BelieveTheChildren 2017). Another 
account “Deplorable Slùggo” tweeted on the 4th of November, “Hillary’s dirty 
Muslim terrorist rapefugees wants 550% more terrorists more rapes more attacks 
[sic] on white communities?” (Deplorable Slùggo 2016). “OfficerWally” tweeted 
on the 24th of September 2018: “If Democrats care so much about #sexualAssault 
then why do they fight TO BRING IN ILLEGALS WHO ARE RAPEIST [sic]?” 
(OfficerWally 2018). “Kayla Lane” tweeted: “If you use #walls for your house to 
keep #robbers out, what is so different about walls to keep #killers, #rapists, and 
#illegals out?” (Kayla Lane 2019).  
 
The backlash directed at freshman Democratic Congresswoman Ilhan Omar 
provides an example of the expression of these narratives directed at a specific 
individual, rather than an amorphous group. Her treatment offers an interesting 
case study, as she is a public figure who embodies all the ‘markers’ of this 
incarnation of the ‘Dark Other’ - a refugee, a Muslim – and a Woman. She is 
subjected to the same characterisations of the feared ‘un-American’ body: those of 
savagery, violence and sexual perversion. Some of the racist stories fearfully and 
circulated about her are that she is a ‘sleeper terrorist’, that she looks like a rat, 
and that she married her own brother.168 These reactions are “deeply bound up 
with gendered histories of imperialism and capitalism, in which violence against 
the bodies of subaltern women is both granted and taken for granted in the 
making of worlds” (Ahmed 2013:170).       
 
On the 25th of August while at the 2019 G7 summit, Trump retweeted a 
conspiracy theory that alleged Omar married her own brother to commit 
immigration fraud, “RT @JudicialWatch: CREDIBLE Evidence Ilhan Omar 
Married Her Brother—‘We’re Not Sure Her Last Name is Omar!’ WATCH MORE 
																																																								
168 The vitriol of these attacks displays the attitude towards ‘others’ that choose to 
speak out; as Ahmed observes (2013) subaltern females who voice their concerns 
are constructed as ‘un-grateful’ to be let in to the ‘we’ of the nation. “The appeal is 
then for her to ‘go home’ where ‘home’ is not only constructed as ‘elsewhere’, but 
also as the ‘where’ of terrorism”(170). 
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HERE…” (Donald J. Trump 2019). At a ‘Keep America Great’ rally in Minnesota 
(Omar’s home state), Trump repeated the claim, tied her to ISIS, and stated 
“Congresswoman Omar is an America-hating socialist!” (Bowden 2019). On a 
YouTube video that captured the moment (“Trump goes OFF on Omar”), 
comments echoed Trump’s sentiment: “Tammy Lucas” commented “Omar 
supports terrorist organization, I’m with PRESIDENT TRUMP SEND HER 
BACK” (Tammy Lucas 2019). “Warren Jackson” left a comment that read “this 
swamp rat turbin [sic] hag needs to go” (Warren Jackson 2019), “Goj Ira” wrote 
“diaper head idiot Omar will soon be nothing but a skid mark in history” (Gorj Ira 
2019); “Bob Anderson” commented “Someone did something to Omar…her 
brother…her white boy lover…her dad…probably a goat…her uncle her mom and 
ISIS……she really gets around….” (Bob Anderson 2019). The hatred directed at 
Ilhan Omar from some quarters has been so vitriolic that she has received several 
death threats. These vary in degrees of seriousness, from tweets and comments 
like “Margaret Hochdoerfer”’s on the 14th of October 2019 “Ilhan Omar needs the 
death penalty, that is the only way her Jihadism will stop” (Margaret Hochdoerfer 
2019), and “Brandon Davis”’s tweet on the 12th of October 2019 “Omar is a hadji. 
The bad kind. The kind I dealt with overseas. She hates America and needs to be 
destroyed. I can easily handle it. I dealt with her relatives. Say the word Mr. T” 
(Brandon Davis 2019), to even more serious intimidations.  
 
John Kless (a man from Florida) left voice messages at the Washington offices of 
three Democrats (Eric Swalwell, Rashida Tlaib, and Corey Booker) in which he 
explicitly threatened them, and expressed his hatred of Ilhan Omar.  
In November of 2019 the campaign Twitter account of Danielle Stella, a pro-
Trump Republican candidate running for Congress, was suspended after she 
posted at least twice, the idea that Omar should be hanged (one post included a 
crude stick figure drawing depicting the act). In response to her removal from 
Twitter, Stella released this statement: “My suspension for advocating for the 
enforcement of federal code proves Twitter will always side with and fight to 
protect terrorists, traitors, pedophiles and rapists” (in Bekiempis 2019).  
 
Throughout the discourse surrounding ‘illegals’ in the context of the USA similar 
patterns and themes emerge that have dominated the historical landscape of 
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racism. Diverse cultures and peoples are homogenised into a savage brown entity 
that (supposedly) threatens the very heart of ‘American’ white Christian identity.  
 
The Collective Cultural Emotional Residuum of Fear 
This marks the crux of my argument. Fear narratives surrounding refugees are 
conditional upon on the emotional residuum of social histories that predate the 
present encounters. That is to say – cultural fear feeds off of its own antecedent 
past. As Wrenn so eloquently puts it: “The growth and nature of fear must be 
studied as a process that develops under its own inertia… as well as a 
phenomenon that is shaped by and in turn shapes its institutional setting” 
(2014:338). 
 
Instead of regarding these fears of refugees as something that is peculiar to a 
specific time, it is important to unpack how fear both creates and perpetuates 
actions and institutions. Fear should not be thought of as simply an individual 
experience, but rather as “the shared experience of individuals living within the 
same sociocultural –historical context” (Wrenn 2014:338). Such emotions are not 
the creation of a moment. The reception of refugees in the United States and 
Germany has been influenced by fear that has built up over generations. The 
collective emotional residuum of fear has the effect of limiting society’s 
perspective as the present is bound to past experiences - and thus, anticipation 
about the future is also based on the expectations inherited from these narratives. 
Fear overflows the consciousness and limits reactions to pre-conditioned 
patterns. 
 
A collective cultural residuum of fear overlaps with the idea of historical and 
cultural memory, which is widely recognised in the literature surrounding studies 
of ethnic nationalism. Historical or cultural memory is the shared remembrance 
and interpretation of a collective past (Assmann and Conrad 2010, Assmann 
2011). These historical memories are transmitted through the artefacts of culture, 
from poems to politics:     
and most powerfully in the oral and written stories, and legends of 
common peoples handed down through generations. Historical memory is 
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usually imbued with quasi-sacred meanings capable of evoking very 
powerful emotions. It is thus an important source of symbols and values 
that élites have for mobilizing their constituencies and legitimating their 
action (Arfi 1998:164-165). 
However, I would argue that the connection to shared pasts runs deeper than 
historical memory evoking specific – but individually felt –emotions169; and that 
a sensitivity to particular emotions (in the instances of Germany and the US – 
fear)170 becomes woven into the very fabric of a culture, through the stories they 
tell.171 
																																																								
169	Societies can be characterised by a sensitisation to a particular emotion, and 
this is as much a part of the cultural makeup as collective memories, ideologies, 
shared cultural myths and aspirations. Culture provides the framework of beliefs 
that interpret particular emotions, it provides the basis for the interpretation of 
particular information that evokes emotion, and conditions the expression of 
these emotions. I see shared emotion, not as a specific orientation as such, but 
rather as a cultural emotional residuum, an emotion that is built up over time, 
shared not only across culture but throughout it as well. With this emotional 
framework of fear positioned in the shared psyche of society, individuals respond 
to conditioned stimuli, influenced by the cultural narratives that built up this 
residuum, as if they were responding, having learnt from their own personal 
experiences. 
170 Mohammad (2011) created an emotion analyser that mapped the use of 
emotion words in a wide variety of texts across vast collections. His analysis 
showed that the use of fear or fear-related words experienced a marked rise in 
German and American texts after WW1, and then again after WW2, and that fear 
related words have remained in relatively high occurrence in the texts of these 
nations (compared to other countries) ever since. 
171	I turn to an analogy that I think perfectly explains this relationship, which 
Ahmed presented in her beautiful work The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2013). 
A Child sees a bear, is afraid, and runs away:“The child must ‘already know’ the 
bear is fearsome. This decision is not necessarily made by her, and it might not 
even be dependent on past experiences. This could be a ‘first time’ encounter, and 
the child still runs for it. But what is she running from? What does she see when 
she sees the bear? We have an image of the bear as an animal to be feared, as an 
image that is shaped by cultural histories and memories. When we encounter the 
bear, we already have an impression of the risks of the encounter, as an 
impression that is felt on the surface of the skin. This knowledge is bodily, 
certainly: the child might not need time to think before she runs for it. But the 
‘immediacy’ of the reaction is not itself a sign of a lack of mediation. It is not that 
the bear is fearsome, ‘on its own’, as it were. It is fearsome to someone or 
somebody. So fear is not in the child, let alone in the bear, but is a matter of how 
child and bear come into contact. This contact is shaped by past histories of 
contact, unavailable in the present, which allow the bear to be apprehended as 
fearsome” (2013:7). 
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Many scholars have examined fear as a tool utilised by institutions as a means to 
an end.172 For Arfi (1998) the other, or ‘ethnic enemy’ is socially constructed 
through a four-step process. First, leaders use salient historical memories to 
construct a set of political myths. Second, the internalisation and propagation of 
these myths by the group creates a climate that imbues leaders with social power, 
in which leaders’ actions become deciding factors of inter-group relations. Third, 
within such climates, leaders increasingly demonise the ‘Other’ through language 
and action. Fourth, the ‘other’ group reciprocates in kind (Arfi 1998:153).173  
People’s relationships with institutions and power inform how fear is 
experienced. Those with less overt power tend to experience social fears more 
acutely.  However, this is not to suggest that the contours of fear can be 
transposed directly onto the lines of class. As Bourke reminds us, fear cannot be 
used as a sorting mechanism for class - but rather fear informs the interactions 
between the individual and the social structure, and this exchange tacitly informs 
power relations (2003, 2005). 
 
Importantly, the cultural emotional residuum of fear is different from mass 
anxiety, or ‘moral panics’. Hysteria and panics are temporally specific - in that 
they only last for a short amount of time, whereas the collective emotional 
residuum of fear is continuous, being built upon through each generation (unless 
																																																								
172 In his work on immigration and the nation state Balch (2016) suggests that 
there are two strains of the ‘politics of fear’, a weak, and a strong. He 
characterises the weak as such: “States will over-estimate threats to national 
security, leading them to take all available measures to enhance protection of 
citizens, including engaging in public exaggerations of the threat to ‘sell’ these 
measures to those they are trying to protect” (179). In the weak politics of fear, 
the emotions of citizens are manipulated by the hegemony, in response to a ‘real’, 
or perceived threat. In the strong version however: “States will construct threats 
in order to create a politics of fear to enable and legitimize authoritarian and 
repressive laws and policies which themselves threaten liberal democratic 
values”(2016:179). In these cases, the threat is not ‘real’, and the intention behind 
it is not one of protection – but rather to slake the thirst for untrammelled state 
power. 
173 However it is important to remember that ethnic conflict is not an inherent 
feature of multiethnic societies: “Both ethnic peace and conflict are socially 
constructed”  (Arfi 1998:199). Arfi’s thesis is that changes within the social 
identities of, and power relations between ethnic groups create the construction 
of ethnic fear, and concurrently ethnic violence. She favours a constructivist 
approach to studying ethnic conflict. 
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a concerted and wide-spread effort is undertaken to shift or break it).174 Skoll and 
Konstanje (2013) name a collective state of sensitivity to fear a ‘culture of fear’:  
The present culture of fear does not require people to feel frightened all or 
most of the time, but it does entail patterns of behaviour and a colouring of 
social relations grounded in a fearful outlook. Moreover, the construction 
of a fear culture does not rest exclusively on the fear mongering campaign. 
The campaign helps set it in motion. It manages and channels it, but 
cultural creation of any kind needs mass participation. It is a collective 
enterprise (Skoll and Konstanje 2013:4).175  
 
Rationalist V. P. Gagnon argues that leaders promote or even create ethnic 
conflicts to carry out self-serving political agendas: "violent conflict along ethnic 
cleavages is provoked by élites in order to create a domestic political context 
where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity….The elite thereby 
constructs the individual interest of the broader population in terms of the threat 
to the community defined in ethnic terms" (1994, cited in Arfi 1998: 154). 
However, this view is constrained in that it does not take account of the fact that 
																																																								
174 Fear memories prove to be particularly resilient and are not given to erosion 
over the passage of time: “But the memories, which may even last throughout life, 
are never carbon copies of the information provided by learning. Rather, they are 
biased and modified reconstructions of the absorbed information” (Bar-Tal 2001: 
603). All of this means that fear may be invoked by a wide range of culturally and 
socially conditioned cues, which in and of themselves do not actually present any 
real threat or danger. Fear proceeds to override rationality and logic, as the 
connections from the emotional system to the cognitive one are stronger than 
those of the opposite direction. 
175 Skoll and Konstanje (2013) argue that America has operated under what they 
term a ‘fear culture’ since the 1940’s. They propose that this fear culture was 
created by the ‘elites’ in response to communism, and built on communism, 
crime, and then terrorism: “The postwar construction of fear about communism 
evolved into the 21st century fear of terrorism” (Skoll and Konstanje 2013:7). 
While my views overlap with Skoll and Konstanje in several ways, I believe that 
the ‘fear culture’ of America is far older, and begins with the nation’s very colonial 
inception. It is how the nation was created, the ‘free America’ defined in 
opposition to the ‘Dark Other’. Skoll and Konstanje see the creation and 
maintenance of structural racism in the USA as an ingredient in the American 
fear culture, but find the true driving force to be more economically motivated. 
They also argue that the US fear culture is a motive-driven, top-down exercise of 
power: “Elites created a culture of fear: a field of meanings within which variable 
enemies could serve as targets” (2013:8). However, this is a somewhat simplified 
view of things, as the ‘elites’ themselves do not exist in a cultural and social 
vacuum.  
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cultural histories and political myths exert their own influence on the leaders 
themselves. Those in power do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they are embedded 
within existing social and material structures, similarly influenced and 
constrained by historical and cultural considerations. Thus those that wish to 
lead, or those with overt power, act as a channel for these ideas, rather than their 
outright creators.176 
  
For example, examining the context of the United States, the fearful narratives 
surrounding refugees are often most loudly and vehemently expressed by ‘the 
mob’.177 These narratives may be reflected by those in power, and manipulated for 
political or corporate control, but the genesis of these emotions is much more 
complex and interconnected than the top-down approach that is often described. 
“Casting the ethnographic canvas wide avoids the myth that racism (and other–
isms) belongs only to certain people such as lower-class whites, and instead 
uncovers how racism is historically built in to the ‘civilities of respectable, 
educated white women and men’ (Stoler 2016:253 in McGranahan 2017:247). 
  
In Arlie Hochschild’s beautiful and important work Strangers in Their Own Land 
(2018) the author seeks to understand the rise of the right, and the accompanying 
paradox of why those who are poor and vulnerable often vote against their own 
self-interest.178 Contrary to the mainstream voices that surround the study of 
rising right-wing populism which locate the problem within economic concerns, 
Hochschild sees emotion as the locus:  
In trying to dissect the rise of the right in the USA some thinkers on one 
end of the spectrum have argued that the astronomically rich have bought 
																																																								
176 As Ellul (1968) reminds us, for an idea, a myth, a movement to stick, it must 
play on culturally preconceived notions or beliefs. 
177 Although as Arendt writes in On Totalitarianism, just because a voice is loud, 
does not mean it is a true representative of the people. “The mob is primarily a 
group in which the residue of all classes are represented. This makes it so easy to 
mistake the mob for the people, which also comprises all strata of society”, the 
mob is often confused as ‘the voice of the people’ but in reality it is just a 
caricature of the people (1951:107). This would seem to be the case in the USA, 
where Trump who lost the popular vote – twice, was nevertheless (along with his 
supporters), the ‘loud voice’ of the USA during his administration. 
178 The states which represent Trump’s biggest support are those that receive the 
most in federal funding, yet they wish to do away with ‘big government’. 
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and paid for, vast and far-reaching misinformation 
campaigns….Purchased political influence is real, is powerful, and is at 
work. However the idea that it is the major factor that defines how people 
feel, and vote is too simplistic. Though compelling, all of these works miss 
something crucial, a full understanding of emotion, both in life – and 
politics (2018:10).  
 
Hochschild proposes that white working class rural Americans (who make up the 
majority of the Republican Party) no longer feel that they are central to the 
cultural life of the country they believed they helped to create.179 Hochschild 
proposes that life in the Southern states is characterised by a state of cultural 
revanchism and a series of ingrained ‘emotional grooves’ (or an emotional 
residuum): “What interests me about Southern history is the series of emotional 
grooves, as we might call them, carved into the minds and hearts of the people I 
came to know through the lives of their ancestors” (Hochschild 2018:207). These 
entrenched narratives, and corresponding patterns of emotion have contributed 
to an in-built sense of victimhood in the white working class (predominantly 
male) mentality. “When fear of the other meets a decline in power to check that 
other, politics ends, dread extends its icy grip, and tribal warfare- unyielding, 
uncompromising, and zero sum- begins” (Belosa 2018:na). 
 
																																																								
179 Hochschild lived in the deep South for five years while she was conducting her 
research, and came to the conclusion that her participants, and their wider 
communities had a closely held ‘deep story’ that shaped the way in which their 
economic and social lives were perceived and felt. The deep story reads thus: 
White Americans have been patiently waiting in line for their shot at the 
American dream. But other groups, other less deserving groups than they 
(African Americans, immigrants, those on welfare), keep pushing in front of 
them, accessing the opportunities and economic support that should be coming to 
them. However they don’t feel resentment towards the exceptionally wealthy, or 
1%, as they aspire to succeed at the American Dream themselves. They see their 
willingness to look forward as hopeful and brave. They do feel resentment to 
those less deserving who are pushing in line however. Behind the deep-story - 
indelibly linked to White American identity, is the ‘Dark Other’. In Hochschild’s 
book her participants measure themselves in relation to other ‘less deserving’ 
groups. Participants used the idea of ‘hard-work’ as a racial signifier, and felt that 
the ‘undeserving groups’, (mainly African Americans, but also refugees) did not 
participate in ‘hard-work’, but benefited above and beyond ‘true- Americans’ like 
themselves (2018:147). 
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Engels (2010) discusses the effect of these ‘rhetorics of victimhood’ arguing that 
such rhetorics can be used to manipulate the vitriolic emotions that accompany 
the sense of victimage, and that these emotions may be used to manipulate the 
public.  
When rhetorics cultivate hostility toward the perceived cause of suffering, 
they become deeply problematic — especially when one is not really a 
victim, or when one has identified the cause of suffering incorrectly. Such 
rhetorics of victimage do more than praise or blame, more than assign 
guilt or innocence. Such rhetorics transform the conversation, making 
democratic deliberation less about finding consensus and more about 
achieving expiation, less about giving reasons and more about plotting 
revenge (304).180    
  
For Hochschild, the success of Trump is hardly a surprise, as she sees Trump 
answering the emotional need of her participants (overriding economic and 
																																																								
180 Engels (2010) notes that rhetorics of victimage are not inherently problematic, 
as they can raise awareness of abuse and imbalances of power, setting the scene 
for productive deliberations. Engels calls this the ‘curative’ aspect of ‘victimage’ 
(drawing from Nietzsche’s 1967 work On the Genealogy of Morals in which 
identity is constructed around experiencing oneself as a perpetual victim). 
Nietzsche understands victimage as being characterised by a sense of 
‘‘ressentiment”, (a stronger and more complex version of resentment, and a 
specific by-product of Judeo-Christian morality) in which the understanding of 
self is entirely constructed around one’s relationship with ‘the enemy’. For 
Nietzsche, ‘victimage’ operates on the principle of dialectical opposition: the 
individual, gripped by ressentiment ‘‘has conceived ‘the evil enemy,’ ‘the Evil 
One,’ and this in fact is his basic concept, from which he then evolves, as an after 
thought and pedant, a ‘good one’—himself!’’  (1967:39). While Nietzsche’s own 
leanings were decidedly un-democratic, and he asserted the importance of 
hierarchy, this does not diminish his ideas and their utility for studying 
democracy, and seems especially pertinent in relation to North American political 
trends in the late 2010s). ‘Modern’ democracy in the United States grew out of the 
Second Great Awakening, and utilises the rhetoric and moral code of Christianity. 
Through naming an enemy, an aggressor, it is possible to transform oneself into 
the victim. Thus locating an external, combatable aetiology for the symptoms of 
our distress. However Engels argues that the US rhetoric from the political right, 
that frames the ultimate victim as the white working-class, Christian (male), 
(hardly the most marginalised group in the States), does not even have this 
curative effect, but rather aims to cultivate and continue these feelings of fear, 
anger and resentment, in order to achieve political victories, and promote 
corporate interests. This is what he terms the ‘politics of resentment’: the masses 
are kept fearful and angry, in constant need of strong leadership, through keeping 
them perpetually hostile towards their supposed victimisers (Engles 2010:305). 
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material concerns). Trump (and right wing demagogues like him) reflect or fulfil 
the emotional needs of their audience181: “He won in part by tapping into a 
different sort of moral outrage, into feelings of anger and loss, of being left behind 
and defeated economically and perhaps culturally as well” (McGranahan 
2017:246). Trump furthers the sense of unity experienced by his supporters by 
denigrating, and promising to expel members of out-groups. This feeling of 
connectivity and unity produces a ‘high’, and, Hochschild argues, the desire to 
hang on to this becomes a matter of emotional self-interest (2018:228).182   
   
The narratives that surround refugees in Germany and the USA follow patterns 
present in the historical narratives of fear examined in the previous chapter. This 
is due to the fact that these countries and cultures are marked by an emotional 
residuum of fear that accretes, perpetuates and extends within certain silos of 
society. Emotion is a social phenomenon, and is at the centre of why and how 
people act. These fearful narratives (amplified and intensified by new forms of 
communication) answer an emotional need within societies, and provide a sense 
																																																								
181	Jutel 2019, and Zeiher 2020, suggest that support of Trump is characterised 
by ‘jouissance’, that tension between antagonism and enjoyment: “Trump’s 
politics of jouissance corresponds perfectly to the alt-right logic of trolling in 
which enjoyment combines both vicious dehumanisation and an obsession with 
the enemy” (Jutel 219:260): “In the case of Trump, we might say that while some 
enjoy his authority, others enjoy expressing their outrage, both of which are over 
time caught in an ongoing circuit of repetition and intensification” (Zeiher 
2020:208). Indeed many of the tweets examined in this research would seem to 
lend themselves to this idea, as the sheer passionate vitriol conveyed often speaks 
to enjoyment in the very expression of these fears. 
182	Here Emile Durkhiem’s concept of “collective effervescence” presented in The 
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1965 [1912]) proves useful. Durkheim 
describes the state of emotional excitation that a person experiences when they 
join with others that they understand to be fellow members of their biological or 
moral tribe. They feel unified and uplifted through this process. Although 
Durkheim was studying the religious rites of indigenous tribes when he made 
these observations, much of what he discussed is relevant in the contemporary 
Western political scene. People gather around a ‘totem’ or symbol, and while this 
‘totem’ is generally an object, charismatic leaders can become totems themselves. 
The function that the totem performs is unifying the worshippers. Thus, in the 
context of Trump, the sense of awe and fervour that surrounds him isn’t simply to 
do with Trump himself, but rather the unity and sense of belonging experienced 
by those who support him. 
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of belonging. This reflects and results in increasing authoritarianism and 
religious and nationalist conflicts across the globe.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion: Globalisation, Collective Emotion 
and the Search for Identity and Meaning 
Throughout the body of this research, I have sought to understand how 
particular narratives of fear are created and recreated in the German and US 
contexts. To conclude, I turn to look at why such fearful narratives 
surrounding refugees, and the accompanying move towards right-wing 
populism, are occurring across the globe. 
 
Neoliberal Globalisation and the Softening of the Nation State 
The historical narratives of fear presented in this work all share something in 
common. They appeared at a time in history when momentous social and 
political change was occurring. The captivity narratives of colonialists were an 
attempt to create order out of the ‘strange new world’ in which they found 
themselves, and Hitler’s success in the Third Reich was born not out of his 
extraordinary charisma, but rather was the direct result of the economic and 
social fall-out from the First World War, which resulted in the worst cataclysm 
of capitalism the world had ever seen. In periods of social and political tumult, 
humans grasp for certainties. These narratives (for Germany the fear of the 
Ideological Other, for the States the fear of the ‘Dark Other’), which have 
become embedded within clusters of the cultural collective consciousness in 
the form of shared emotion, provide such certainties through social continuity 
and meaning, and deliver instruction on how to act, and react.   
 
 While the number of displaced peoples in the world has been deemed a 
‘crisis’, such flows of people are not a new phenomenon. The sheer scale of 
those that were seeking asylum in 2015 however is larger than what has been 
previously experienced. The number of displaced peoples looks set only to 
rise, with the steady march of anthropogenic global heating disturbing the 
ways, and places in which people have lived. In spite of all this, refugees are 
predominantly fearfully framed within xenobhobic and racist discourses in 
terms of threat. This has very real effects on the existence of these refugees, as 
Chapter 5| Conclusion 
	 144	
“those risking their lives to escape the economic and political hardship of their 
countries in search of a better life for themselves and their children are 
increasingly denied access” (Kinnvall 2004:741).  
   
I argue that these narratives of fear surrounding refugees have emerged as an 
expression of the uneasiness experienced by so many due to the rapid social 
and cultural changes involved in neoliberal globalisation. Globalisation is 
characterised by the dissolution of the boundaries of both space and time, and 
the increased visibility of the flows of bodies, goods and services that move 
across these softened borders (Bauman 1999, Appadurai 2006). The utopian 
ideals of ‘high globalisation’ were the neoliberal principles of open markets 
and ‘free trade’, and the accompanying spread of democratic values, and 
technological advancement which would (theoretically) mitigate inequality 
both within and across societies, increasing transparency of governance, and 
freedom (Appadurai 2006:2). These principles were meant to create stability 
and equality but instead – produced instability and inequality.    
 
As Apadurai observes: “The speed and intensity with which both material and 
ideological elements now circulate across national boundaries have created a 
new order of uncertainty in social life” (2006:5). ‘Traditional’ social and 
cultural values have been superseded by market values, just as Horkheimer 
and Adorno (in Marcus and Fischer 1999) had feared. Appadurai (2006) 
argues that the process of globalisation has created mass uncertainty by 
deconstructing the nation-state’s command of its own economic destiny. 
Globalisation exposes “severe pathologies in the sacred ideologies of nation-
hood” (1). As a consequence of this, the production of cultural cohesion has 
gained even greater significance as the state struggles to retain relevancy and 
the citizen struggles to retain a sense of belonging. 
 
The nation often presents itself as an organic whole - but nations are created, 
and exist only when citizens make sense of themselves and the world through 
the hermeneutic framework of national identity (Anderson 1983, Bar-Tal 
2001, Kinnvall 2004, Wrenn 2014, Skoll 2016).  
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To retain hegemony nations must continually maintain themselves, 
reaffirming and recreating the very verisimilitude of their being. The 
dangerous and fundamental idea behind the construction of ‘the nation-state’ 
is the conception of a ‘national ethnos’, the idea that a nation’s sovereignty is 
organised around the belief in some sort of particular cultural or ethnic genius 
(Appadurai 2006:3). This idea of a ‘national ethnos’ is hardly the natural 
product of a specific patch of land - but rather has been ‘produced and 
naturalised’ through narratives of conflict and war, and the subordination of 
minority ‘others’ (Anderson 1983, Arfi 1998, Bar-Tal 2001, Appadurai 2006, 
Ahmed 2013, Bhaba 2013): "If national mobilization depends upon national 
identity, then establishing identity depends upon embedding it within an 
essentialising historical narrative" (Reicher and Hopkins 2001 in Kinnvall 
2004:758). 
 
The historical examples of narratives of fear presented in this research have 
all emerged at times when shifts in society, politics and ideology created an 
environment of uncertainty and change within Germany and the USA. I have 
argued that these narratives of fear have had a telic (purposive) motive – 
predominantly to define national identity through opposition to (for Germany 
ideological, for the USA racial) difference.   
 
Ontological Insecurity and Existential Anxiety 
The understanding of the self as based in nation-hood has become eroded 
throughout the process of neoliberal globalisation. Gone are the days in which 
‘culture' could be neatly collapsed into the nation state. Within the neoliberal 
system, paradoxically societies are increasingly intermingled and blurred, 
while concurrently being fragmented and stratified. Marx warned about the 
effect of capitalism on the proletariat, arguing that it would enrich only a 
select few (2011 [1867]), and Durkheim (1979 [1897]) and Weber (2003 
[1905]) were accurate in their predictions that the emotional and social effects 
of a modernist capitalist society would lead to loneliness and isolation, 
dissolution of community ties, loss of meaning brought about by existential 
crises, and the consequent decay of egalitarian ideals and values. Horkheimer 
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and Adorno’s (in Marcus and Fischer 1999) predictions that the ‘culture 
industry’ would result in societies primed for authoritarianism and fascism to 
take hold appear to be painfully apt.  
 
‘Modern’ life in a globalised world is characterised by a sense of both 
ontological insecurity and existential anxiety (Wrenn 2014). “Ontological 
security” and “existential anxiety” are essential components in Giddens’ (1991) 
theory of human existence. Ontological security is a security of being, both in 
terms of a spatial and material context – and in terms of a strong sense of self-
identity and belonging. Security on the ontological front is a salve against 
existential anxieties. For Giddens, self-identity consists of the development of 
a consistent feeling of continuity, where a deeply-held narrative about the self 
or group is able to provide answers to the questions of who we are, and what 
we do.    
 
However, the neoliberal ideology of modern globalisation rests on the 
atomisation of society, and emphasises hyper-individualism. The stress placed 
on individual responsibility, and the erosion of social and community ties, 
naturally segues into increased existential anxiety (Bauman 2006). The 
greater the agency and responsibility, the greater the anxiety individuals 
experience: “Humans can control their own destiny, which in the hands of the 
responsible is wonderfully empowering. In the hands of the paranoid, that 
power is terrifying” (Bourke 2005: 370). This speaks to the fact that in times 
of upheaval and uncertainty, people look to more authoritarian styles of 
leadership to alleviate the burden of personal duty (Fromm 1941, Arendt 
1951). 
During periods of heightened uncertainty and anxiety, individuals 
gravitate toward philosophically conservative, right-wing ideals which 
provide concrete answers to unanswerable questions and which also 
provide boundaries for order, structure, and hierarchy that relieve the 
individual from having to process too much information and make too 
many decisions in an uncertain environment (Jost and Hunyady 2005 
in Wrenn 2014:341). 
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Ideologies, belief systems and identity constructs are born from the human 
struggle with existentialism. In times where existential anxiety proves harder 
to keep at bay, we seek comfort in the forms of these constructed systems: “As 
such, conservative ideologies anchored in tradition and the past become more 
attractive” (Wrenn 2014:341).       
 
Adhering to systems which stem from ‘tradition’ provides a sense of continuity 
and order in an otherwise overwhelming world, giving the individual a sense 
of group participation, in which the potential nothingness of being is soothed 
through membership with the social group: “ ... ‘they’ provides a constant 
tranquillization about death” (Heidegger in Wrenn 2014: 340). “The greater 
the crisis of existential anxiety, the deeper the allegiance to identity groups 
and ideologically driven beliefs runs” (Wrenn 2014:341). 
 
It would seem that this yearning for group belonging proves particularly 
salient in the ‘modern’ world. While capitalism as a system emphasises 
individual freedom of ‘choice’ (consumption), it is important to note that this 
is - for the most part - simply an illusion. Capitalism by its very nature is built 
upon the constriction of the agency and economic and social mobility of 
certain groups. Capitalist accumulation is only feasible if exploitation is 
introduced as the key factor in the organisation of society (Marx 2011 [1867], 
Weber 2003 [1905], Appadurai 1998 and 2006, Bauman 1999 and 2006, 
Brodkin 2005, Roy 2014, Skoll 2016).183  
  
Thus a vicious cycle appears. Those individuals who are more isolated within, 
or constrained by the neoliberal system verily experience less ontological 
security in such a model. Those who have greater levels of ontological 
insecurity are also less equipped to deal with existential anxiety. “Therefore, 
those individuals, twice alienated—once through the neoliberal project, and 
																																																								
183 Within the capitalist model, as Marx predicted (2011) [1867], the vast 
majority are being exploited and abused by a tiny minority. And yet, as seen, 
the anger and suffering that this system of inequality has caused is directed 
not at those who bear the brunt of blame, but rather towards other groups 
who are even more disenfranchised, such as refugees. This othering provides 
an answer to the question “How can a system both create pain and deflect 
blame for that pain?” (Hochschild 2018:10). 
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again through the experience of existential anxiety—must find more dramatic 
and all-encompassing means of connection with others in order to push 
against that alienation” (Wrenn 2014:348).184 Shared emotion provides such a 
shield.  
 
Fear and Power 
As exemplified, one of the most salient means of group connection is through 
the construction of an ‘other’ - for if there is a ‘them’, there must also be an ‘us’ 
(Rutjens and Loseman 2010). Both nationalism and religion are powerful 
forms of such ‘identity signifiers’ which “in times of rapid change and 
uncertain futures (are) therefore more likely than other identity constructions 
to arise during crises of ontological insecurity” (Kinnvall 2004:741). This use 
of an ‘other’ is twofold, as it not only provides group security, but it also 
identifies a threat that may be named, a locus of blame for the problems 
experienced, that might be challenged and defeated (Wrenn 2014:344).  
 
This explains the paradoxical nature of the rise in nationalist sentiment at a 
time when the nation state has arguably less sway than ever before over the 
actual lives of its citizens. As individuals become unmoored from practised 
patterns and social structures through the globalising process, insecurity 
drives them to re-create social ties through a reimagining of those social 
structures, which they pursue more intently than they would had change not 
occurred (Kinnvall 2004). 
 
 Indeed Ulrich Beck argued that solidarity is based solely on insecurity in the 
new modernity, and that communities only become a ‘binding force’ through 
the perception of shared risk (Beck 1992 in Ahmed 2013:72).  
																																																								
184 Ellul argues that media and propaganda have an easier time manipulating 
people’s emotion in an increasingly globalised, capitalist society (he calls it a 
‘technological one’) as people lack the support of earlier tightly knit 
communities (such as village or church), and are thus more likely to be 
susceptible to adapting to a prescribed mass consciousness in order to 
experience a sense of closeness and shared community (in Marlin 2014:192). 
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As the individual becomes de-contextualized via change, both political 
and economic, she can become more attached to an imagined past, and 
in so doing, become more deeply rooted in that imagined tradition and 
less tolerant of deviations from it (Wrenn 2104:342). 
 
This longing for ‘traditional’ ideals, and nativist sentiment can be, and has 
been manipulated by those in power. Hobbes marked fear as primary to the 
emergence of government, suggesting that it is fear of anarchy that makes 
subjects consent to being governed (in Ahmed 2013:71). Machiavelli similarly 
saw fear as the central organ of effective rule: “make a people afraid and 
controlling them becomes much easier” (in Skoll 2016:1). Governance and 
political movements have often coalesced around ideas of cultural 
identification and exclusion: “The fact that insecurity is linked with 
intolerance of out-groups has been demonstrated repeatedly in history, when 
demagogues have manipulated mass fears to build strong in-group feeling and 
rejection of out-groups” (Inglehart et al. 2006 in Balch 2016:183).  
 
Fear (and its accompanying anger) towards ‘others’ is used by ‘the powers that 
be’ to obfuscate the failures of both the neoliberal model of globalisation, and 
the state – indeed within neoliberalism fear is profitable for the hegemony, 
with politicians, the media, and religion all relying on it for continued success 
and participation.185 It is the very institutions to which people turn to for 
information and protection against fear, that gain the most from our 
continued state of it (Bauman 1999, 2006, Bourke 2005, Appadurai 2006, 
Ahmed 2013, Altheide 2013, 2018, Skoll 2016, West 2017). “Fear which 
prompts this nativist reaction and neoliberalism which promotes ontological 
insecurity and reinforces fear, thus, sustain each other” (Wrenn 2014:351-
352).186  
																																																								
185 Skoll terms this ‘ideological warfare’. “Not only does ideological warfare 
create fear and provide enemies and allies, it also mystifies, diverts, and 
distracts. It encourages complacency and complicity among the masses” 
(2016:10). 
186 Balch argues that fear can be a positive emotion: “Importantly, and 
perhaps counter-intuitively, the ostensibly negatively charged emotion of fear 
is shown to have constructive as well as destructive power. It can perform 
productive political work in connecting the state with society, building, and 
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While the consortia of governance manipulate the fears of their societies 
(often for their own gain) it is important to recognise that these institutions 
and their ideologies (or, these ideologies with their accompanying 
institutions) do not appear out of a vacuum- but rather are coproduced.  Here 
I return again to Arendt’s horizontal theory of power:  
Power springs up whenever people get together and act in concert, but 
it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together rather than 
from any action that then may follow. Legitimacy, when challenged, 
bases itself on an appeal to the past, while justification relates to an end 
that lies in the future (Arendt 1970:52). 
Fear may dictate action and reaction, and may be used as a means to an end, 
but it does not appear out of nowhere. I argue that the narratives of fear 
surrounding refugees in the USA and Germany may appear simply as an 
implement of control visited by the authorities upon the masses187, but in 
actual fact – are the product of societies who have built up a collective 
emotional residuum of fear. These fears have become so deeply entwined 
within certain nodes of the cultural psyche, and ingrained within the national 
ethos, that it is through this emotion that the nation understands itself.    
 
Fear is so deeply embedded within certain clusters of the cultural memory of 
the USA and Germany, it has been nurtured through the generations, and 
continually embedded into cultural products. Thus it is little wonder that 
beliefs evoking this particular emotion are used for decision making by 
society’s institutions, influencing courses of action and reaction (Bar-Tal 
2001:606).   
 
																																																																																																																																																														
expressing identity, affirming belonging.” (Balch 2016:193). However, while 
this claim is true to a certain extent – it is only ‘constructive’ for those who are 
not ‘feared’. 
187 As discussed, while the official German response to the refugee ‘crisis’ has 
been one of welcome, this has been highly contested, with those hoping to 
wrest political control attempting to utilise historical xenophobic sentiment. 
As exemplified by the 2015-16 New Years events in Cologne, scratch the 
surface of welcome, and the deeply held fears are quickly revealed. 
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As discussed, fears of each nation take on specific narrative topoi. For 
Germany, this xenophobic fear is characterised by an ideological threat to 
German nationalism (the fears of the loss of the spirit of das Volk captured 
through the work of the Brothers Grimm, the spectre of ‘international Jewry’ 
in the Third Reich, the struggle between capitalism and communism that 
characterised the German experience of the Cold War). For the USA, racist 
fear is personified in the form of a ‘Dark Other’ (originating from the colonial 
encounters with ‘savage’ indigenous tribes, reoccurring in the subjugated 
bondage of ‘animalistic’ African Americans, and the ‘evil’ Islamic attacks on 
9/11).  
 
It would seem little wonder then, that in ‘modern’ society, which is 
characterised by the poverty that capitalism creates for the masses, and the 
loss of community ties and other such systems of social-meaning-making 
which keeps the nothingness at bay, that fear has dictated the way in which 
some aspects of these societies have responded to refugees. With some in the 
German public voicing narratives of fear surrounding the incompatibility of 
Islam with the German way of life, and some Americans (echoed by the Trump 
administration) consumed by racial fears that cause the homogenisation of 
black and brown immigrant bodies from across the globe into a dehumanised 
‘illegal alien’, these narratives have had devastating effects on the people 
whom they ‘stick’ to (Ahmed 2013), and have resulted (in the USA) in state-
sanctioned dehumanisation, and violence. It appears in these instances that 
the USA and Germany are trapped in an intractable cycle of fear, which feeds 
off its own ancestral past to create the future.    
 
Hope and Wonder: The Way Forward 
This research paints a bleak picture of the path ahead. While I have argued 
that Germany and the USA are characterised (in xenophobic and racist 
sentiments) by an emotional build-up of fear that dictates their actions in 
times of change and uncertainty, this emotion is not as intractable as it 
appears. Bar-Tal (2001) suggests that the only way that these patterns of 
violence and conflict (which result from cultural fear) might be broken is 
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through adopting a cultural orientation of hope. Ahmed (2013) suggests 
adopting what she calls an attitude of wonder, which involves a “reorientation 
of one’s relation to the world”. This shift from fear, to hope and wonder 
involves a tremendous amount of work.  
 
One of the reasons that fear is so able to take hold of particular cultures is that 
it is a physiological response that often overrides cognitive processing. Hope 
and wonder on the other hand rely on higher cognitive processing “which 
requires mental representations of future situations and, more specifically, 
setting goals, planning how to achieve them, and the use of imagery, 
creativity, cognitive flexibility” (Bar-Tal 2001:603). In Fromm’s view, to hope 
is to move towards a ‘greater aliveness’: 
Every moment existence confronts us with the alternatives of 
resurrection or death; every moment we give an answer. This answer 
lies not in what we say or think, but in what we are, how we act, where 
we are moving (Fromm 1968:17). 
Hope requires a constant active overcoming. Disconnection from the 
dominance of fear, and a cultural commitment towards hope are necessary to 
break the patterns of mistrust or violence manifest in global interactions with 
displaced peoples. 
 
Developing a collective culture of hope and wonder involves the formulation of 
new narratives, new goals towards a more connected and inclusive future 
society, one that will be kinder to all. It also necessitates the construction of 
ways through which to achieve these goals, through the use of openness, 
creativity and flexibility (Bar-Tal 2001: 620). Alison Phipps, UNESCO chair in 
refugee integration, characterises the climate of displaced peoples not as a 
‘refugee crisis’, but rather as a ‘crisis of hospitality’. Phipps emphasises the 
importance of creativity, shared emotion and shared storytelling (all of which 
have been practiced in the Glaswegian refugee reception) in constructing a 
more hopeful welcome for displaced peoples, one that is kinder both for the 
refugees themselves, and those receiving them (2020).  
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Some of these tactics of welcome were attempted in the German 2015-16 
reception of refugees. However, it is important to remember that even when an 
orientation of hope or wonder is attempted, the foundations of fear remain:  
Thus hope orientation not only needs to inhibit the automatic activation 
of memories associated with fear, but also must replace these memories 
with new beliefs and behaviours. These new beliefs must be attended, 
comprehended, accepted, learned, and practiced before they can serve 
as an alternative (Bar-Tal 2001:620). 
Germany is just beginning on its path.188 It takes time, and constant, concerted 
effort across society to create a new, hopeful shared base of cultural emotion 
(Rumford 2008). As Fromm wrote in 1968: “It is up to the people to take their 
warning seriously and to change their ways, or to remain deaf and blind - and 
to suffer” (18).     
  
What it comes down to is this, emotions are important. They drive action, and 
human interaction. Shared emotion can provide comfort and belonging, and it 
can also have devastating effects. To move forward, towards hope, fear must 
be unpacked, and new growth for change planted. Otherwise the risk remains 






188 In the USA there have also been attempts at an emotional reorientation, 
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